Jeffery Deaton v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
Jan 27 2014, 7:06 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KIRK S. FREEMAN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Law Office of Kirk Freeman Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
KARL M. SCHARNBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JEFFERY DEATON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 79A02-1306-CR-519
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE TIPPECANOE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Judge
Cause No. 79D01-1209-FB-17
January 27, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge
Case Summary
Following his guilty plea and admission that he is a habitual substance offender,
Jeffery Deaton (“Deaton”) received a thirteen-year sentence for Possession of
Methamphetamine, as a Class B felony,1 enhanced by three years due to his status as a
habitual substance offender.2 He challenges that sentence on appeal. We affirm.
Issues
Deaton presents two issues for review:
I. Whether the trial court entered an adequate sentencing statement; and
II. Whether his sentence is inappropriate.
Facts and Procedural History
On January 8, 2013, Deaton pled guilty to Possession of Methamphetamine; he also
admitted his status as a habitual substance offender. On March 8, 2013, Deaton was
sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment for the Class B felony conviction, enhanced by
three years due to his status as a habitual substance offender. Three years of his aggregate
sixteen-year sentence were suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Sentencing Statement
A person who commits a Class B felony has a sentencing range of between six and
twenty years, with the advisory term being ten years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-5. Deaton received
a sentence of three years above the advisory. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-10, a
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1.
2
I.C. § 35-50-2-10.
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person who is adjudicated a habitual substance offender is subject to an enhancement of
between three and eight years. Deaton received the minimal three-year enhancement. He
argues that the trial court failed to provide an adequate sentencing statement when imposing
the aggregate sixteen-year sentence.
“So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for
abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other
grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007) (Anglemyer II). When imposing a sentence for a
felony, the trial court must enter “a sentencing statement that includes a reasonably detailed
recitation of its reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Id. at 491. The trial court’s
reasons must be supported by the record and must not be improper as a matter of law. Id.However, a trial court’s sentencing order may no longer be challenged as reflecting an
improper weighing of sentencing factors. Id.At sentencing, the trial court articulated the relevant sentencing considerations at
length. The court observed that Deaton had pled guilty, but further stated that the mitigating
nature of the circumstance was tempered somewhat by the fact that he received a benefit in
exchange, as several charges were dismissed. The court also noted that Deaton had a history
of employment, he had cooperated with police and long-term incarceration would cause
hardship to his minor child. The trial court articulated Deaton’s significant criminal history,
discussed Deaton’s substance abuse history and his failure to submit to court-ordered
treatment in the past. The trial court concluded that past rehabilitative efforts had been
unsuccessful.
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The written sentencing order specified that the trial court found as aggravating
circumstances: Deaton’s criminal history, his violation of probation in committing the
instant offense, his substance abuse history, and the failure of prior rehabilitative efforts. The
court specified that mitigating circumstances included: Deaton’s guilty plea, his cooperation
with law enforcement, and undue hardship to his child.
As such, the trial court entered “a sentencing statement that includes a reasonably
detailed recitation of its reasons.” See id. We find no abuse of discretion.
Appropriateness of Sentence.
The authority granted to this Court by Article 7, § 6 of the Indiana Constitution
permitting appellate review and revision of criminal sentences is implemented through
Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides: “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by
statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.”
Under this rule, and as interpreted by case law, appellate courts may revise sentences
after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, if the sentence is found to be
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Cardwell
v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222-25 (Ind. 2008); Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 856-57
(Ind. 2003). The principal role of such review is to attempt to leaven the outliers. Cardwell,
895 N.E.2d at 1225.
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There is nothing particularly remarkable in the nature of Deaton’s offense of
possession of methamphetamine. As to his character, Deaton has a substantial criminal
history and a lengthy history of substance abuse, for which he has refused treatment.
Deaton’s criminal history includes six prior felony convictions and twelve prior
misdemeanor convictions. He has had probation revoked on four occasions. He was on
probation for possession of cocaine, methamphetamine, or a schedule I or II narcotic drug at
the time he committed the instant offense. Deaton reported using illegal drugs regularly,
commencing at age sixteen. Nonetheless, he failed to complete substance abuse treatment
court-ordered in 1992, 2003, and 2006.
Having reviewed the matter, we conclude that the trial court did not impose an
inappropriate sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B), and the sentence does not warrant
appellate revision. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the aggregate sixteen-year sentence
imposed by the trial court.
Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to enter an adequate sentencing
statement for a felony sentence. Deaton’s sentence is not inappropriate.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
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