In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: D.W., Minor Child, G.W., Father v. Indiana Department of Child Services ( 2013 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                            ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    STEVEN J. HALBERT                                  GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Carmel, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    ROBERT J. HENKE
    PATRICK M. RHODES
    Deputies Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF                )
    THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF:                  )
    D.W., Minor Child,                                 )
    )           Dec 19 2013, 10:02 am
    G.W., Father,                                      )
    )
    Appellant-Respondent,                       )
    )
    vs.                                )       No. 49A02-1304-JT-333
    )
    INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD                        )
    SERVICES,                                          )
    )
    Appellee-Petitioner.                        )
    APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Marilyn Moores, Judge
    The Honorable Roseanne Ang, Magistrate
    Cause No. 49D09-1210-JT-41458
    December 19, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY, Judge
    G.W. (Father) appeals the involuntarily termination of his parental rights to D.W.
    (Child). He argues the trial court’s finding that he did not complete drug treatment services
    was not supported by the evidence. We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Child was born on January 28, 2012, to Father and R.J. (Mother).1 Child was taken
    into dustody by the Department of Child Services (DCS) just after being born because
    Mother and Child tested positive for cocaine. On March 15, Father and Mother admitted
    Child was a Child in Need of Services (CHINS). The juvenile court’s dispositional order,
    issued on April 12, ordered Father to maintain suitable housing; obtain and maintain a legal
    source of income; refrain from illegal drug use or illegal drug possession; engage in home-
    based counseling; complete a parenting assessment and enroll in recommended services;
    complete a substance abuse assessment, “follow all treatments and successfully complete all
    treatment recommendations” (State’s Ex. 5); submit to random drug screens; follow the terms
    of his criminal probation; and visit with Child.
    Father completed an inpatient drug treatment program before he was ordered to do so,
    but he relapsed shortly afterward. Father’s substance abuse assessment resulted in a
    recommendation to enroll in and complete an outpatient drug treatment. Father did not enroll
    in or complete the outpatient drug treatment program. Father did not visit with Child after
    April 2012. Father obtained housing in May 2012, but he was evicted because he spent his
    1
    Mother does not appeal the involuntary termination of her parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.
    2
    rent money on crack cocaine. Father tested positive for crack cocaine several times during
    the CHINS proceedings.
    From May to September 2012, Father was placed in a halfway house program as part
    of his sentence for bank fraud in 2010. Father left the halfway house with three months left
    on his sentence, and later surrendered to U.S. Marshals. He was placed in the Marion County
    jail for three months. Father was offered the option to serve his sentence for leaving the
    halfway house by completing three years probation, paying $4,000.00 in fees, completing
    regular drug screens, attending Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings, and obtaining housing.
    Instead, Father chose to serve eleven months in prison, and was transferred to a federal
    detention center in Kentucky in December 2012. Father was scheduled to be released from
    incarceration in August 2013.
    On October 24, 2012, DCS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights to
    Child. After hearing evidence, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Father’s rights.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., 
    750 N.E.2d 832
    , 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh evidence or judge credibility of
    witnesses. In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we
    consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. 
    Id.
     In
    deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a
    judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S.,
    
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied 
    534 U.S. 1161
     (2002).
    3
    When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon,
    we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children,
    
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine first whether the evidence supports the
    findings and second whether the findings support the judgment. 
    Id.
     “Findings are clearly
    erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by
    inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 
    671 N.E.2d 98
    , 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and
    inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d at 208
    .
    “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is
    protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B., 
    666 N.E.2d 73
    , 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A trial court must subordinate the interests
    of the parents to those of the child, however, when evaluating the circumstances surrounding
    a termination. In re K.S., 
    750 N.E.2d at 837
    . The right to raise one’s own child should not be
    terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, 
    id.,
     but parental rights
    may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental
    responsibilities. 
    Id. at 836
    .
    To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, the State is required to allege and
    prove:
    (A) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
    months under a dispositional decree.
    (ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable
    efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required,
    including a description of the court’s finding, the date of the finding,
    and the manner in which the finding was made.
    (iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under the
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    supervision of a county office of family and children or probation
    department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-
    two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the
    home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of
    services or a delinquent child;
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in
    the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of
    the parents will not be remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-
    child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a
    child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
    (b)(2). The State must prove these allegations by clear and convincing
    evidence. In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied. If the court finds
    the allegations in the petition are true, it must terminate the parent-child relationship. 
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8
    .
    Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings
    under 
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
    (b)(2)(B)(i), which requires DCS to prove the conditions under
    which the child was removed would not be remedied. In making such a determination, a
    juvenile court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the
    termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T.,
    
    742 N.E.2d 509
    , 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. It must evaluate the parent’s
    habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future
    neglect or deprivation. 
    Id.
     Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of
    a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide
    5
    support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of
    Family & Children, 
    762 N.E.2d 1244
    , 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The juvenile
    court may also properly consider, as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied, the
    services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent’s response to those services. 
    Id.
     A
    juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle
    such that his or her physical, mental, and social growth are permanently impaired before
    terminating the parent-child relationship. In re E.S., 
    762 N.E.2d 1287
    , 1290 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2002).
    Father challenges the findings regarding his participation in substance abuse treatment
    programs and his ability to procure stable housing on his release from prison:
    9.     Subsequent to his discharge from inpatient drug treatment in mid-
    March of 2012, [Father] submitted to a drug and alcohol assessment
    with Laura Kolbus, chemical dependency assessor with Families First.
    Based on [Father’s] disclosures of using $50 to $100 worth of crack
    cocaine three to four times per week, using illicit substances for 34
    years and trying to quit in the past without being able to maintain long-
    term sobriety, Ms. Kolbus recommended that [Father] participate in a
    four-month IOP program.              [Father] failed to follow the
    recommendations of this assessment and has not engaged in additional
    drug treatment. [Father’s] last use of illegal substances occurred in
    October of 2012.
    ***
    17.    [Family Case Manager] Burroughs believes that adoption is in [Child’s]
    best interest as her parents have not changed the circumstances that led
    to the filing of [Child’s] CHINS matter. Neither parent has received
    treatment for their long-term use of illicit substances or obtained stable
    housing. . . .
    18.    The children’s [sic] guardian ad litem, Alane Singleton, believes that
    adoption is in [Child’s] best interest as her parents have not addressed
    their drug issues, have not seen [Child] in nearly one year and have no
    relationship with her. . . .
    ***
    6
    20.    There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
    removal of [Child] or the reasons for continued placement outside the
    home of her parents, [Mother] and [Father], will not be remedied.
    [Mother] and [Father] have been offered drug treatment services by the
    Indiana Department of Child Services under two separate causes of
    action and each individual continues to use illicit substances. [Finding
    about Mother]. [Father] has an extensive history of drug usage, has
    failed to participate in drug treatment to address his continued use of
    illicit substances, is currently incarcerated and has ceased any attempt at
    contact with the [C]hild.
    (App. at 19-20.)
    Father argues the juvenile court’s findings regarding his participation in substance
    abuse treatment programs and his ability to secure stable housing are not supported by the
    evidence. During the evidentiary hearing, Father testified he successfully completed an
    inpatient substance abuse treatment program before he was ordered to do so by DCS, he
    participated in Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings prior to his
    incarceration, and he was in the process of completing a twelve-step substance abuse
    treatment program in prison. He also testified he had secured living arrangements with his
    older brother once he was released from incarceration, he received income from Social
    Security, and he would obtain employment once his health improved.
    The trial court noted Father completed a drug treatment program, but there was
    evidence he relapsed thereafter. DCS presented evidence Father was ordered to attend a
    specific treatment program, and he did not. At the time of the termination hearing, Father
    was incarcerated with a possible release date of August 2013. He testified he would be living
    with a family member, but presented no other evidence confirming that arrangement and the
    7
    suitability thereof. The trial court is obliged to judge the credibility of the witnesses before it
    and base its decision on its assessment thereof, but it need not view the evidence in the same
    way a party requests. See Bergman v. Knox Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 
    750 N.E.2d 809
    , 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (juvenile court is not required to give the same weight to
    certain testimony as the parent may desire). Father’s arguments are invitations for us to
    reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d at 265
     (appellate
    court cannot reweigh evidence or judge credibility of witnesses). Accordingly, we affirm the
    involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights to Child.
    Affirmed.
    RILEY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
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