Patrick Wiese v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Apr 08 2013, 9:52 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
VALERIE K. BOOTS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
J.T. WHITEHEAD
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
PATRICK WIESE, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1207-CR-595
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Rebekah F. Pierson-Treacy, Judge
The Honorable Shatrese M. Flowers, Commissioner
Cause No. 49F19-1201-CM-3720
April 8, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge
Case Summary
Patrick Wiese (“Wiese”) presents this discretionary interlocutory appeal from the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained when Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department Officer Adam Jones (“Officer Jones”) entered his apartment while
responding to a report of a disturbance. Wiese presents one issue for our review, which we
restate as whether the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence was improper
because Officer Jones’s entry into the apartment violated Wiese’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On January 17, 2012, Officer Jones responded to a report of a verbal disturbance at an
apartment building at 4945 Edinborough Lane, in Marion County, Indiana. A resident on the
second floor of the apartment building reported a verbal disturbance on the third floor.
Immediately upon entering the front door of the building on the first floor, Officer Jones
heard a loud male voice screaming or yelling.
After locating the third-floor apartment from which the noise was emanating, Officer
Jones knocked on the door. A male voice asked who was at the door, and Officer Jones
identified himself as a police officer. Officer Jones heard something moving inside the
apartment, and after waiting a short time and receiving no answer at the door, he knocked
again. The voice again asked who was at the door, and Officer Jones again identified himself
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as a police officer.
After Officer Jones knocked a third time, Wiese, who appeared angry and agitated,
opened the door slightly. Officer Jones explained that there was a report of a disturbance, to
which Wiese replied that there was no disturbance. When asked if there was anyone else in
the apartment, Wiese replied that there was. Through the partially-opened door, Officer
Jones could see only the front living room area, so he asked Wiese for permission to enter the
apartment “to check on the welfare of everybody inside.” (Tr. at 12.) Wiese refused.
Throughout this encounter, Wiese was still yelling, and appeared to be agitated.
Fearing that Wiese would slam the door in his face, Officer Jones placed his foot
between the door and the doorframe. They discussed whether Officer Jones could enter the
apartment for another ten or fifteen seconds, at which point Officer Jones forced the door
open with Wiese still behind the door. Officer Jones secured Wiese in handcuffs and
checked the inside of the apartment, where he found another man who was uninjured.
Officer Jones arrested Wiese for Resisting Law Enforcement. The same day, the State
charged Wiese with Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Class A Misdemeanor.1
On May 25, 2012, Wiese filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that Officer
Jones’s entry into Wiese’s apartment was illegal and that all evidence obtained from the
entry, including the testimony of Officer Jones, should be suppressed from evidence at trial.
A hearing was conducted on Wiese’s motion on June 7, 2012, at the conclusion of which the
1
Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 (2011). The relevant statutory provision was recodified as Indiana Code section
35-44.1-3-1, effective July 1, 2012. We refer to the statutory provision in effect at the time of the alleged
offense.
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trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence.
On July 2, 2012, Wiese moved the trial court to certify its order for interlocutory
appeal, which the trial court granted on July 6, 2012. We accepted jurisdiction, and this
appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
Wiese brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, contending that Officer Jones’s entry into his apartment violated the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress similarly to other sufficiency
issues. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Ind. 2005). We determine whether
substantial evidence of probative value exists to support the trial court’s ruling. Id. We
review de novo a trial court’s ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we
give deference to a trial court’s determination of the facts, which will not be overturned
unless clearly erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008). Thus, we do
not reweigh the evidence, but consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s
ruling. Id. However, in reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we must also consider
uncontested evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Jackson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 615,
618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. We will affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is
sustainable on any legal grounds that are apparent in the record. Richardson v. State, 848
N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
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Federal Constitution
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part, that
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the legitimate expectations of
privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings. Taylor v.
State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006) (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)).
The principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant
requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, and therefore searches and seizures inside a
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Alspach v. State, 755 N.E.2d 209,
212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The State bears the burden of proving that a
warrantless search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. Taylor, 842 N.E.2d
at 330. Whether a particular warrantless search violates the guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. State v. Joe, 693 N.E.2d
573, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.
The existence of exigent circumstances is among the exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 936 (Ind. 2006). A warrant is unnecessary
when the “‘exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that
the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. at 936–
37 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Under the exigent circumstances exception, police may enter a residence without a
warrant if the situation suggests a reasonable belief that someone inside the residence is in
need of aid. Smock v. State, 766 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Vitek v. State,
750 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Ind. 2001)). However, an officer's subjective belief that exigent
circumstances exist is insufficient to justify a warrantless entry. Cudworth v. State, 818
N.E.2d 133, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Rather, the test is objective, and the
State must establish that the circumstances as they appear at the moment of entry would lead
a reasonable, experienced law enforcement officer to believe that someone inside the house
or apartment required immediate assistance. Id.
Moreover, “while exigent circumstances justify dispensing with a search warrant, they
do not eliminate the need for probable cause.” Id. at 140. In an emergency, the probable
cause element may be satisfied where the officer reasonably believes that a person is in
danger. Id. at 140-41. “The burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent
circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all
warrantless home entries.” McDermott v. State, 877 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied.
The evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling indicates that Officer Jones was
at the apartment building responding to a report of a domestic disturbance. From the first
floor entryway of the apartment building, he heard a male voice screaming or yelling
somewhere on the third floor. When he knocked on the apartment door he twice received no
response other than a voice asking who was at the door, and he heard the sound of something
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moving inside the apartment. When Wiese finally opened the door slightly, he told Officer
Jones, in a loud and agitated voice, that there was no disturbance, that there was someone
else in the apartment, but that Officer Jones could not enter the apartment.
From these circumstances, a reasonable, experienced law enforcement officer could
reasonably believe that, at the moment Officer Jones entered the apartment, someone inside
the apartment required immediate assistance, and that person was in danger. Officer Jones
had probable cause to enter Wiese’s residence, and his doing so was not a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. We cannot conclude that the trial court erred in denying Wiese’s motion
to suppress evidence in this respect.
Indiana Constitution
Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution states, in relevant part, that “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search and seizure, shall not be violated[.]” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. The
purpose of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution is “to protect from unreasonable
police activity those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private.” Brown v. State, 653
N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1995).
Our state provision tracks the language of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution verbatim. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). However, the
legality of a governmental intrusion under the Indiana Constitution turns on an evaluation of
the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances. Id.
Although there may be other relevant considerations under the circumstances, the
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reasonableness of a search or seizure turns on a balancing of the following: (1) the degree of
concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the
method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities; and (3) the extent
of law enforcement needs. Id. at 361. The burden is on the State to show that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the police intrusion was reasonable. State v. Gerschoffer, 763
N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. 2002).
Here, Officer Jones was at the apartment building responding to a report of a domestic
disturbance, and he heard screaming or yelling coming from the third floor while he was on
the first floor. After Officer Jones knocked on the door and made two attempts to elicit a
response, Wiese finally opened the door slightly and told Officer Jones, in a loud and agitated
voice, that there was no disturbance, that there was someone else in the apartment, but that
Officer Jones could not enter the apartment. Thus, the degree of concern, suspicion, or
knowledge that a violation had occurred was high, as was Officer Jones’s need to enter the
apartment to verify the welfare of its occupants.
When asked for permission to enter the apartment, Wiese refused. Officer Jones
placed his foot between the door and the doorframe, forced the door open with Wiese still
behind the door, and secured Wiese in handcuffs. Thus, the degree of intrusion undoubtedly
was high. However, this concern was, under the totality of the circumstances, outweighed by
law enforcement concerns, and the need to verify the safety of the occupants inside the
apartment.
For these reasons, we conclude that Officer Jones’s entry into Wiese’s residence was
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reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, and thus was not a violation of Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, we cannot agree that the trial court erred
in denying Wiese’s motion to suppress evidence in this respect.
Conclusion
Wiese’s rights were not violated under either the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Thus, the trial court
did not err in denying Wiese’s motion to suppress evidence.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
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