In Re the Paternity of: L.M.J. b/n/f, D.R.D. v. C.A.J. ( 2013 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of
    Dec 11 2013, 9:28 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                            ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
    DAN J. MAY                                         CRAIG PERSINGER
    Kokomo, Indiana                                    Marion, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    IN RE THE PATERNITY OF:                            )
    L.M.J. b/n/f                                       )
    )
    D.R.D.,                                            )
    )
    Appellant-Respondent,                    )
    )
    vs.                               )        No. 34A02-1305-JP-458
    )
    C.A.J.,                                            )
    )
    Appellee-Petitioner.                     )
    INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE HOWARD CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Thomas C. Perrone, Special Judge
    Cause No. 34C01-9507-JP-72
    December 11, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BRADFORD, Judge
    CASE SUMMARY
    Appellant-Respondent D.R.D. (“Mother”) and Appellee-Petitioner C.A.J. (“Father”)
    are the parents of L.M.J. (“Daughter”). In 1998, the trial court issued an order (the “1998
    Order”) regarding the support of Daughter. Under the terms of the 1998 Order, Father was
    obligated to pay $94.00 weekly in child support. Father was also obligated to pay additional
    child support when certain conditions were met. In October of 2011, Mother filed a motion
    for a rule to show cause, claiming that Father had failed to pay child support beyond his
    $94.00 weekly obligation pursuant to the terms of the 1998 Order. Mother appeals following
    the denial of her request for summary judgment on this issue. We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Mother and Father are the parents of Daughter who was born on October 3, 1994. In
    an order dated July 10, 1998, the trial court determined that Father’s weekly gross income
    was $448.00. Based on this weekly gross income, the trial court ordered Father to pay child
    support in the amount of $94.00 weekly. The trial court also recognized that Father had a
    history of earning additional income due to overtime opportunities and bonuses, and set forth
    certain conditions under which Father would become obligated to pay additional child
    support.
    On October 25, 2011, Mother moved for a rule to show cause, claiming that Father
    had failed to pay child support beyond his $94.00 weekly obligation pursuant to the terms of
    the 1998 Order. Mother subsequently filed a motion seeking summary judgment on her
    motion for a rule to show cause. On November 14, 2012, the trial court heard argument from
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    the parties regarding Mother’s summary judgment request. At the conclusion of the hearing,
    the trial court took the matter under advisement.
    On February 26, 2013, the trial court issued an order denying Mother’s request for
    summary judgment. In doing so, the trial court stated that it was “not persuaded by
    [Mother’s] interpretation of [the 1998 Order] and submission of how to do the calculation of
    the support due.” Appellant’s App. pp. 18-19. The trial court further stated that “an
    additional hearing is needed to determine the proper amounts to be included in a calculation
    of overtime opportunities and/or bonuses.” Appellant’s App. p. 19. Mother subsequently
    sought, and was granted, permission to bring the instant interlocutory appeal.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    Mother contends that the trial court erroneously denied her motion for summary
    judgment.
    Pursuant to Rule 56(C) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, summary
    judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
    when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When
    reviewing a decision to grant summary judgment, this court applies the same
    standard as the trial court. Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 
    714 N.E.2d 702
    ,
    705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). We must determine whether there is a genuine issue
    of material fact requiring trial, and whether the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. 
    Id.
     Neither the trial court nor the reviewing court
    may look beyond the evidence specifically designated to the trial court. 
    Id.
    A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden to make a prima
    facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. American Management, Inc. v.
    MIF Realty, L.P., 
    666 N.E.2d 424
    , 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Once the moving
    party satisfies this burden through evidence designated to the trial court
    pursuant to Trial Rule 56, the non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings,
    but must designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine
    issue for trial. 
    Id.
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    Heritage Dev. of Ind., Inc. v. Opportunity Options, Inc., 
    773 N.E.2d 881
    , 887-88 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2002). Upon review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment, this
    court stands in the shoes of the trial court and considers only those materials properly
    designated before the trial court pursuant to Trial Rule 56. Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 
    930 N.E.2d 1
    , 6 (Ind. 2010). The party appealing the trial court’s denial of summary judgment
    bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court erred. New Albany-Floyd Cnty. Educ.
    Ass’n v. Ammerman, 
    724 N.E.2d 251
    , 256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
    In challenging the trial court’s denial of her motion for summary Judgment, Mother
    claims that the language of the 1998 Order is unambiguous. Mother also claims that the only
    reasonable interpretation of the language of the 1998 Order was that proffered by Mother,
    and that by rejecting Mother’s proffered interpretation, the trial court impermissibly modified
    the 1998 Order. We disagree.
    Although, like a divorce decree, an order establishing a parent’s child support
    obligation may be considered final, in the case of an alleged ambiguity, we must interpret the
    order as we do any other contract. See Overholtzer v. Overholtzer, 
    884 N.E.2d 358
    , 361 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2008).
    The interpretation and construction of contract provisions is a function for the
    courts. On appeal, our standard of review is essentially the same as that
    employed by the trial court. Unless the terms of a contract are ambiguous, they
    will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Niccum v. Niccum, 
    734 N.E.2d 637
    , 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The terms of a contract are not ambiguous
    merely because controversy exists between the parties concerning the proper
    interpretation of terms. 
    Id.
     Where the terms of a contract are clear and
    unambiguous, the terms are conclusive and we will not construe the contract or
    look at extrinsic evidence, but will merely apply the contractual provisions. 
    Id.
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    Id.
     Furthermore, when trying to ascertain the intent of the parties, the court will read the
    contract as a whole and will make all attempts to construe the language in the contract so as
    not to render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless. The Winterton, LLC v.
    Winterton Investors, LLC, 900 N.E.2d. 754, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. “The
    court must accept an interpretation of the contract that harmonizes its provisions rather than
    one that causes the provisions to conflict.” 
    Id.
    Here, the relevant portions of the 1998 Order read as follows:
    5.      The Court finds that [Father’s] child support obligation herein
    should be and is herein modified to the sum of ninety-four dollars ($94.00) per
    week, which sum is determined by an application of the Indiana Child Support
    Guidelines to the following findings:
    a.    [Father’s] weekly gross income based on a 40 hour work
    week is $448.00[.]
    …
    7.      The Court further finds that [Father] has a history of earning
    additional income due to overtime opportunities and/or bonuses, and that in
    addition to his regular weekly support of $94.00 per week, he shall pay
    additional sums for support on a periodic basis. Said additional sums shall be
    calculated as follows: 15% of [his] gross income in excess of $448.00 per
    week. Said additional support shall be paid no less than quarterly, with
    payment due for the preceding quarter within ten (10) days of January 1, April
    1, July 1, and October 1 of each year.
    Appellant’s App. pp. 21-22.
    Mother argues that paragraph seven provides that Father was required to pay
    additional child support in the amount of 15% of all gross income in excess of $448.00,
    irrespective of how said gross income was earned. Mother’s argued interpretation of Father’s
    child support obligation would require the court to read the provisions of paragraph seven
    separately, as opposed to as a whole. This we should not do. Again, in trying to interpret
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    contractual language, this court reads the document as a whole and attempts to construe the
    language therein so as not to render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless.
    See Winterton, 900 N.E.2d at 759. In doing so, we accept the interpretation of the document
    that harmonizes its provisions rather than cause them to be in conflict. Id.
    Reading all relevant portions of the 1998 Order together, we are convinced that the
    additional support obligation set forth in the 1998 Order is dependent upon additional gross
    income that was earned through “overtime opportunities and/or bonuses.” Appellant’s App.
    p. 21. The first sentence of paragraph seven explicitly states that Father “has a history of
    earning additional income due to overtime opportunities and/or bonuses, and that in addition
    to his regular weekly support of $94.00 per week, he shall pay additional sums for support on
    a periodic basis.” Appellant’s App. pp. 21-22. The court used the word “and” to connect the
    explanation of how Father earned the additional income to its statement he shall pay
    additional support on a periodic basis. This connection leads to the reasonable interpretation
    that the trial court intended to base the additional child support obligation upon the earning of
    additional income through overtime opportunities and bonuses.
    The second sentence of paragraph seven goes on to state that “[s]aid additional sums
    shall be calculated as follows: 15% of [his] gross income in excess of $448.00 per week.”
    Appellant’s App. p. 22. The second sentence clearly refers back to the first sentence. As
    such, when read together, these sentences indicate that Father’s obligation to pay additional
    child support was dependent upon his earning additional gross income through “overtime
    opportunities and/or bonuses.” Appellant’s App. p. 21. Acceptance of Mother’s contrary
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    interpretation would, in effect, amount to a retroactive modification of the 1998 Order
    through an unreasonable interpretation of the language.
    Because we conclude that the 1998 Order, when read as a whole, indicates that
    Father’s obligation to pay additional child support is dependent upon his earning additional
    gross income through bonuses and/or overtime opportunities, we conclude that the trial court
    did not err in denying Mother’s request for summary judgment. Furthermore, it is important
    to note that had Mother believed that Father’s base gross pay had increased at any time after
    the 1998 Order went into effect, Mother could have raised the issue with the trial court by
    requesting a modification of the 1998 Order. Mother, however, chose not to do so.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    MATHIAS, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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