State of Indiana v. Bobby Walden ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
GREGORY F. ZOELLER KAREN CELESTINO-HORSEMAN
Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
KATHERINE M. COOPER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Apr 04 2013, 9:32 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1211-CR-566
)
BOBBY WALDEN, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Marc T. Rothenberg, Judge
Cause No. 49F09-1109-FD-69637
April 4, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Plaintiff, the State of Indiana (State), appeals the trial court’s grant of
Appellee-Defendant’s, Bobby Walden (Walden), motion to dismiss.
We reverse and remand.
ISSUE
The State raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it granted Walden’s motion to dismiss the charges as a matter
of law.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Nicholas Caldwell (Caldwell) lived at the Latitudes Apartments in Indianapolis,
Indiana from March or April 2010, until his landlord evicted him in December 2010. In
July or August of 2010, Caldwell started living at his fiancée’s residence while still
maintaining his apartment as his legal address. At some point in September 2010,
Caldwell became unemployed. Aware that his landlord might commence eviction
proceedings, Caldwell began moving his belongings from the apartment.
On November 15, 2010, Caldwell’s landlord filed a summons and notice of claim
for possession of real estate. On November 29, 2010, a notice to move was filed with the
trial court which provided that Caldwell must vacate his apartment on or before 6:00 p.m.
on December 6, 2010. Sometime between Thanksgiving and Christmas 2010, Caldwell
visited his apartment. He did not notice the summons or notice on the apartment door
during this visit.
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On December 22, 2010, Caldwell’s landlord requested Jones Movers to move and
store the personal property from Caldwell’s apartment. That day, Candace Jones (Jones),
co-owner of Jones Movers, received a phone call from her son-in-law who was at
Caldwell’s apartment supervising the eviction, informing her that “the constable was
dirty.” (Appellant’s App. p. 187). Walden was the police officer supervising the eviction
proceedings. Jones’ son-in-law told her that a watch, cigars, and cigar cutters were
missing and he believed Walden had taken them. He also advised Jones that Walden
“had told [him] that if [they] wanted to continue working in Franklin Township, this is
how things were going to be from now on.” (Appellant’s App. p. 188). Generally, after
taking items removed during an eviction to storage, Jones would contact the owner of the
items within thirty days. The company would keep the property for ninety days before
sending a certified letter to the owner, giving him an additional thirty days to pay the
storage fees and recover the property. If the items would not be claimed within that
period, Jones would advertise the items in the newspaper and auction them ten days later.
Caldwell was not present during the eviction and only learned that his belongings
had been moved to storage after a police detective contacted him about the possible theft.
In February 2011, Caldwell emailed Jones about paying the balance owed and taking
inventory of the remaining items to determine if anything else was missing. Jones
forwarded him the requested information and also told him that he needed to contact the
detective as the detective would have to be present when Caldwell accessed the storage
unit. On March 1, 2011, Caldwell sent Jones another email requesting to go through his
belongings the following day and to notify the detective if needed. In May of 2011,
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Jones sent Caldwell an email informing him that the items were scheduled to be sold at
auction on June 7, 2011 and that he needed to contact her as soon as possible if Caldwell
wanted to retrieve his belongings.
During his deposition, Caldwell testified that after he lost his employment in
September, he could not afford to move his belongings into storage. He stated “I thought
they were going to be donated or thrown away . . . And, I mean there was nothing I could
do at that point.” (Appellant’s App. p. 117). When questioned by Walden’s attorney
whether he considered his belongings that were left behind in the apartment as “kind of
abandoned,” Caldwell replied, “Yeah.” (Appellant’s App. p. 118).
On September 30, 2011, the State filed an Information charging Walden with
Count I, theft, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-43-4-2 and Count II, official misconduct, a
Class D felony, I.C. § 35-44-1-2. On October 5, 2012, Walden filed a motion to dismiss,
together with a memorandum in support. On October 15, 2012, the trial court granted
Walden’s motion as a matter of law, concluding in pertinent part as follows:
As [Walden] points out, according to the testimony in [Caldwell’s]
deposition, [Caldwell] considered the property that the State alleges stolen
to be, in fact, abandoned. The State responds to this by citing to bailment
law, arguing that [Caldwell] retained an ownership interest in the alleged
stolen property. While a well thought out and considered argument, the
court finds that at the time of the alleged theft and misconduct, a bailment
did not exist, and that by his actions, as he even considered it so, [Caldwell]
had abandoned his property and therefore had no ownership interest in it on
December 22, 2010, the date of the offense. Therefore, the charges . . .
would fail on their face as it would be impossible, under law, for the State
to meet its burden on the elements in Counts 1 and 2 of “exerting
unauthorized control over the property of another person[.]”
(Appellant’s App. pp. 222-23).
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The State now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted
Walden’s motion and dismissed the charging Information. On appeal, the court will
review a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss an information for an abuse of
discretion. Johnson v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). In reviewing a
trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, we reverse only where the decision is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.
The State appeals pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-34-1-4, which enumerates
the grounds for dismissing an information or indictment and which provides, in relevant
part:
(a) The court may, upon motion of the defendant, dismiss the indictment or
information upon any of the following grounds:
(1) The indictment or information, or any count thereof, is defective under
section 6 of this chapter.
(2) Misjoinder of offenses or parties defendant, or duplicity of allegation in
counts.
(3) The grand jury proceeding was defective.
(4) the indictment or information does not state the offense with sufficient
certainty.
(5) The facts stated did not constitute an offense.
(6) The defendant has immunity with respect to the offense charged.
(7) The prosecution is barred by reason of a previous prosecution.
(8) The prosecution is untimely brought.
(9) The defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial.
(10) There exists some jurisdictional impediment to conviction of the
defendant for the offense charged.
(11) Any other ground that is a basis for dismissal as a matter of law.
As a general rule, when a defendant files a motion to dismiss an information, the
facts alleged in the information are to be taken as true. State v. Gill, 949 N.E.2d 848, 850
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(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Questions of fact to be decided at trial or facts constituting a
defense are not properly raised by a motion to dismiss. State v. Isaacs, 794 N.E.2d 1120,
1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In Houser v. State, 622 N.E.2d 987, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993),
we determined that it is improper for a trial court to grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss
an information when it is based on the sufficiency of the evidence.
Not challenging the propriety of the actual indictment, Walden supported his
motion to dismiss by referencing Caldwell’s deposition testimony. Specifically, Walden
asserts that he has a defense against the charge of theft and official misconduct because
he could not knowingly exert unauthorized control over Caldwell’s belongings with the
intent to deprive Caldwell of any part of that property because Caldwell had abandoned
his property at the moment Walden took it.
In Isaacs, the defendant was charged with operating a vehicle while under the
influence of a controlled substance. Isaacs, 794 N.E.2d at 1122. Moving for a dismissal,
he alleged that he had a valid prescription for that controlled substance. Id. The trial
court granted his motion. Id. We reversed because we considered Isaacs’ claim to be a
factually-based defense which must be decided at trial, not resolved in a pre-trial motion
to dismiss. Id.
Likewise here, the question whether Caldwell had abandoned his property and
thus relinquished ownership and possession of his belongings is a factual dispute which
cannot be settled by a pre-trial motion. While Walden challenges whether Caldwell
could be the victim of theft after abandoning his property, the State refers to other
evidence indicating that Caldwell had not relinquished his belongings. Caldwell’s
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deposition testimony indicates that he only learned that he had been evicted and his
property moved to storage when a detective contacted him about a possible theft.
Thereafter, the email exchange between Jones and Caldwell establishes that Caldwell
intended to reclaim his belongings and worked towards getting the storage fees paid. By
alleging in the motion to dismiss that Caldwell had abandoned his property at the time of
the eviction and the purported theft by Walden, Walden disputes the sufficiency of the
evidence. As a motion to dismiss is an improper vehicle to decide questions of fact, we
reverse the trial court’s grant of Walden’s motion to dismiss and remand to the trial court
for further proceedings.1 See Caesar v. State, 964 N.E.2d 911, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012),
trans. denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
granting Walden’s motion to dismiss.
Reversed and remanded.
BAKER, J. and BARNES, J. concur
1
Because we reverse on the basis that Walden’s asserted defense amounted to a question of the
sufficiency of the evidence, we do not need to address the merits of the State’s claim that (1) the trial
court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing and (2) proof of absolute ownership is not required
for purposes of a theft charge.
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