John W. Taylor, IV v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 03 2013, 8:26 am
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
GARY L. GRINER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Mishawaka, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KELLY A. MIKLOS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JOHN W. TAYLOR, IV, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 20A03-1208-CR-365
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Terry C. Shewmaker, Judge
Cause No. 20C01-1110-FA-20
April 3, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, John W. Taylor, IV (Taylor), appeals his conviction for
three Counts of attempted murder, Class A felonies, Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1(1) & -41-5-
1.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Taylor raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State
presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Taylor’s conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 26, 2011, Chamar Jackson (Jackson) and Avery Copeland (Copeland)
walked to a fast food restaurant in Elkhart County, Indiana to visit their friend, Chynna
Sipili (Sipili), who was employed there. When they arrived at the restaurant, Taylor was
standing near the soda dispensers. Taylor and Sipili had just split up the previous day
after Sipili had sent him a text message informing him that she needed space. When
Jackson approached the counter to speak with Sipili, he was stared down by Taylor who
told him to stop talking to his girlfriend. Jackson continued to talk to Sipili, and Taylor
stormed angrily out of the restaurant. Thereafter, Jackson and Copeland returned to
Copeland’s house. Michael Raeder (Raeder) noticed them standing outside the residence
and pulled up in his vehicle. Jackson and Copeland got in Raeder’s car, intending to
smoke marijuana together.
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Approximately ten to thirty minutes after Jackson and Copeland had left the fast
food restaurant, Taylor returned and angrily confronted Sipili. He told her, “I swear to
God after work I’ll kill you and them niggas.” (Transcript p. 340). Taylor again stormed
out of the restaurant.
Meanwhile, Jackson, Copeland, and Raeder were sitting in Raeder’s vehicle.
Raeder was in the driver’s seat, Jackson in the front passenger seat, and Copeland was in
the rear seat on the driver’s side. While they were talking, Taylor drove up in his car. He
pulled up next to Raeder’s car and jumped out, carrying a large black rifle. He rapidly
approached Raeder’s vehicle. He walked to the driver’s side of the car and stopped
approximately ten feet away. Without saying anything, Taylor first started firing into the
passenger compartment where Copeland was sitting. He then fired into the driver’s seat.
The vehicle became “riddled with bullets” and both of the driver’s side windows were
shot out. (Tr. p. 490). Jackson jumped out of the car and rolled underneath, Copeland
laid flat on the backseat, and Raeder curled up into a ball with his hands up, then opened
the door of the car and tried to crawl to the trunk. As Taylor walked around the car firing
the rifle, he lowered his aim from the window level down into the body of the car.
Following the shooting, police officers and ambulances arrived at Copeland’s house.
Jackson was not injured, Copeland was shot in the back, and Raeder received a shrapnel
wound to the head and a bullet penetrated his right arm above the elbow.
After the shooting, Taylor went to his sister’s apartment where he spoke with
Sarah Lemon (Lemon). He told Lemon that he thought he had killed Jackson. Police
officers also found a note, written by Taylor, which read, “I’m Killin’ niggas put em’ in
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the dirt . . . The choppa is under the cough . . . Domo.” (State’s Exh. 21). The police
searched Taylor’s sister’s home and found a black rifle under her couch in the living
room. Ten shell casings and bullet fragments recovered from the scene were later
determined to have been fired from the rifle recovered by the police.
On October 31, 2011, the State filed an Information charging Taylor with three
Counts of attempted murder, class A felonies, I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1(1) & -41-5-1. On July 9,
2012, a jury trial was conducted. At the close of the evidence, the jury found Taylor
guilty as charged. On August 9, 2012, the trial court sentenced Taylor to thirty-five years
on Count I, Forty years on Count II, to be served consecutive to Count I, and forty years
on Count III, to be served concurrently to Count II.
Taylor now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Taylor contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction for three Counts of attempted murder, Class A
felonies. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court does not reweigh
the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208,
212-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. We will consider only the evidence most
favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom and will
affirm if the evidence and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative
value to support the judgment. See id. at 213. Reversal is appropriate only when
reasonable persons would not be able to form inferences as to each material element of
the offense. Id.
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To convict Taylor of attempted murder, the State was required to establish beyond
a reasonable doubt that Taylor acted with the specific intent to kill each of the three
victims and that he engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the killing.
I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1; -41-5-1. Intent to kill may be inferred from the nature of the attack
and the circumstances surrounding the crime. Gall v. State, 811 N.E.2d 969, 975 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The intent to kill may also be inferred from the use of a
deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury. Id. Likewise, an
assailant’s words may be indicative of an intent to kill the victim. Tancil v. State, 956
N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Focusing on the nature of the attack, Taylor asserts that “[a]t such close range, had
[he] really intended to kill, he would have inflicted more serious injury or death” to the
three victims. (Appellant’s Br. p. 5). Because the injuries were not severe, Taylor asserts
that he did not have the requisite intent to kill; rather, he committed a reckless act by
firing a rifle at close range to people.
We find that the fact that the victims’ injuries were not more severe merely proves
that Taylor is a bad marksman; his actions and words clearly belie his intent to kill the
three occupants of the vehicle. When he approached Raeder’s car, he walked up to the
driver’s side and started firing indiscriminately. He methodically walked around the car,
moving his aim from window level down to the body of the car. When he stopped firing,
the vehicle was riddled with bullets and both of the driver’s side windows were shot out.
The rifle was so powerful that a bullet penetrated the outside wall of Copeland’s
residence, 172 feet away, and was located in an inner hallway of the house. Prior to the
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shooting, Taylor had told Sipili that he would kill her “and them niggas.” (Transcript p.
340). Later, after the shooting, Taylor told Lemon that he thought he had killed Jackson.
And in a note, Taylor stated, “I’m Killin’ niggas[.]” (State’s Exh. 21).
Based on the facts surrounding the shooting, including Taylor’s own statements
and conduct, the jury could reasonably infer that Taylor acted with the intent to kill
Jackson, Copeland, and Raeder.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
to sustain Taylor’s conviction for three Counts of attempted murder.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J. and BARNES, J. concur
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