Antwon Davis v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), Aug 15 2013, 5:37 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the purpose
of establishing the defense of res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law
of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BRIAN J. MAY GREGORY F. ZOELLER
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ANTWON DAVIS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 71A03-1304-CR-130
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable John M. Marnocha, Judge
Cause No. 71D02-1012-FC-282
August 15, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Antwon Davis appeals his conviction for Class C felony child molesting. We
affirm.
Issue
The sole issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
prohibited Davis from reading ten pages of a United States Supreme Court opinion
during his closing argument.
Facts
During early December 2010, Davis was living in South Bend with his girlfriend
Sharon Weatherall. Weatherall’s daughter, S.W., who was seven years old, went to sleep
in her mother’s bed one evening. Davis lay in bed with S.W. and touched S.W.’s vagina.
The next day, S.W. went to school and told her teacher about the incident with Davis.
The school contacted Child Protective Services and the St. Joseph County Police
Department.
Detective Dave Sult of the St. Joseph County Police Department called Davis and
told Davis that he wanted to meet with him. Davis met with Detective Sult on December
14, 2010. Detective Sult used the “Reid” technique to interview Davis, which is a
method of interrogation that involves nine steps to get the “truth out.” Tr. p. 209.
Detective Sult received special training in that area; this method is often used by law
enforcement to question suspects. He initially built a rapport with Davis and, after some
conversation, advised Davis of his Miranda rights. Davis voluntarily signed a Miranda
waiver, and Detective Sult questioned him about the incident. Initially, he denied
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touching S.W. and, after further interrogation, eventually admitted to inappropriately
touching her. The interview lasted approximately one hour.
Davis was arrested and charged with Class C felony child molesting. On February
26, 2013, during his jury trial, Davis testified that he did not touch S.W. inappropriately,
that the reason he said he did was because he was angry with Detective Sult, and that
Detective Sult made him say it. Prior to the closing arguments, Davis’s counsel indicated
that he wanted to read aloud ten pages from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct.
1602 (1966), to the jury, but the trial court prohibited him from doing so. The jury found
Davis guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to four years executed. He now appeals.
Analysis
Davis claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited him from
reading ten pages of Miranda during his closing argument. “Control of final argument is
assigned to the discretion of the trial judge.” Rouster v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1342, 1347
(Ind. 1992). Unless there is an abuse of this discretion that is clearly prejudicial to the
rights of the accused, the trial court ruling will not be disturbed. Emerson v. State, 952
N.E.2d 832, 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) trans. denied. We will not find an abuse of
discretion unless the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances before it. Id. Among matters within a trial court’s discretion is
whether to allow a defendant’s attorney to read from appellate court decisions as part of
closing argument. Schlabach v. State, 459 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting
Lax v. State, 414 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ind. 1981)).
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Davis argues that he was denied the opportunity to present his defense when he
was prohibited from reading ten pages of the Miranda case during his closing argument.
He states that the case discussed “in much greater detail the psychological workings of a
police interview” and would have helped diminish the probative value of his confession
to Detective Sult. Appellant’s Br. p. 8.
However, even if we were to assume without deciding that Davis should have
been permitted to read from Miranda during closing argument, “any abuse of discretion
in restricting the scope of closing argument is subject to harmless error analysis.” Nelson
v. State, 792 N.E.2d 588, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Davis was not
prejudiced when he was prohibited from reading from Miranda because he was still able
to present his defense to the jury. He was able to vigorously question Detective Sult
about the interrogation. During his closing argument, he was able to state in great detail
criticism of the “Reid” interrogation technique. Davis explained that the method is
disfavored by the courts, and he further highlighted to the jury the disadvantages Davis
had during the interview process. His closing argument, therefore, was not unduly
harmed by the prohibition against reading from Miranda because he was still able to
effectively challenge the veracity of his confession.
Conclusion
Even if we were to assume Davis should have been allowed to read from Miranda
during his closing argument, any such error was harmless. We affirm.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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