Tammy Price v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development and WC Fern Exposition Services , 2013 Ind. App. LEXIS 656 ( 2013 )


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  • FOR PUBLICATION
    APPELLANT PRO SE:                        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA
    TAMMY PRICE                              DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
    Indianapolis, Indiana                    DEVELOPMENT:
    GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Attorney General of Indiana
    KATHY BRADLEY
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    TAMMY PRICE,                             )
    )
    Appellant,                        )
    )
    vs.                       )    No. 93A02-1304-EX-369
    )
    REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA              )
    DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE                  )
    DEVELOPMENT and WC FERN                  )
    Nov 13 2013, 7:16 am
    EXPOSITION SERVICES,                     )
    )
    Appellees.                        )
    APPEAL FROM THE REVIEW BOARD OF THE DEPARTMENT
    OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
    Cause Nos. 13-R-830, 13-R-831
    November 13, 2013
    OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
    BRADFORD, Judge
    CASE SUMMARY
    Appellant Tammy Price has been employed as a part-time employee by George Fern
    Exposition & Event Services (“Employer”) since October of 1991. Due to the nature of her
    work with Employer, Price would occasionally go through short periods of unemployment.
    During these periods of unemployment, Price would apply for unemployment compensation
    benefits. In the instant matter, Price appeals from the denial of unemployment compensation
    benefits during two alleged periods of unemployment by the Review Board of the Indiana
    Department of Workforce Development (“Review Board”). Concluding that Price has failed
    to establish that she was unemployed, i.e., that she earned no remuneration because of a lack
    of available work, during the periods in question, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Price has been employed as a part-time employee by Employer since October of 1991.
    Through her employment with Employer, Price worked on an as-needed basis in the field of
    event services. Due to the nature of her work with Employer, Price would periodically go
    through short periods of unemployment. During these periods of unemployment, Price
    would apply for unemployment compensation benefits.
    At some point during two alleged periods of unemployment, Price filed two separate
    claims for unemployment compensation benefits.1 The first claim, filed under Cause Number
    13-R-830 (“Cause No. 830”), related to a period that included the week ending November 26,
    1
    Cause No. 830 lists Employer listed as the employer. Cause No. 831 lists United Temps as the
    employer. Price explained during the evidentiary hearings that Employer has been her employer at all times
    since October of 1991, but that United Temps was listed as her employer in Cause No. 831 because United
    Temps handled payroll for Employer. The testimony was similar in both hearings and the exhibits identical,
    2
    2011. The second claim, filed under Cause Number 13-R-831 (“Cause No. 831”), related to
    a period that included the week ending July 7, 2012. On November 16, 2012, a claims
    deputy of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development determined that Price was not
    unemployed as of either the week ending November 26, 2011, or the week ending July 7,
    2012, and was therefore ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits for either
    period. Price appealed these determinations.
    On February 6, 2013, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) conducted two separate
    hearings on the matters. On February 8, 2013, the ALJ issued two orders affirming the
    determinations of the claims deputy. With respect to Cause No. 830, the ALJ found as
    follows:
    FINDINGS OF FACT: The claimant has been working her usual customary
    hours for this employer since 1991. The claimant is employed by an event
    services company as a temporary event worker. The claimant has not been laid
    off from work as the claimant is working on an as-needed basis. The claimant
    has worked at this job for greater than twenty six weeks as of the week ending
    November 26, 2011; this employer is the claimant’s primary employer. The
    claimant does not have regular hours. The [ALJ] finds that the claimant is on
    an as needed, part-time basis at her regular employer and has been employed in
    that manner since 1991. The [ALJ] finds that the claimant is unemployed only
    during those weeks in which she earned no remuneration from work because
    of a lack of available work. The claimant could not show which weeks during
    the period covered by this determination that she had no remuneration because
    of a lack of work.
    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: The [ALJ] concludes that the clamant is not
    unemployed. The [ALJ] concludes that the claimant worked for this employer
    for more than twenty six weeks on a part-time as needed basis and the claimant
    was working her usual and customary hours. The [ALJ] concludes that the
    claimant is not entitled to benefits as the claimant is not partially unemployed,
    part-totally unemployed, or unemployed.…
    DECISION: The initial determination of the deputy is affirmed. The
    with the exceptions that the employers listed were different.
    3
    claimant’s benefit rights are suspended the week ending November 26, 2011.
    The claimant is entitled to benefits only during weeks in which she had no
    remuneration payable to her because of lack of available work, if otherwise
    eligible.
    Cause No. 830 Tr. pp. 42-43. With respect to Cause No. 831, the ALJ found as follows:
    FINDINGS OF FACT: The claimant has been working her usual customary
    hours for her employer since 1991. The listed employer is a co-employer
    providing payroll services. The claimant is employed by an event services
    company as a temporary event worker. The claimant has not been laid off
    from work as the claimant is working on an as-needed basis. The claimant has
    worked at this job for greater than twenty six weeks at the claimant’s primary
    employer as of the week ending July 7, 2012. The claimant does not have
    regular hours. The [ALJ] finds that the claimant is on an as needed, part-time
    basis at her regular employer and has been employed in that manner since
    1991. The [ALJ] finds that the claimant is unemployed only during those
    weeks in which she earned no remuneration from work because of a lack of
    available work. The claimant could not show which weeks during the period
    covered by this determination that she had no remuneration because of a lack
    of work.
    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: The [ALJ] concludes that the clamant is not
    unemployed. The [ALJ] concludes that the claimant worked for this employer
    for more than twenty six weeks on a part-time as needed basis and the claimant
    was working her usual and customary hours. The [ALJ] concludes that the
    claimant is not entitled to benefits as the claimant is not partially unemployed,
    part-totally unemployed, or unemployed.…
    DECISION: The initial determination of the deputy is affirmed. The
    claimant’s benefit rights are suspended the week ending July 7, 2012. The
    claimant is entitled to benefits only during weeks in which she had no
    remuneration payable to her because of lack of available work, if otherwise
    eligible.
    Cause No. 831 Tr. pp. 39-40.
    On February 25, 2013, Price appealed the determinations of the ALJ to the Review
    Board. Price also requested permission to submit additional evidence to the Review Board.
    On March 26, 2013, the Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s determinations, finding that Price
    was not unemployed during the relevant periods and, as such, was ineligible for
    4
    unemployment compensation benefits. This appeal follows.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Standard of Review
    On judicial review of an unemployment compensation proceeding, we determine
    whether the decision of the Review Board is reasonable in light of its findings. Value World
    Inc. of Ind. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Unemp’t Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 
    927 N.E.2d 945
    , 947
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We are bound by the Review Board’s resolution of all factual matters;
    thus, we neither reweigh evidence nor reassess witness credibility. 
    Id. at 948
    . Rather, we
    consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review Board’s decision and the reasonable
    inferences to be drawn therefrom, and if there is substantial evidence of probative value to
    support the Review Board’s conclusion, it will not be set aside. 
    Id.
     When, however, an
    appeal involves a question of law, we are not bound by the agency’s interpretation of law,
    and we will reverse a decision if the Review Board incorrectly interprets a statute. 
    Id.
    II. Review Board’s Alleged Failure to Consider Additional Evidence
    In the “Statement of the Issues” section of Price’s brief on appeal, Price contends that
    the Review Board abused its discretion when it declined to accept additional evidence.
    Appellant’s Br. p. 1. Price, however, does not develop this contention further. Her brief is
    devoid of any cogent argument relating to or citation to relevant authority in support of this
    contention. As such, Price has waived this claim for appellate review. See Ind. Appellate
    Rule 46(A)(8) (requiring that contentions in an appellant’s brief be supported by cogent
    reasoning and citations to relevant authority); Cooper v. State, 
    854 N.E.2d 831
    , 834 n.1 (Ind.
    5
    2006) (providing that a contention is waived when it is supported neither by cogent argument
    nor citation to authority); Davis v. State, 
    835 N.E.2d 1102
    , 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
    (observing that failure to present a cogent argument or citation to authority constitutes waiver
    of issue for appellate review), trans. denied.
    III. Sufficiency of Evidence to Suspend Benefits
    Price also contends that the Review Board’s denial of unemployment compensation
    benefits was not supported by sufficient evidence.            In denying Price’s claim for
    unemployment compensation benefits for the weeks ending November 26, 2011, and July 7,
    2012, the Review Board adopted the ALJ’s determination that Price failed to establish that
    she was unemployed during these periods. “It is well established in Indiana that in order to
    collect [unemployment compensation] benefits … the claimant must be unemployed.” Pope
    v. Wabash Valley Human Servs., Inc., 
    500 N.E.2d 209
    , 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). Indiana
    Code section 22-4-3-3 provides that an individual is not unemployed for any week in which
    the individual “(1) is regularly and customarily employed on an on call or as needed basis;
    and (2) has: (A) remuneration for personal services payable to the individual; or (B) work
    available from the individual’s on-call or as needed employer.”
    Price concedes that she has been employed by Employer on an as needed basis since
    October of 1991. While Price claims that she “only files [for unemployment benefits] on
    weeks she is laid off and has never filed for benefits when she works,” Appellant’s Br. p. 6,
    Price presented no evidence before the ALJ that verified the specific periods during which
    she did not receive remuneration for personal services or during which there was no work
    6
    available from Employer. Price, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that she received no
    remuneration because of a lack of available work during the relevant periods for which she
    requested unemployment benefits. Consequently, we conclude that the record supports the
    Review Board’s determination that Price was not unemployed during the relevant periods.
    Price’s claim to the contrary amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will
    not do. See Value World, 
    927 N.E.2d at 948
    .
    The judgment of the Review Board is affirmed.
    BAILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 93A02-1304-EX-369

Citation Numbers: 2 N.E.3d 13, 2013 Ind. App. LEXIS 656

Judges: Bradford, Bailey

Filed Date: 11/13/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024