James Averitte v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )


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  •                                                                                   Oct 31 2013, 5:30 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                             ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    SUZY ST. JOHN                                       GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Marion County Public Defender Agency                Attorney General of Indiana
    Appellate Division
    Indianapolis, Indiana                               ELLEN H. MEILAENDER
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    JAMES AVERITTE,                                     )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                         )
    )
    vs.                                  )       No. 49A04-1303-CR-119
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                   )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                          )
    APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Gary L. Miller, Judge
    Cause No. 49G21-1211-CM-76911
    October 31, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    KIRSCH, Judge
    James Averitte (“Averitte”) appeals from his conviction after a bench trial of one
    count of harassment1 as a Class B misdemeanor, contending that Indiana’s harassment
    statute is unconstitutionally vague. Given his waiver of this claim, his failure to show
    any reason that the waiver rule should not be applied to his claim, and precedent against
    his position, we affirm his conviction.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Averitte was the ex-boyfriend of Sharon Bingham (“Bingham”).                Their
    relationship ended in May of 2012.        In June of 2012, Averitte contacted Bingham
    telephonically on numerous days and numerous times leaving numerous threatening
    voice messages, including threatening to burn down her house. Bingham recognized both
    Averitte’s voice and telephone number. Averitte wanted to restore his relationship with
    Bingham, and she declined on at least four or five occasions, specifically ruling out any
    friendship, let alone a romantic relationship.
    After Averitte repeatedly called Bingham on her cell phone on June 20, 2012
    leaving a message that was vulgar, Bingham then sought law enforcement intervention.
    Although Bingham did not answer or return his telephone calls, Averitte continued in his
    efforts to contact Bingham by telephone and email.
    The State charged Averitte with Class B misdemeanor harassment for placing the
    telephone call to Bingham on June 20, 2012. Averitte did not file a pre-trial motion to
    dismiss the charges against him, nor did he raise any argument that the statute was
    1
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2
    .
    2
    unconstitutional during his bench trial. At the conclusion of Averitte’s bench trial, the
    trial court found Averitte guilty of one count of Class B misdemeanor harassment and
    sentenced him to a sixty-day sentence, entirely suspended. Averitte now appeals.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    Averitte argues on appeal that Indiana’s harassment statute is unconstitutionally
    vague as applied to him because it does not define what constitutes “intent of legitimate
    communication” leaving that definition to “the discretion of juries, judges and
    prosecutors.” Appellant’s Br. at 8.
    Indiana Code section 35-45-2-2 provides in pertinent as follows: a) A person who,
    with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate
    communication:    (1) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues;
    commits harassment, a Class B misdemeanor.
    “When considering the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the
    presumption of constitutional validity, and therefore the party challenging the statute
    labors under a heavy burden to show that the statute is unconstitutional.” Person v. State,
    
    661 N.E.2d 587
    , 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Jackson v. State, 
    634 N.E.2d 532
    , 535
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). When the validity of a statute is challenged, we begin with a
    “‘presumption of constitutionality.’” State v. Downey, 
    476 N.E.2d 121
    , 122 (Ind. 1985)
    (quoting Sidle v. Majors, 
    264 Ind. 206
    , 209, 
    341 N.E.2d 763
    , 766 (1976)) (upholding the
    constitutionality of Indiana’s dependent neglect statute under a void for vagueness
    challenge).   “The burden to rebut this presumption is upon the challenger, and all
    reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of the statute’s constitutionality.” State v.
    3
    Lombardo, 
    738 N.E.2d 653
    , 655 (Ind. 2000).
    Averitte has waived his claim of error because he has raised it for the first time on
    appeal. A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute must be raised by a motion to
    dismiss filed prior to trial. “Generally, the failure to file a proper motion to dismiss
    raising the Constitutional challenge waives the issue on appeal.” Payne v. State, 
    484 N.E.2d 16
    , 18 (Ind. 1985). Because Averitte did not file a motion to dismiss prior to trial,
    did not object at trial, nor did he otherwise assert this argument prior to appeal, he has
    waived the argument for purposes of appeal.2
    Affirmed.
    ROBB, C.J., and RILEY, J., concur.
    2
    We also note that in Kinney v. State, 
    404 N.E.2d 49
    , 50, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), a panel of this court held
    that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because it “forbids a specific act, a telephone call, when it is
    accompanied by a specific intent, ‘to harass, annoy, or alarm another person but with no intent of legitimate
    communication.’ This specific intent prevents the statute from being unconstitutionally vague.”
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A04-1303-CR-119

Filed Date: 10/31/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014