P.A. v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not Oct 29 2013, 5:32 am
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the
law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ANTHONY C. LAWRENCE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ERIC P. BABBS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
P.A., )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 33A01-1305-JV-196
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HENRY CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Mary G. Willis, Judge
Cause No. 33C01-1302-JD-10
October 29, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Chief Judge
Case Summary and Issue
P.A. was adjudicated a delinquent child after he admitted to committing what
would have been resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, if committed by an
adult. The juvenile court awarded wardship of P.A. to the Indiana Department of
Correction (“DOC”) for housing in a correctional facility for children, with the
recommendation that he receive mental health treatment and medication management.
P.A. appeals the disposition, raising one issue for our review: whether the trial court
abused its discretion in committing him to the DOC. Concluding P.A.’s history of
involvement with the juvenile justice system warranted such a disposition, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
P.A.’s mother called New Castle Police Department officers to her home because
her seventeen-year-old son, P.A., was “out of control.” Appellant’s Appendix at 11.
P.A. resided at the house with his parents, his girlfriend, and their one-month-old child.
P.A.’s mother reported to the officers that P.A. had been yelling at everyone for a long
time and had broken several pieces of furniture. She also reported that P.A. refused to
take prescribed psychiatric medication. The officers observed P.A. “charging” his
mother and yelling obscenities at her. Id. When the officers attempted to restrain him, he
struggled and directed obscenities at them despite their warnings for him to calm down.
The officers placed P.A. in handcuffs, advised him he was under arrest for resisting, and
transported him to the New Castle Police Department.
The State filed a delinquency petition alleging P.A. had committed acts that would
constitute resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, and criminal mischief, a
Class B misdemeanor, if committed by an adult, and also alleging that he “habitually
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disobeys the reasonable and lawful commands” of his parents and needs care, treatment,
or rehabilitation requiring the coercive intervention of the court. Id. at 30. P.A. admitted
to the delinquent act of resisting law enforcement, the trial court adjudicated him a
delinquent, and the State dismissed the remaining counts. The pre-dispositional report
indicated that P.A. had been diagnosed with paranoia schizophrenia, panic disorder with
agoraphobia, major depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. The report
also indicated P.A. had nine referrals to the probation department since 2010, and that he
had been offered least restrictive placements but had proven, by continuing to break the
law and disobey his parents, that “a more restrictive level of care is needed for him.” Id.
at 53.
At the dispositional hearing, Henry County Juvenile Probation Officer Amy Bell,
who had prepared the pre-dispositional report, acknowledged P.A.’s severe mental health
issues, but testified that her recommendation was for P.A. to be committed to the DOC:
Probation has been involved with [P.A.] since 2010, and we have had him
on formal probation for two (2) separate times. He has been in and out of
detention several different times. He’s been in [a treatment facility], he has
also been in Court order [sic] placement. We’ve also given him straight
time as well. Probation has been exhausted and there are no other options
for [P.A.] at this time. He could get more treatment if he is committed [to]
the [DOC] that [sic] he would be serving straight time in a detention
facility.
***
[I]f the Judge would want to release him it would have to be, you know, it
would have to be that he is under strict supervision, because I don’t believe
the community or his family will be safe if he is released without strict
supervision or continued therapy, um, and I guess anger management.
Transcript at 10-11. Phil Haggard, the probation-assigned therapist for this case who had
also worked with P.A. during a previous case, testified that “it would require, uh, some
pretty serious measures if he were to be released.” Id. at 13. Haggard therefore agreed
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with the probation department recommendation, presuming commitment to the DOC
would give him the opportunity to receive psychiatric and medical treatment. P.A. and
his father testified about their desire for him to be released to receive private therapeutic
treatment.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the juvenile court made the following findings:
[P.A.] is suffering from a mental illness which has significantly impaired
his ability to function. Despite the mental illness [P.A.] has adjudication
[sic] for Resisting Law Enforcement and this present case 2013 has
involved adjudication for Battery of a police officer; 2011 adjudication for
Burglary; 2010 Theft, Runaway, Truancy, Resisting Law Enforcement,
Incorrigibility, Possession of Paraphernalia and then there was a Public
Intoxication of a probation violation. There is quite a mental illness of
Agoraphobia . . . . [P.A.’s] decisions to go out in the community endanger
both himself and others. So, the Court does believe he needs treatment.
The Court does think that the best place for that treatment is in a Juvenile
Facility for boys that can’t be accomplished in a straight secure placement.
The Court has exhausted all sources of programs we have available for the
Juvenile Justice System, which includes periods of probation supervision,
in home counseling, out-patient counseling, medication management, two
(2) prior residential placements – one court ordered and one voluntary. The
Court is going to make a recommendation that he receive mental health
treatment and immediate pharmacological medication management for his
known mental health issues. . . . Court finds that the Wardship shall
continue until such time as [DOC] determines rehabilitation. . . . Court is
not going to reinstate any jurisdiction at the conclusion of this placement
due to his age.[1]
Id. at 41-42. P.A. now appeals the disposition.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
When a person under the age of eighteen commits an act that would be a crime if
committed by an adult, the person is adjudicated a “delinquent child” and the juvenile
court issues a dispositional decree providing for placement, sanctions, and treatment of
1
P.A. turned eighteen in August 2013.
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the child. R.J.G. v. State, 902 N.E.2d 804, 806 (Ind. 2009). Dispositional decrees are
intended to promote rehabilitation, id., consistent with the expressed legislative intent to
“ensure that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of
care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation,” Ind. Code § 31-10-2-1(5). Thus, the
juvenile court is given a myriad of alternatives and is accorded great latitude and
flexibility to allow the disposition that “best fits the unique and varying circumstances of
each child’s problems.” A.A.Q. v. State, 958 N.E.2d 808, 813-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
The choice of the specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent child
is a matter within the sound discretion of the juvenile court, subject to certain statutory
considerations. D.A. v. State, 967 N.E.2d 59, 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Indiana Code
section 31-37-18-6 provides that the juvenile court shall choose a disposition that is “in
the least restrictive . . . and most appropriate setting available,” consistent with the safety
of the community and the best interest of the child. We will reverse only if there has
been an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the juvenile court’s action is clearly
erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court
or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences that can be drawn therefrom. D.A., 967
N.E.2d at 64.
II. DOC Wardship
P.A. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding wardship of him to
the DOC because the court “failed to consider the special circumstances of P.A.,”
including his mental health condition and his particular family circumstances.
Appellant’s Brief at 8. We disagree. The juvenile court made the findings required by
statute, see Ind. Code § 31-37-18-9(a), and referenced the “special circumstances” P.A.
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contends were not considered. The juvenile court recognized P.A.’s mental health issues
and specifically determined that those issues and his inability to appropriately deal with
them required treatment and medication management best provided in a DOC facility.
Although the juvenile court did not specifically mention the fact that P.A. had an infant
child, treatment of his mental health issues would only be beneficial to his relationship
with his child and improve his ability to care and provide for him, especially considering
the child was present when P.A. was so out of control that his parents called the police
for assistance.
P.A. also analogizes the facts of his case to those in D.P. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 767(Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The juvenile in D.P. had just one prior contact with the juvenile
justice system when he was ten years old, and he had successfully completed probation
and stayed out of trouble for five years after that. The conduct which invoked the
juvenile justice system on this occasion was not repetitive or serious, and there was little
evidence to suggest that he would not respond positively to probation. Therefore, this
court held that a commitment to the DOC was not warranted and a less-harsh disposition
should have been ordered. Id. at 771. Even P.A. admits that he has a history of prior
juvenile adjudications and that he has been afforded multiple different opportunities to
rehabilitate, none of which have been successful. See Appellant’s Brief at 9. Therefore,
P.A.’s situation is substantially different from the juvenile’s situation in D.P., and the
result in D.P. does not drive our decision here. Cf. E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681, 685-86
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing dispositional decree awarding wardship to the DOC
because the juvenile’s involvement with the juvenile justice system was, in part, due to
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his parents’ abuse and neglect, there was no evidence he was a threat to the community,
and he had been making considerable progress in his current situation), trans. denied.
Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6 states that a juvenile should be placed in the least
restrictive placement “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community and the best
interest of the child,” inherently recognizing that the least restrictive placement is not
always the appropriate placement. See C.C. v. State, 831 N.E.2d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008). P.A.’s history, the testimony at the dispositional hearing, and the juvenile court’s
findings in this case indicate this is such a situation. The juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in entering a dispositional decree awarding wardship of P.A. to the DOC.
Conclusion
Given P.A.’s lengthy history of delinquency adjudications and the repeated failure
of less restrictive placements to alter his behavior, we hold the juvenile court’s
dispositional decree was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
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