Joshua D. Huff v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata, Mar 13 2013, 9:09 am
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JEFFREY S. JACOB GREGORY F. ZOELLER
CHRISTOPHER B. SERAK Attorney General of Indiana
Jacob, Hammerle & Johnson
Zionsville, Indiana CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JOSHUA D. HUFF, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 06A01-1208-CR-396
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE BOONE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Rebecca McClure, Judge
Cause No. 06D02-1205-FB-335
March 13, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
Joshua Huff (“Huff”) was convicted in Boone Superior Court of Class B felony
burglary and Class D felony theft and ordered to serve an aggregate fifteen-year sentence
in the Department of Correction. Huff appeals his convictions and raises two issues,
which we restate as:
I. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support Huff’s burglary conviction; and,
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury on
accomplice liability.
Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion when it tendered erroneous
accomplice liability instructions to the jury, but that the error was harmless and the
evidence is sufficient to support his burglary conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Huff and his girlfriend, Cara Crane (“Crane”), are heroin addicts. On May 1, 2012,
Huff and Crane discussed stealing items and pawning them to obtain funds to purchase
heroin. Tr. p. 86. Crane told Huff that her aunt, Tammy Spidel (“Spidel”) always left the
door to her house unlocked. Crane then used Huff’s cellphone to text Spidel to ask when
Spidel would be home. Crane told her aunt that she wanted to use her hot tub. Spidel
responded that she would not be home that evening until after 5:30 p.m.
Crane then called Dustin Pennington (“Pennington”) and asked Pennington to take
her to Spidel’s home. Crane told Pennington that she wanted to see if her aunt left the
door unlocked, and to steal items from the home. After Crane spoke to Pennington, she
relayed the conversation to Huff. Pennington, accompanied by his girlfriend, Tanya
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Ellsberry (“Ellsberry”), drove Ellsberry’s vehicle to Crane’s home and picked up Crane
and Huff.
The foursome proceeded to Spidel’s house as planned. Crane and Pennington
walked around to the back of the residence while Huff and Ellsberry waited in the vehicle.
The door to Spidel’s home was locked, and Pennington broke the door down to gain
access to the home. Pennington and Crane returned to the vehicle with several items
stolen from Spidel’s home, including a jar of change, two rings, and several watches.
Pennington then delivered Ellsberry to her place of employment. Next,
Pennington, Crane, and Huff drove to a nearby Marsh grocery store. All three
individuals entered the grocery store and used a Coinstar™ machine to obtain cash for
the jar of coins totaling $95.40. They then proceeded to a store specializing in buying
gold for cash. Pennington took the two rings into the store and sold them for $35.
Pennington and Huff went into two pawn shops together to attempt to sell watches they
stole from Spidel’s residence but were only able to sell one watch.
Next, the threesome stopped at a pizza restaurant and purchased pizza.
Pennington asked more than one customer if the customer would be interested in
purchasing a watch. Huff also tried to sell one of the watches while there. Tr. p. 109.
After unsuccessfully attempting to sell the watches, they drove to a nearby neighborhood.
Pennington purchased several packages of heroin and divided the heroin between himself,
Huff and Crane. Tr. p. 112. They then returned to Zionsville and picked up Ellsberry
who had completed her shift at work. Thereafter, Pennington, Huff, Crane, and Ellsberry
drove to a motel on Post Road where Pennington traded an iPod for heroin. Pennington
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also divided that heroin between himself, Huff and Crane. Tr. p. 115. After Crane
returned home, her mother confronted her about the burglary that had occurred at
Spidel’s house, and Crane admitted her involvement in the burglary.
On May 16, 2012, Huff was charged with Class B felony burglary and Class D
felony theft. A two-day jury trial commenced on July 10, 2012. Before Huff’s trial
began, Crane and Ellsberry entered into plea agreements with the State, and they both
testified at Huff’s trial.
During discussion of the tendered final jury instructions, the trial court agreed to
give Final Instructions 7, 8, and 9 over Huff’s objection. Instructions 7 and 8 informed
the jury of the definitions of “aiding, inducing, or causing” burglary and theft, and each
instruction listed specific facts the State was required to prove for the jury to find Huff
guilty of those offenses. See Appellant’s App. pp. 120-21. Final Instruction 9 is a
general accomplice liability instruction.
The jury found Huff guilty as charged. The trial court ordered Huff to serve an
aggregate fifteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction. Huff now appeals.
Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
I. Sufficient Evidence
Huff argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his Class B felony burglary
conviction.1 Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d 124, 129
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005)), trans.
1
Huff does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his theft conviction.
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denied. Rather, we consider only the probative evidence supporting the conviction and
the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of
probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the conclusion
that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, then the
verdict will not be disturbed. Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008).
Indiana Code section 35-43-2-1 provides that “[a] person who breaks and enters
the building or structure of another person, with the intent to commit a felony in it,
commits burglary[.].” The offense is classified as a Class B felony if the building or
structure is a dwelling. I.C. § 35-43-2-1(1). In this case, the State proceeded to trial on
the theory of accomplice liability because it is undisputed that Huff did not break into and
enter Spidel’s home.
The accomplice liability statute does not set forth a separate crime, but merely
provides a separate basis of liability for the crime that is charged. Norvell v. State, 960
N.E.2d 165, 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Thus, an individual who aids
another person in committing a crime is as guilty of the crime as the actual perpetrator.
Specht v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1081, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. In other
words, “a defendant may be convicted as a principal upon evidence that he aided or
abetted in the perpetration of the charged crime.” Id.; see also Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4 (“A
person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit
an offense commits that offense.”). And an accomplice need not participate in each and
every element of the crime in order to be convicted of it. Specht, 838 N.E.2d at 1092.
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In determining whether a person aided another in the commission of a crime, a
court should consider the following four factors: (1) the defendant’s presence at the scene
of the crime; (2) the defendant’s companionship with another engaged in criminal
activity; (3) the defendant’s failure to oppose the crime; and (4) the defendant’s conduct
before, during, and after the occurrence of the crime. Vandivier v. State, 822 N.E.2d
1047, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Garland v. State, 788 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ind.
2003)), trans. denied. Although the defendant’s mere presence during the commission of
the crime or his failure to oppose the crime are, by themselves, insufficient to establish
accomplice liability, the jury may consider them along with other facts and circumstances
tending to show participation. Id. “Mere tangential involvement in the crime can be
sufficient to convict a person as an accomplice.” Berry v. State, 819 N.E.2d 443, 450
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
Huff argues that the State was required, but failed to prove, that he “undertook
some affirmative conduct intended to aid or facilitate the physical act of burglary.”
Appellant’s Br. at 6. In support of his argument, Huff cites to several cases affirming
burglary convictions on a theory of accomplice liability where the Appellant-Defendant
acted as a lookout, transported accomplices to and/or from the crime scene, carried stolen
items from the dwelling, or provided items used in the burglary. See id. at 6-7.
Huff’s insistence that he did not actively participate in the actual breaking and
entering of Spidel’s house is accurate. However, on the day of the burglary, Huff and
Crane discussed stealing items to pawn to obtain money to purchase heroin. Tr. p. 86.
Crane told Huff that Spidel would not be at home and that her door was always unlocked.
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Crane then used Huff’s cellphone to determine whether Spidel was at home and to call
Pennington to arrange transportation to Spidel’s house.
Huff accompanied Crane and Pennington to Spidel’s house and remained in the
vehicle while Crane and Pennington broke and entered the house. After Crane and
Pennington returned the vehicle with items stolen from Spidel’s house, Huff and
Pennington had a discussion with Crane “about how they couldn’t get in any more
trouble and caught for this[.]” Tr. p. 98.
When Huff saw the jar of change that Pennington stole from Spidel, he asked
Crane and Pennington how much money they thought was in the jar. The threesome then
went into a Marsh grocery store and cashed in the change using the store’s Coinstar™
machine. They then all returned to the vehicle and proceeded to a store that specializes in
buying gold for cash where Pennington sold the rings taken from Spidel’s house.
Next, Pennington drove to a pawn shop. Huff and Pennington both went into the
pawn shop to attempt to pawn the stolen watches. They were unsuccessful at the first
pawn shop, but the second pawn shop purchased a watch. Both Huff and Pennington
went into second pawn shop.
The threesome went to a Little Caesar’s pizza store where they purchased pizza
and attempted to sell the remaining watches to customers. Huff unsuccessfully attempted
to sell one of the watches. Tr. p. 109. Pennington then used the money obtained from the
sale of the stolen items to purchase heroin, which he divided between himself, Crane, and
Huff.
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This evidence is sufficient to convict Huff of burglary under the theory of
accomplice liability. Huff knew of Crane’s plan to burglarize her aunt’s home,
accompanied her to Spidel’s house, was present at the scene of the crime, and aided
Crane and Pennington in acquiring cash for the stolen items. Huff did so with the intent
of obtaining money to purchase heroin. Huff’s argument to the contrary is merely an
invitation to reweigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, which our court
will not do.
II. Jury Instructions
Huff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the
jury on accomplice liability. In reviewing this claim, we are mindful that the manner of
instructing the jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Rogers v. State, 897
N.E.2d 955, 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. We will not reverse the trial court’s
ruling unless the instructional error is such that the charge to the jury misstates the law or
otherwise misleads the jury. Id. Jury instructions must be considered as a whole and in
reference to each other. Id. An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error
if the instructions, taken as a whole, do not misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury.
Id.In reviewing a trial court’s decision to give or refuse a tendered instruction, we
consider: (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is
evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the
substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other given instructions. Id. Finally,
“errors in the giving or refusing of instructions are harmless where a conviction is clearly
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sustained by the evidence and the jury could not properly have found otherwise.”
Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
The challenged instructions provide as follows:
Final Instruction # 7
Aiding, inducing, or causing Burglary is defined by statute as follows: A
person who, knowingly, or intentionally, aids, induces, or causes another
person to commit an offense commits that offense. A person may be
convicted of aiding, inducing, or causing Burglary even if the other person
has not been prosecuted for the burglary, has not been convicted of the
burglary, or has been acquitted of the burglary.
Before you may convict the Defendant, the State must have prove each of
the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. The Defendant, Joshua D. Huff
2. knowingly or intentionally
3. aided, induced, or caused
4. Dustin Pennington and/or Cara Crane to commit the offense of
Burglary, defined as
a. Dustin Pennington and/or Cara Crane
b. Knowingly or intentionally
c. Breaking and entering
d. Into the dwelling of another person, Tammy Spidel
e. With the intent to commit a felony, Theft, in it, by exerting
unauthorized control over the property of another person,
with the intent to deprive said person of any part of the use or
value of the property.
5. by allowing Cara Crane to use his cell phone; by going with
Dustin and/or Cara to the residence of Tammy Spidel for the
purposes of Cara and/or Dustin acquiring property without
permission to sell or pawn; sitting in the vehicle while Dustin and or
Cara entered into the residence of Tammy Spidel; discussing how
much money could be received from items stolen; going with Dustin
and/or Cara to various locations to get money for the items stolen;
attempting to sell the items that were stolen; not reporting this
incident to law enforcement; denying he was ever at the scene of the
burglary; receiving heroin from the sale of the items stolen.
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If the State failed to prove each of the elements, beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must find the Defendant not guilty of aiding, inducing, or causing
Burglary, a Class B felony, charged in Count I.
Final Instruction # 8
Aiding, inducing, or causing Theft is defined by statute as follows: A
person who, knowingly, or intentionally, aids, induces, or causes another
person to commit an offense commits that offense. A person may be
convicted of aiding, inducing, or causing theft even if the other person has
not been prosecuted for the theft, has not been convicted of the theft, or has
been acquitted of the theft.
Before you may convict the Defendant, the State must have prove each of
the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. The Defendant, Joshua D. Huff
2. knowingly or intentionally
3. aided, induced, or caused
4. Dustin Pennington and/or Cara Crane to commit the offense of
Theft, defined as
a. Dustin Pennington and/or Cara Crane
b. Knowingly or intentionally
c. exerted unauthorized control over the property of another
person, Tammy Spidel,
d. with the intent to deprive the other person of any part of its
value or use
5. by allowing Cara Crane to use his cell phone; by going with Dustin
and/or Cara to the residence of Tammy Spidel for the purposes of
Cara and/or Dustin acquiring property without permission to sell or
pawn; sitting in the vehicle while Dustin and or Cara entered into the
residence of Tammy Spidel; discussing how much money could be
received from items stolen; going with Dustin and/or Cara to various
locations to get money for the items stolen; attempting to sell the
items that were stolen; not reporting this incident to law enforcement;
denying he was ever at the scene of the burglary; receiving heroin
from the sale of the items stolen.
If the State failed to prove each of these elements, beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the Defendant not guilty of aiding, inducing, or
causing Theft, a Class D felony, charged in Count II.
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Final Instruction # 9
A person may be convicted upon evidence that he aided in the commission
of a crime, it is not necessary that the evidence show that the defendant
participated personally in the commission of each element of the crime.
The trier of fact may infer an accomplice’s participation in a crime from
several factors considered together, including presence, failure to oppose
the crime, companionship with a principal, and conduct, before, during,
and after the offense which tends to show complicity.
Appellant’s App. pp. 120-22.
Huff argues that these instructions are improper because “they are [r]epetitive,
[a]rgumentative and [s]lanted in [f]avor of [p]roving the State’s [c]ase for [c]onviction.”
Appellant’s Br. at 9. Although Huff concedes that tendering jury instructions on
accomplice liability was supported by the evidence and the instructions correctly state the
law, he contends that
the instructions present a reversible error because they do not include
potentially exculpatory elements governing case law and because they
misrepresent facts in a manner that creates a misleading perception to a jury
of how the law relates to the evidence presented.
Id. at 13.
Huff correctly observes that mere presence at the crime scene or a defendant’s
failure to oppose the crime is insufficient proof to support a conviction. See Rohr v. State,
866 N.E.2d 242, 248-49 (Ind. 2007); Vandivier, 822 N.E.2d at 1054. The jury must be
instructed that accomplice liability requires proof that the defendant engaged in voluntary
conduct in concert with his accomplice. Boney v. State, 880 N.E.2d 279, 293 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008), trans. denied. “[B]ut presence at the scene coupled with other circumstances
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tending to show participation in the crime may be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.”
Rohr, 866 N.E.2d at 249.
In this case, the trial court’s instructions, when considered as a whole and in
reference to each other, do not mislead the jury to believe that the State could meet its
burden of proof simply by presenting evidence of Huff’s presence during commission of
the offense and his failure to oppose the crime. Moreover, it was certainly not error for
the trial court to instruct the jury that it could consider Huff’s presence and failure to
oppose the crime together with the other factors listed in Instruction No. 9. See e.g.
Townsend v. State, 934 N.E.2d 118, 129-30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
However, we also observe that our courts “have ‘long disapproved’ instructions
that unduly ‘emphasize one particular evidentiary fact, witness, or phase of the case.’”
Fowler v. State, 900 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Ham v. State, 826
N.E.2d 640, 641-42 (Ind. 2005)). “‘An instruction as to what evidence warrants an
inference of guilty clearly invades the jury’s province.’” Id. (quoting Crawford v. State,
550 N.E.2d 759, 761 (Ind. 1990)).
In Marks v. State, 864 N.E.2d 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), our court concluded that
the quoted instruction below unnecessarily emphasized certain evidence and invited the
jury “‘to violate its obligation to consider all the evidence.’” Id. at 411-12 (quoting Ludy
v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. 2003)).
Evidence of the following can establish impairment:
(1) the consumption of significant amounts of alcohol;
(2) impaired attention and reflexes;
(3) watery or bloodshot eyes;
(4) the odor of alcoholic beverage on the breath;
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(5) unsteady balance;
(6) failure of field sobriety tests;
(7) slurred speech
Id. at 410 (record citation omitted). See also Ham, 826 N.E.2d at 641 (holding that the
trial court erred when it instructed the jury that a defendant’s “refusal to submit to a
chemical test may be considered as evidence of intoxication”); Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d
1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001) (holding that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that
the defendant’s flight after the commission of a crime, although not proof of guilt, may
be considered as evidence of consciousness of guilt); Cox v. State, 512 N.E.2d 1099,
1101 (stating that “no instruction should single out certain portions of evidence”).
In this case, Instructions Nos. 7 and 8 certainly emphasize certain evidence and
focus the jury’s attention on that evidence, which violates the jury’s obligation to
consider all the evidence. See Marks, 864 N.E.2d at 412. However, we will “disregard
any error that does not effect the substantial rights of a party.” Id. (citations omitted).
“Errors in the giving or refusing of instructions are harmless where a conviction is clearly
sustained by the evidence and the instruction would not likely have impacted the jury’s
verdict.” Id.As we discussed above, the evidence is more than sufficient to sustain Huff’s
conviction for burglary under a theory of accomplice liability. For this reason, we
conclude that the instructions would not likely have impacted the jury’s verdict, and that
tendering the erroneous instructions to the jury was harmless error.
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Conclusion
The trial court abused its discretion when it tendered Jury Instructions Nos. 7 and
8 to the jury. However, the evidence is more than sufficient to sustain Huff’s Class B
felony burglary conviction and the error in the instructions would not likely have
impacted the jury’s verdict. For these reasons, tendering the erroneous instructions to the
jury was harmless error. We therefore affirm Huff’s Class B felony burglary conviction.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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