Tony Kimble v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Oct 22 2013, 5:28 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MARJORIE LAWYER-SMITH
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TONY KIMBLE, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1303-CR-268
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, Magistrate
Cause No. 49F19-1209-CM-67847
October 22, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
CASE SUMMARY
On September 29, 2012, while working as an off-duty police officer at the Keystone
North Apartments, Marion County Sheriff’s Deputy James Ellis observed Appellant-
Defendant Tony Kimble entering the driver’s seat of a parked vehicle after displaying signs
of intoxication. Believing that Kimble was intoxicated, Deputy Ellis approached the vehicle
and asked Kimble for identification. While reviewing Kimble’s identification, Deputy Ellis
saw Kimble reach into his left front pocket. Kimble did not remove his hand from his pocket
when Deputy Ellis requested that he do so. In light of Kimble’s failure to comply with his
request and out of concerns for officer safety, Deputy Ellis asked Kimble to exit the vehicle.
When Kimble opened the door to the vehicle, Deputy Ellis saw two small bags containing
marijuana in plain view on the floorboard of the driver’s area of the vehicle.
Kimble was subsequently charged with one count of Class A misdemeanor possession
of marijuana. At trial, Kimble moved to suppress all evidence recovered during the course of
his encounter with Deputy Ellis. This motion was denied. Kimble did not, however, make a
separate objection to the admission of the marijuana. Following a bench trial, Kimble was
found guilty of Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana and sentenced to time served.
On appeal, Kimble contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
suppress. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 29, 2012, Deputy Ellis was working security at the Keystone North
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Apartments1 (“apartment complex”). The apartment complex is government housing. There
are signs posted throughout the apartment complex that indicate that any resident or visitor to
the apartment complex must carry proper government identification at all times.
While completing a routine foot patrol of the apartment complex, Deputy Ellis
observed Kimble exit an apartment and approach a parked vehicle. Deputy Ellis observed
that Kimble displayed poor balance, swayed from side to side, and almost fell over several
times. Deputy Ellis’s training and experience led him to believe that Kimble was “possibly
in the state of intoxication.” Tr. p. 8.
Deputy Ellis approached Kimble after Kimble entered the driver’s seat of the parked
vehicle. Deputy Ellis asked Kimble for identification. Kimble complied with Deputy Ellis’s
request. While Deputy Ellis was reviewing Kimble’s identification, Deputy Ellis saw Kimble
reach into his left front pocket. Deputy Ellis asked Kimble to remove his hand from his
pocket. Kimble, however, did not comply with Deputy Ellis’s request and continued
“fumbling around” in his pocket. Tr. p. 11. Citing concerns for officer safety, Deputy Ellis
then asked Kimble to exit the vehicle. When Kimble opened the door to the vehicle, Deputy
Ellis saw two small bags of a green leafy substance in plain view on the floorboard of the
driver’s area of the vehicle. Though his training and experience, Deputy Ellis knew that the
green leafy substance was marijuana. Combined, the two bags contained 2.62 grams of
marijuana.
Kimble was subsequently charged with one count of Class A misdemeanor possession
1
The Keystone North Apartments are also known as the Phoenix Apartments.
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of marijuana. On February 25, 2013, the trial court conducted a bench trial during which
Kimble moved to suppress all evidence recovered during the course of his encounter with
Deputy Ellis. Specifically, Kimble argued that his encounter with Deputy Ellis violated his
constitutional rights because Deputy Ellis did not have any reason to stop him. The trial
court denied Kimble’s motion to suppress. Kimble did not make a separate objection to the
admission of the marijuana. Following trial, the trial court found Kimble guilty of Class A
misdemeanor possession of marijuana and sentenced him to time served.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Kimble contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
evidence obtained during his encounter with Deputy Ellis. Although Kimble originally
challenged the admission of the evidence through a motion to suppress, he appeals following
a completed trial and thus challenges the admission of the evidence at trial. “Accordingly,
‘the issue is more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting the evidence at trial.’” Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(quoting Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).
Our standard of review for rulings on the admissibility of evidence is
essentially the same whether the challenge is made by a pre-trial motion to
suppress or by an objection at trial. Ackerman v. State, 774 N.E.2d 970, 974-
75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We do not reweigh the
evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005),
trans. denied. We also consider uncontroverted evidence in the defendant’s
favor. Id.Id.
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A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.
Washington, 784 N.E.2d at 587 (citing Bradshaw v. State, 759 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001)). Accordingly, we will reverse a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of
evidence only when the trial court abused its discretion. Id. (citing Bradshaw, 759 N.E.2d at
273). An abuse of discretion involves a decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. (citing Huffines v. State, 739 N.E.2d 1093,
1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). In the instant matter, Kimble argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the marijuana discovered during his encounter with Deputy Ellis
because the marijuana was discovered in violation of his constitutional rights under both the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution.
A. Waiver
As an initial matter, we note that while Kimble moved to suppress all evidence
discovered during his encounter with Deputy Ellis, Kimble did not make a contemporaneous
objection to the admission of the marijuana at trial. Failure to make a contemporaneous
objection to the admission of evidence at trial generally results in waiver of the error upon
appeal. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010); Lewis v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1116,
1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). However, waiver notwithstanding, we will address the merits of
Kimble’s claims.
B. The Fourth Amendment
Kimble argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the marijuana
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found in his vehicle during his encounter with Deputy Ellis into evidence because Deputy
Ellis lacked the reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred or was about to occur when
he initiated the warrantless stop during which the marijuana was discovered.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides all citizens
with “[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ....” U.S. CONST. amend.
IV; see also Black v. State, 810 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ind. 2004). The Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable search and seizure has been
extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Berry v. State,
704 N.E.2d 462, 464-65 (Ind. 1998). The protection against unreasonable
seizures includes seizure of the person. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
624, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (citation omitted). However, not
all police-citizen encounters implicate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“Only
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some
way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude a ‘seizure’ has
occurred.”); see also Molino v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind. 1989). A
seizure does not occur, for example, simply because a police officer
approaches a person, asks questions, or requests identification. Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); see also
Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ind. 2006) (recognizing that a person is
not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when police officers
merely approach an individual and ask if the individual is willing to answer
questions).
Instead, a person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when,
considering all the surrounding circumstances, the police conduct “would have
communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline
the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion);
see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216-17, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d
247 (1984) (“Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as
to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a
detention under the Fourth Amendment.”).
Applying a version of the U.S. Supreme Court’s test, this Court has
determined that not “every street encounter between a citizen and the police” is
a seizure. Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g
denied, trans. denied.… Similarly, a number of other jurisdictions have held
that there is no “seizure of persons” when an officer walks up to a person
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seated in a parked vehicle in a public place and asks a question of that person.
See, e.g., State v. Carlson, 762 N.E.2d 121, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing
Latta v. Keryte, 118 F.3d 693, 699 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that no seizure
occurred where police officer approached parked vehicle and asked defendant
to get out, but instead the defendant drove off); United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d
1426, 1430-31 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that there was no Terry stop where
police officers came upon an already parked vehicle even though police car
“partially blocked” the parked car), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1030, 115 S.Ct. 607,
130 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994); People v. Long, 99 Ill.2d 219, 75 Ill. Dec. 693, 457
N.E.2d 1252, 1257 (1983) (holding that no seizure occurred where a police
officer approached a parked vehicle and asked defendant a few questions);
State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 602 P.2d 1344, 1349 (1979) (holding that no
seizure occurred where officer, responding to a police dispatch, approached
parked vehicle and put questions to occupants); People v. Taylor, 454 Mich.
580, 564 N.W.2d 24, 28 (1997) (holding that officer made no seizure by
merely approaching the vehicle in a public place and asking defendants if they
were willing to answer some questions), overruled on other grounds by People
v. Kazmierczak, 461 Mich. 411, 605 N.W.2d 667, 674-75 (2000); and State v.
Glaesman, 545 N.W.2d 178, 182 (N.D. 1996) (holding that there was no
seizure where police officer walked up to a parked pickup truck and then,
when the driver opened door, police officer smelled alcohol)).
An encounter that begins as consensual might become a seizure,
however, when a police officer orders a suspect to “freeze” or get out of the
vehicle. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.4(a), at 434 (2004). The
Fourth Amendment may also be implicated when police engage in activity,
which one “would not expect if the encounter was between two private
citizens—boxing the car in, approaching it on all sides by many officers,
pointing a gun at the suspect and ordering him to place his hands on the
steering wheel, or use of flashing lights as a show of authority.” Id. at 434-35.
Bentley v. State, 846 N.E.2d 300, 305-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
Here, the encounter between Deputy Ellis and Kimble began as a consensual
encounter. The record reveals that Deputy Ellis observed Kimble enter the driver’s seat of a
vehicle after displaying signs of intoxication. Deputy Ellis approached Kimble and asked
Kimble for identification. This request did not convert the encounter into an investigatory
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stop. See id. at 306 (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 at 434).
The evidence further demonstrates that after complying with Deputy Ellis’s request
for identification, Kimble placed his hand in his left front pocket. When Deputy Ellis noticed
that Kimble had put his hand in his pocket, Deputy Ellis asked Kimble to remove his hand
from his pocket. This too was insufficient to convert the encounter into an investigatory stop
requiring reasonable suspicion under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See id. at 307
(providing that an officer’s request that a passenger put his hands upon the seat was
insufficient to convert the encounter into an investigatory stop requiring reasonable
suspicion). The record does not indicate, for instance, that Deputy Ellis drew his weapon,
spoke in an intimidating fashion, or otherwise restricted Kimble from leaving the area. See
id. Rather, the request for Kimble to remove his hand from his pocket was largely to ensure
officer safety. That said, the consensual encounter escalated into a seizure for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment when Deputy Ellis asked Kimble to exit the vehicle. See id.
The protection of the Fourth Amendment does “not ... guarantee against
all ... seizures, but only against unreasonable ... seizures.” United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). In [Terry,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868], the Court established the rule that a police officer
may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain a person for either
investigatory purposes or a protective search (“frisk”)—which permits an
officer, in the course of an investigative detention, to conduct a limited search
for weapons for his or her own protection—if, based upon specific and
articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, “official
intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests” of private citizens is
reasonably warranted, and the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity “may be afoot.” Id. at 21-22, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
Id.The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he concept of reasonable
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suspicion, like probable cause, is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct.
1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citations omitted). Rather, in evaluating the
legality of a Terry stop, we must consider “the totality of the circumstances—
the whole picture.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690,
66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Therefore, the reasonable-suspicion inquiry is fact-
sensitive and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Lampkins v. State,
682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh’g on other grounds, 685
N.E.2d 698. The reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied where the facts
known to the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable
inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to
believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Lyons v. State,
735 N.E.2d 1179, 1183-1184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied; see also
Gipson v. State, 459 N.E.2d 366, 368 (Ind. 1984). Thus, reasonable suspicion
entails something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of
the evidence. Luster v. State, 578 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). We
review a trial court’s determination regarding reasonable suspicion de novo.
Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Id.In the present case, Kimble claims that Deputy Ellis did not have reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity had occurred or was about to occur when he requested that Kimble exit
the vehicle, thereby initiating the stop. We disagree. Deputy Ellis observed Kimble display
signs of intoxication as Kimble approached the driver’s seat of the vehicle. Specifically,
Deputy Ellis observed that Kimble’s “balance was off,” that he almost fell over several times,
and that he was “swaying back and forth from side to side.” Tr. pp. 7, 8. Deputy Ellis’s
training and experience lead him to believe that these behaviors indicated that Kimble was
intoxicated and this belief, coupled with the fact that Kimble entered the driver’s seat of a
vehicle and appeared to be preparing to operate said vehicle, was sufficient to create a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity, i.e. operating a vehicle while intoxicated, was
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about to occur.
Under the circumstances, we conclude that although the encounter between Deputy
Ellis and Kimble was initially a consensual encounter that did not require reasonable
suspicion under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the search transformed into a stop when
Deputy Ellis requested that Kimble exit the vehicle. However, because Deputy Ellis
reasonably believed that criminal activity was about to occur and that it was necessary for
Kimble to exit the vehicle due to officer safety concerns, we conclude that Kimble’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment were not violated.
Further, we note that the marijuana was not discovered during an intrusive search of
Kimble’s person or vehicle but rather was in plain view when Kimble opened the door to the
vehicle in an effort to comply with Deputy Ellis’s request that he exit the vehicle. When
Kimble opened the door to the vehicle, Deputy Ellis observed two small bags containing a
green leafy substance sitting on the floorboard of the driver’s area in the vehicle. Deputy
Ellis testified that “through [his] training and experience” he knew that the green leafy
substance was marijuana. Tr. p. 11. Combined, the two bags contained 2.62 grams of
marijuana. (Tr. 20)
B. Article I, Section 11
Kimble also argues that his encounter with Deputy Ellis violated his rights under
Article I, Section 11.
Article I, Section 11 provides, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure,
shall not be violated....” The purpose of this article is to protect from
unreasonable police activity those areas of life that Hoosiers regard as private.
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Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. 1994). The provision must receive
a liberal construction in its application to guarantee the people against
unreasonable search and seizure. Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind.
1995).
State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 339-40 (Ind. 2006).
“While almost identical to the wording in the search and seizure clause
of the federal constitution, Indiana’s search and seizure clause is independently
interpreted and applied.” Baniaga v. State, 891 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008). Under the Indiana Constitution, the legality of a governmental search
turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the
totality of the circumstances. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind.
2005).… The burden is on the State to show that under the totality of the
circumstances, the intrusion was reasonable. Id.Hathaway v. State, 906 N.E.2d 941, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
For the reasons stated in our analysis relating to the Fourth Amendment, we conclude
that Deputy Ellis’s encounter with Kimble was reasonable under the totality of the
circumstances. Again, Deputy Ellis observed that Kimble’s “balance was off,” that he almost
fell over several times, and that he was “swaying back and forth from side to side.” Tr. pp. 7,
8. Deputy Ellis’s training and experience led him to believe that these behaviors indicated
that Kimble was intoxicated. Deputy Ellis further observed Kimble enter the driver’s seat of
a vehicle. Under these circumstances, we conclude that it was reasonable for Deputy Ellis to
approach Kimble to determine whether Kimble was intoxicated before Kimble drove away in
the vehicle because of the increased risk that Kimble could have injured himself or an
innocent bystander if he had been permitted to operate a vehicle in an intoxicated state. In
addition, Deputy Ellis’s concern for officer safety was reasonable in light Kimble’s failure to
comply with Deputy Ellis’s request that he remove his hand from his front left pocket. It was
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not unreasonable for Deputy Ellis to request that Kimble exit the vehicle under the totality of
the circumstances. As such, we conclude that Kimble’s rights under Article I, Section 11
were not violated.
Because Kimble’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 were
not violated, the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting into evidence the
marijuana recovered from Kimble’s vehicle. Therefore, we affirm his conviction.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.
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