Pie Kitchen, LLC d/b/a Homemade Ice Cream and Pie Kitchen v. Merchant, LLC ( 2013 )


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  •  Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                           ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
    JOHN A. KRAFT                                      C. GREGORY FIFER
    JENNIFER KRAFT KUCHLE                              Applegate Fifer Pulliam LLC
    Young, Lind, Endres & Kraft                        Jeffersonville, Indiana
    New Albany, Indiana
    FILED
    Feb 15 2013, 9:19 am
    IN THE
    CLERK
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA                                  of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    tax court
    PIE KITCHEN, LLC, d/b/a HOMEMADE                   )
    ICE CREAM AND PIE KITCHEN,                         )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                        )
    )
    vs.                                 )    No. 10A01-1207-CC-322
    )
    MERCHANT, LLC,                                     )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                         )
    APPEAL FROM THE CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Steven M. Fleece, Senior Judge
    Cause No. 10C02-1109-CC-1175
    February 15, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    CRONE, Judge
    Case Summary
    Pie Kitchen, LLC, d/b/a Homemade Ice Cream and Pie Kitchen (“Pie Kitchen”) and
    Chalfant Industries, Inc. (“Chalfant”), executed a letter of intent (“LOI”) in which Chalfant
    would lease commercial space to Pie Kitchen to use as a restaurant. The LOI set forth terms
    that were later incorporated into the lease. Six months after the parties executed the lease,
    Chalfant sold the shopping center to Merchant, LLC (“Merchant”), and assigned to it the
    commercial leases of the shopping center’s tenants.
    A contract dispute later arose between Merchant and Pie Kitchen as to whether a five-
    percent annual cap on additional rent increases included Pie Kitchen’s pro rata share of real
    estate taxes on the shopping center. Claiming that the taxes were subject to the five-percent
    cap, Pie Kitchen paid the taxes commensurate with the cap. Claiming that the cap did not
    include real estate taxes, Merchant filed an action against Pie Kitchen for unpaid rent in the
    amount by which the taxes exceeded the cap. Both parties sought summary judgment. The
    trial court interpreted the lease as excluding the taxes from the five-percent cap and granted
    summary judgment in favor of Merchant, awarding Merchant over $48,000 in damages and
    interest.
    Pie Kitchen appeals the summary judgment order, claiming that the trial court
    erroneously construed the lease and LOI as excluding the real estate taxes from the five-
    percent cap. Finding no error, we affirm.
    2
    Facts and Procedural History
    On October 20, 2006, Chalfant and Pie Kitchen executed an LOI concerning Pie
    Kitchen’s leasing of certain commercial space (“the Premises”) in Chalfant’s shopping
    center. The LOI states in pertinent part as follows:
    Taxes, Insurance and CAM:
    Tenant shall pay its pro rata share of real estate taxes and insurance based on
    the Tenant’s square footage divided by the total gross leasable area of the
    center. Tenant shall be responsible for its pro rata share of Common Area
    Maintenance charges, taxes and insurance as set forth in the Lease as
    “Additional Rent”. Common Area Maintenance, taxes and insurance charges
    for the “Base Year” shall not exceed $2.00 per square foot. All Common Area
    Maintenance, taxes and insurance shall be billed to the Tenant at the cost the
    Landlord was charged for them. The “Base Year” will be established on
    January 1st, 2007. After the “Base Year”, additional Rent (CAM) increases
    shall be capped at 5% annually over the “Base Year”. Landlord is responsible
    for outside of building including but not limited to, common areas, roofs,
    awnings, windows and walkways. Landlord must present proof of CAM
    expenses before the “Base Year” begins and each year of the lease thereafter.
    All CAM expenses must be passed to the Tenant at the actual cost of the
    maintenance charge based on the percentage of space used for the center.
    Management fees may only be included as part of the CAM.
    ….
    Upon the signed acceptance of this Letter of Intent, this document shall
    become a binding agreement and an obligation to the Landlord to provide a
    valid and agreeable Lease meeting the terms and conditions of this LOI, within
    15 working days. The Lease shall not negate any conditions and or terms
    included herein, and conditions normally found in a commercial lease.
    Landlord and Tenant reserves the right to correct or adjust any errors included
    herein. The LOI shall remain a part of the lease as Exhibit: “LOI”.
    Appellant’s App. at 25-26, 29.
    The lease, executed by Chalfant and Pie Kitchen on November 20, 2006, states in
    pertinent part as follows:
    3
    ARTICLE 5 ADDITIONAL RENT FOR COMMON AREA EXPENSES
    Tenant shall pay as additional rent, “Tenant’s pro rata share” of all
    operating costs and expenses incurred by Landlord for the property and
    improvements known as Lowe’s Center. “Tenant’s pro rata share” of all
    additional rent shall be computed on the basis that the total number of square
    feet of the gross floor area in the Tenant’s premises, be [sic] 2,380 square feet,
    bears to the total number of the gross rentable square feet of the building,
    being 40,000 square feet for a pro rata percentage of 6%. These operating
    costs and expenses shall include: All property taxes and licenses accessed by
    any governmental unit; all insurance premiums for liability, fire, and extended
    coverage with respect to the building and improvements; all common area
    utilities for lighting, parking and driveway lighting, electricity or gas for
    operating any equipment deemed as common area equipment, such as signs,
    pumps, etc., but shall not include any special utility usage for the sole benefit
    of any one tenant such as a sign or etc.; all maintenance and operating
    expenses for the lawn, parking, and driveway facilities including gardening,
    landscaping, moving, management fees and repairing asphalt, sealing, line
    stripping, removal of snow, ice, trash, rubbish and refuse, all maintenance and
    operating costs for repairing and repainting the building and common areas.
    All expenses for garbage collection unless it is deemed more practical for each
    Tenant or any one Tenant to provide this service for themselves, then such
    Tenant or all Tenants will provide for their own collection, and their “pro rata
    share” for such costs shall be exempted from Additional Rent. OPERATING
    COSTS AND EXPENSES SHALL NOT INCLUDE: Cost of any capital
    improvement made after the completion of the building, unless capital
    improvement shall constitute a substantial labor or cost saving device or
    operation in which case Operating Expenses in each year shall continue to
    include the expenses which would have been incurred if said capital
    improvement had not been made; expenses for painting, redecorating, or other
    work performed for the other tenants in the building; expenses for repairs or
    other work occasioned by fire, windstorm or other insurable casualty; expenses
    incurred in leasing or procuring new tenants including lease commissions
    advertising expenses and expenses of renovating space for new tenants; legal
    expenses incurred in enforcing the terms of any lease, interest or amortization
    payment of any mortgages. Landlord and Tenant agree to fix additional rent
    for Common Area Maintenance in an amount not to exceed $2.00 per square
    foot for Base Lease Year 1.
    4
    ARTICLE 6 PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL RENT FOR COMMON AREA EXPENSES
    For each lease year and partial lease year, the additional rental provided for in
    Article 6 shall be paid by Tenant in monthly installments, in advance, on the
    first day of each calendar month. The amount for additional rent for the first
    lease year shall be $4,760.00 annually paid in monthly installments of $396.67.
    If the total amount by Tenant under this Article for 2004 or any future year be
    less than the actual amount paid by Landlord for the expenses referred to in
    Article 5, then Landlord shall furnish Tenant with a detailed statement of the
    actual amount of Tenant’s proportionate share of such costs and expenses for
    such period. Tenant shall pay to Landlord the deficiency between the amount
    paid by Tenant and the amount due within thirty (30) days after the furnishing
    of each statement. Landlord shall then, based on the preceding years’
    experience, increase the monthly additional rent paid by Tenant, Tenant’s
    proportionate share of such deficiency divided by twelve. Landlord grants
    Tenant the right to review Landlord’s records relating to said Center for the
    purpose of confirming actual expenses annually. Exclusive of any increase in
    property taxes, Landlord and Tenant agree that additional CAM increases shall
    be capped at 5% annually over the “Base Year”.
    ….
    17.9 Entire Agreement: This lease, the attached Letter of Intent, and
    any guaranty, riders or exhibits attached hereto and forming a part hereof, set
    forth all the promises, agreements, and conditions and understandings between
    Landlord and Tenant, or Tenant’s agent, relative to the leasing of the Premises,
    and there are not other promises, agreements, conditions or understandings,
    either oral or written, between them other than those herein set forth.
    
    Id. at 18-19.
    In the spring of 2007, Chalfant sold the shopping Center to Merchant. As part of the
    sale, Chalfant assigned Pie Kitchen’s lease to Merchant, and Merchant assumed the lease. A
    dispute arose between Pie Kitchen and Merchant when Merchant attempted to collect from
    Pie Kitchen a proportionate share of real estate taxes that exceeded the five-percent cap. Pie
    Kitchen refused to pay the excess, claiming that the real estate taxes were included within
    that cap.
    5
    Merchant filed a contract action against Pie Kitchen, seeking eviction and possession
    as well as damages for the unpaid rent representing Pie Kitchen’s excess pro rata tax bills
    from 2009 to the date of judgment. Pie Kitchen filed a counterclaim for damages against
    Merchant. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court
    granted summary judgment in favor of Merchant for $48,523.20 in damages and issued
    contingent orders of eviction and possession. Pie Kitchen filed a motion to correct error,
    which the trial court denied. Pie Kitchen now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as
    necessary.
    Discussion and Decision
    Pie Kitchen asserts that the trial court erred in granting Merchant’s motion for
    summary judgment. We review the trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary judgment
    using the same standard as the trial court. Worman Enters., Inc. v. Boone Cnty. Solid Waste
    Mgmt. Dist., 
    805 N.E.2d 369
    , 373 (Ind. 2004). A motion for summary judgment is properly
    granted only when the pleadings and designated evidence reveal that there is no genuine
    issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Bank of New York v. Nally, 
    820 N.E.2d 644
    , 648 (Ind. 2005). In
    determining whether issues of material fact exist, we must accept as true those facts
    established by evidence favoring the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts against the
    moving party. 
    Id. Indiana courts
    have long recognized the contractual nature of leases and applicability
    of contract law to leases. Stewart v. TT Comm’l One, LLC, 
    911 N.E.2d 51
    , 55 (Ind. Ct. App.
    6
    2009), trans. denied. We construe a lease in the same manner as any other contract. T-3
    Martinsville, LLC v. US Holding, LLC, 
    911 N.E.2d 100
    , 111 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), clarified
    on reh’g, 
    916 N.E.2d 205
    , trans. denied (2010). The construction of a written contract’s
    terms is purely a question of law, which we review de novo. 
    Id. When construing
    the meaning of a contract, our primary task is to determine
    and effectuate the intent of the parties. First, we must determine whether the
    language of the contract is ambiguous. The unambiguous language of a
    contract is conclusive upon the parties to the contract and upon the courts. If
    the language of the instrument is unambiguous, the parties’ intent will be
    determined from the four corners of the contract. If, on the other hand, a
    contract is ambiguous, its meaning must be determined by examining extrinsic
    evidence and its construction is a matter for the fact-finder. When interpreting
    a written contract, we attempt to determine the intent of the parties at the time
    the contract was made. We do this by examining the language used in the
    instrument to express their rights and duties. We read the contract as a whole
    and will attempt to construe the contractual language so as not to render any
    words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless. We must accept an
    interpretation of the contract that harmonizes its provisions, rather than one
    that places the provisions in conflict.
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    “If an ambiguity arises because of the language used in the contract
    and not because of extrinsic facts, its construction is purely a question of law to be
    determined by the trial court.” Bicknell Minerals, Inc. v. Tilly, 
    570 N.E.2d 1307
    , 1310 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied (1992). The mere fact that the parties disagree as to the proper
    interpretation of a contract’s terms does not render the terms ambiguous. Arrotin Plastic
    Materials of Ind. v. Wilmington Paper Corp., 
    865 N.E.2d 1039
    , 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
    Instead, “[a] contract is ambiguous only where a reasonable person could find its terms
    susceptible to more than one interpretation.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    7
    Here, the contract indisputably comprises both the lease and the LOI.1 In examining
    the language of the contract as a whole, so as not to render any words, phrases, or terms
    ineffective or meaningless, we note first the closing language in Article 6 of the lease, which
    states, “Exclusive of any increase in property taxes, Landlord and Tenant agree that
    additional CAM increases shall be capped at 5% annually over the ‘Base Year.’” 
    Id. at 19
    (emphasis added). Pie Kitchen asserts that such language cannot be harmonized with the
    language of the LOI pertaining to the five-percent cap on rent increases and that it violates
    the term of the LOI that states, “The lease shall not negate any conditions and or terms
    included herein, and conditions normally found in a commercial lease.” 
    Id. at 29.
    We disagree. With respect to the cap on “Additional Rent” during the first year of the
    lease, the section of the LOI titled “Taxes, Insurance and CAM” plainly states, “Common
    Area Maintenance, taxes and insurance charges for the ‘Base Year’ shall not exceed $2.00
    per square foot.” 
    Id. at 25
    (emphases added). With respect to all subsequent years, the LOI
    lists only common area maintenance, stating, “After the ‘Base Year’, additional Rent (CAM)
    increases shall be capped at 5% annually over the ‘Base Year’.” 
    Id. at 26
    (emphasis added).
    Thus, taxes are clearly separate from CAM, and only CAM increases are capped at five
    percent.2 As such, we conclude that the lease did not negate the terms of the LOI by
    excluding property taxes from the five-percent cap. Based on the foregoing, we conclude
    1
    We note that the parties to the original LOI and lease were Pie Kitchen and Chalfant and that
    Merchant later assumed the lease as an assignee when it purchased the shopping center from Chalfant.
    2
    The inclusion or exclusion of insurance is not an issue in this appeal.
    8
    that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Merchant.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    KIRSCH, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
    9