Jerome Yates v. State of Indiana , 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 437 ( 2014 )

FOR PUBLICATION
Sep 05 2014, 9:03 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RYAN J. JOHANNINGSMEIER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JEROME YATES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1312-CR-993
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Carol Orbison, Senior Judge
Cause No. 49F19-1307-CM-47932
September 5, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Jerome Yates was convicted after a jury trial of Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement.1 He argues on appeal he could not have been convicted of resisting law
enforcement by fleeing because he did not have a duty to stop.2 We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 22, 2013, Officer Philip Robinette of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department saw Yates riding a bicycle in front of him. Yates was “swerving across both
lanes of travel. Kind of like in an ‘S’ pattern on his bicycle.” (Tr. at 107.) Officer
Robinette, who was a member of the bike unit and had been trained on bicycle laws, noted
Yates did not have any type of audible device required by law on his bicycle.
Yates turned around and saw the patrol car. At that point, he “began to frantically
pedal . . . like he was doing a marathon with his bicycle.” (Id. at 113.) Officer Robinette
turned on the light bar on top of his patrol car and tripped the siren three or four times. Yates
again turned around and looked at the patrol car, then turned onto a nearby street without
signaling.
Officer Robinette followed Yates and had to speed up his patrol car to keep up with
him. Yates attempted to turn into a gravel driveway, but fell off of his bicycle. Officer
Robinette got out of his car and yelled “Police, stop.” (Id. at 119-20.) Yates ran away.
Officer Robinette followed, chasing Yates over a chain link fence and between houses,
1
Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(a)(3).
2
Yates presents his argument as one alleging insufficient evidence, and the State responds in kind. But to the
extent Yates argues he was free to disregard the officer’s order to stop because there was no reasonable
suspicion he committed a crime, his argument is a constitutional one.
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ordering Yates at least once more to stop. Robinette eventually caught Yates. The State
charged him with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
We review de novo trial court determinations of reasonable suspicion. Armfield v.
State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 2009). We make reasonable-suspicion determinations by
looking at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer
had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.
Our legislature defined resisting law enforcement as occurring when:
A person who knowingly or intentionally . . . flees from a law enforcement
officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, including operation of
the law enforcement officer’s siren or emergency lights, identified himself or
herself and ordered the person to stop; commits resisting law enforcement, a
Class A misdemeanor.
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1. The facts most favorable to the judgment demonstrate Yates was
riding a bicycle on a public street when Officer Robinette activated the lights and siren on his
patrol car, identified himself as a police officer, and ordered Yates to stop. In addition, after
Yates fell off the bicycle, he ran away from Officer Robinette as the officer continued to
order Yates to stop. Thus, Yates twice violated Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1 by fleeing from a
law enforcement officer after the officer had identified himself by visible and audible means
and ordered Yates to stop.
Yates argues he had no duty to stop because Officer Robinette had no reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). The
language of the resisting law enforcement statute, on its face, does not expressly require that
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the order to stop be lawful.
Literally applied, however, the “after the officer has . . . ordered the person to
stop” element of the statute, if applied in the absence of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, constitutes an unreasonable detention and impairs a
citizen’s “right to ignore the police and go about his business,” [Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)], contrary to the Fourth Amendment.
Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249, 1254-55 (Ind. 2014).
Officer Robinette had reasonable suspicion to order Yates to stop. Officer Robinette
saw Yates commit two infractions, operating a bicycle left of center and operating a bicycle
on a public roadway without an audible device, which provided reasonable suspicion to stop
Yates. See Veerkamp v. State, 7 N.E.3d 390, 395 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“[b]ecause Veerkamp
committed a traffic infraction, we conclude that Officer Wells had reasonable suspicion to
stop Veerkamp and that the stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment”), reh’g
denied. We accordingly affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, C.J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
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