Louis Townsend v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DANA CHILDRESS-JONES GREGORY F. ZOELLER
The Law Office of Dana Childress-Jones, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
J.T. WHITEHEAD
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
LOUIS TOWNSEND, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 48A04-1207-PC-389
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE MADISON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Thomas Newman, Jr., Judge
Cause No. 48D03-0709-PC-254
February 8, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge
Case Summary
Louis Townsend (“Townsend”) was convicted after a jury trial of Criminal Deviate
Conduct, as a Class B felony,1 and Criminal Confinement, as a Class D felony,2 and his
conviction was affirmed upon appeal. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction
relief, which was denied. He now appeals the denial of that petition.
We affirm.
Issues
Townsend raises several issues for our review, which we restate as:
I. Whether Townsend’s trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
properly lay a foundation at trial to impeach Townsend’s victim’s
testimony concerning whether Townsend used a knife to commit
certain of the charged offenses;
II. Whether Townsend’s appellate counsel was ineffective because he
failed to raise as an issue on appeal the denial of Townsend’s motion
for directed verdict at trial; and
III. Whether the post-conviction court erred when it did not admit as
newly-discovered evidence a transcription of a video recording of
Townsend’s victim that contained statements inconsistent with her trial
testimony.
Facts and Procedural History
We take our statement of the facts of Townsend’s underlying offenses from our
opinion resolving his direct appeal in this case:
Townsend and Jennifer Bates (“Bates”) had an off and on relationship for a
period of about four years. Bates had secured a no-contact order preventing
Townsend from seeing her. Bates ran into Townsend, and the next day
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-4-2.
2
I.C. § 35-42-3-3.
2
Townsend entered her home without permission by letting himself in through
the front door. Bates had sent her older daughter off to school and was
watching television with her three-year-old daughter. Townsend told Bates
that today was the day she was going to die.
Townsend was angry. He entered the bedroom where Bates and her daughter
were watching television. The child became upset and Bates took her into
another room to calm her. Townsend was calm for a while and then he would
get upset again. Townsend said he would kill Bates, let the daughter leave the
house, and then kill himself. Whenever Townsend would raise his voice the
daughter would come running into the room. Townsend told Bates to tell the
child that they were just playing in order to calm the child.
Townsend went into the kitchen and returned with some belts, an electrical
cord, and a knife with a long serrated blade. Townsend placed the knife on a
table next to the bed. Townsend was described as being agitated, was cussing
and insisting that he was going to prison or to the grave. When Townsend
made a trip to the bathroom, Bates made a 911 call on her cell phone, but no
one answered. When Townsend made another trip to the bathroom Bates
made another 911 call while he was gone. When it was answered she
whispered her address and told the operator she could not talk. Bates put the
phone down, but left the connection open. When Townsend returned and saw
the phone he took the phone apart and gagged Bates with a sweatshirt.
Townsend got on top of Bates, who partially undressed, and subsequently
performed oral sex on her. Bates cried during this occurrence. Townsend
removed his belt and took off his pants. The child returned when Bates
screamed.
The police arrived. Townsend saw them through one of the windows.
Townsend told Bates to tell them everything was OK and they would leave.
Bates put her panties and shorts back on. Bates had to move a coffee table
from in front of the door in order to open it. There were two police officers
outside when Bates opened the door. They had responded to a radio dispatch
reporting the 911 call.
Officer Neal and Detective Brizendine asked Bates if everything was OK.
Bates said “yes” but indicated through eye movements and gestures to indicate
that things were not OK. Detective Brizendine saw that Bates was shaking and
crying. He asked Bates and her child to step outside. Officer Neal went into
the house where he saw Townsend sitting on the bed. Officer Neal asked
Townsend what happened. Townsend said they were arguing over money.
Bates told Detective Brizendine about the cord, the belt, and the knife. The
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Detective went into the house and confirmed the presence of the cord, belt, and
knife.
Bates was taken to a hospital and then the sexual assault center. She had been
crying during the investigation and examination.
Townsend was taken to the police department where he told the police that the
sex he had with Bates was consensual and performed at her request.
Townsend v. State, Slip. Op. No. 48A04-0610-CR-599 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2007)
(citations omitted).
On April 24, 2006, the State charged Townsend with Criminal Confinement, as a
Class D felony; Criminal Deviate Conduct, as a Class A felony; 3 and Burglary, as a Class B
felony.4 A jury trial was conducted on June 29 and 30, 2006, at the conclusion of which the
jury found Townsend guilty of Criminal Confinement, as charged, and Criminal Deviate
Conduct, as a Class B felony and lesser-included offense of Criminal Deviate Conduct, as
charged.5 On July 17, 2006, the trial court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced
Townsend to three years imprisonment for Criminal Confinement and twenty years
imprisonment for Criminal Deviate Conduct, with the sentences run concurrently.
Townsend appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court improperly limited his
cross-examination of Bates when the trial court did not permit into evidence testimony
concerning Bates’s alleged drug use and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
3
I.C. § 35-42-4-2.
4
I.C. § 35-43-2-1.
5
The charging information was amended on June 29, 2006. Townsend did not raise during the direct
appeal of his conviction and does not cogently raise in this appeal any claim of error associated with the
amendment. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (failure to provide cogent argumentation with citation to
authority may waive appellate review).
4
a sentence. Id. at 2-4. We affirmed the judgment. Id. at 4.
During his sentencing hearing, Townsend expressed dissatisfaction with the
performance of his trial counsel, Jeffrey Lockwood (“Lockwood”). On December 1, 2011,
Townsend, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for post-conviction relief. An evidentiary
hearing was conducted on May 7, 2012, during which testimony was offered by Lockwood
and his appellate counsel, John Wilson (“Wilson”). On July 12, 2012, after the parties
submitted proposed findings and conclusions, the trial court entered its findings, conclusions,
and order denying Townsend’s petition for relief.
This appeal ensued.6
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
Our standard of review in post-conviction proceedings is well-established.
In reviewing the judgment of a post-conviction court, appellate courts consider
only the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting its judgment. Conner
v. State, 711 N.E.2d 1238, 1245 (Ind. 1999). The post-conviction court is the
sole judge of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Fisher v. State,
810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004). To prevail on appeal from denial of post-
conviction relief, the petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads
unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite to that reached by the
post-conviction court. Graves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 (Ind. 2005).
Where, as here, the post-conviction court enters findings and conclusions in
accordance with Indiana Post–Conviction Rule (1)(6), we will reverse “upon a
showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d
102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 830, 122 S. Ct.
73, 151 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2001). Only where the evidence is without conflict and
leads to but one conclusion, and the post-conviction court has reached the
6
Townsend is represented by counsel in his present appeal.
5
opposite conclusion, will its findings or conclusions be disturbed as being
contrary to law. Miller v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (Ind. 1998).
Hall v. State, 849 N.E.2d 466, 468-69 (Ind. 2006).
A petition for post-conviction relief is not a substitute for a direct appeal from a
conviction or sentence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). Post-conviction petitions afford
defendants with the opportunity to raise issues not known at trial or unavailable upon direct
appeal; claims that were available to a petitioner on direct appeal are not available in a
proceeding for post-conviction relief. Bunch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1285, 1290 (Ind. 2002).
“These are applications of the basic principle that post-conviction proceedings do not afford
the opportunity for a super-appeal.” Id. (citing Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1187
(Ind. 2001)). Thus, a petitioner waives any freestanding claim of error in his petition where
that issue was “known or available at the time of direct appeal but [was] not raised.” Reed v.
State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1193-94 (Ind. 2006).
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
We turn first to Townsend’s claims that Lockwood rendered ineffective assistance of
trial counsel by failing to lay proper foundation for impeachment of Bates’s testimony
concerning whether Townsend used a knife in the commission of the underlying offenses.
Where a defendant claims his right to effective assistance of counsel was violated, he
must establish the two components set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, that is,
falling below an objective standard of reasonableness and denying defendant the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Hollin, 970 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind.
6
2012). “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense by establishing a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. A reasonable probability is one
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.
Performance of counsel is “presumed effective, and a defendant must offer strong and
convincing evidence to overcome this presumption.” Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 714
(Ind. 2007). Counsel is thus afforded discretion in choosing strategy and tactics. Hollin, 970
N.E.2d at 147. “Isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad
judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective.” Timberlake v. State, 753
N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001). Further, where we may resolve a claim of ineffective assistance
on the prejudice prong, we need not and should not address any alleged deficiency in
counsel’s performance. Helton v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1020, 1023 (Ind. 2009).
Townsend claims that Lockwood failed to attempt to introduce into evidence either a
transcript or the video recording of Bates’s interview with police shortly after the date of his
offenses and thus failed to lay proper foundation for impeachment of Bates’s testimony at
trial. Townsend draws our attention to two cases decided by this Court, Ellyson v. State, 603
N.E.2d 1369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), and Wright v. State, 581 N.E.2d 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991),
to establish the premise that failure to properly lay foundation for impeachment testimony
amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. Yet he acknowledges that where we may
resolve a case on the question of prejudice, we do so.
7
Here, Townsend notes that during Bates’s interview with police shortly after the
occurrence of the charged offenses, she stated that she did not see that Townsend had a knife;
during subsequent deposition testimony and trial testimony, however, Bates testified that she
did see Townsend carrying a knife. Townsend contends that by failing to introduce either a
transcript or recording of the interview at trial, Lockwood failed to lay adequate foundation
to impeach Bates’s trial testimony that she had seen Townsend carrying a knife on the day of
the offenses. Observing that Lockwood did not refer to Bates’s statement to police during
cross-examination of Bates at trial, Townsend further contends that, if Lockwood had seen
the video or read the transcript, he would have known of the prior inconsistent statement and
would have performed a proper impeachment of Bates that would have resulted in a not
guilty verdict on all of the charged offenses.
After the presentation of evidence and closing arguments, the jury returned a guilty
verdict on Criminal Deviate Conduct, as a Class B felony, rather than the Class A felony
charged.7 Criminal Deviate Conduct, as a Class B felony, required that the State prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Townsend knowingly or intentionally caused Bates to submit
to deviate sexual conduct when Bates was compelled to so submit by force or imminent
threat of force. I.C. § 35-42-4-2(a). The Class A felony, as charged, required that the State
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Townsend committed the offense of Criminal Deviate
7
Townsend contends in his brief that his trial counsel invited the State to amend the charging information
to add a charge for the lesser-included offense at trial, and sought to punish Townsend by refusing to move
the trial court to reset the trial after it had previously granted Townsend’s speedy trial motion. Townsend
provides neither citation to authority or cogent argumentation on this point, and his claim is therefore
waived. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).
8
Conduct either “using or threatening the use of deadly force,” I.C. § 35-42-4-2(b)(1), or
“while armed with a deadly weapon.” I.C. § 35-42-4-2(b)(2).
The transcript from Bates’s statement to police indicates that Bates did not notice the
knife until after the police arrived, and that Townsend did not use the knife upon her or even
expressly threaten her with it. (App. at 75-76.) The limited excerpts from the trial transcript
that Townsend has provided reveals that while Lockwood did not refer to Bates’s statement
to police, he cross-examined Bates as to the presence of the knife and whether Townsend
used the knife on her:
Q. Ms. Bates, um, I believe you testified that Louis, you call him Eddie…
A. Um hum.
Q. …made a trip to the kitchen? When he came back he had with him a
cord from your sweeper…
A. I didn’t know if was from my sweeper at the time.
Q. …and a belt.
A. Yeah.
Q. And this knife that we’re talking about?
A. Um hum.
Q. And that he laid them all down at the end of the bed?
A. He laid the cords and belts down and then went to the bathroom and
come back and then when he sat down he sat the knife down.
Q. So he took the knife with him to the bathroom the first time?
A. Yes.
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Q. Okay. And the then he came back and he laid the knife down at the end
of the bed?
A. Yes.
Q. And you never saw it again during this entire episode until after the
police got there, is that right?
A. Right, yeah.
Q. He never held it to you?
A. No, he didn’t hold it to me.
Q. Every [sic] threaten to use it on you?
A. No.
Q. He ever show it to you?
A. No.
Q. He never mentioned that he was going to use it in any way?
A. No.
***
Q. When [sic] was the knife when he went to the bathroom the second
time?
A. I, I don’t remember sir. I don’t know. I don’t remember.
***
Q. So, can we take it from that that he left it right where it was?
A. Probably so.
(App. at 63-65.)
The only contrast Townsend draws between the testimony presented at trial and the
content of Bates’s original statement to police is that in one, Bates testified that she saw a
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knife and in the other she did not—but there is no difference between the two insofar as in
neither case did Bates state that Townsend used the knife on her in any way. The jury
ultimately declined to convict Townsend of an offense, Deviate Sexual Conduct, as a Class A
felony, involving the use of a deadly weapon.
Thus, assuming without deciding that Lockwood’s failure either to attempt to
introduce into evidence Bates’s statement to police or even merely to refer to that statement
rose beyond a matter of tactics or strategy to a breach of professional obligations, Townsend
has adduced no evidence that he was prejudiced by that decision. He was convicted of the
lesser-included offense of Deviate Sexual Conduct, as a Class B felony, and not the Class A-
level offense that required the State prove his use of a deadly weapon or threat of deadly
force. We therefore affirm the post-conviction court’s decision that Townsend did not
receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
We turn next to Townsend’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective. The
Strickland test applies in such cases, as it does with claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603-04 (Ind. 2001). Our supreme court has
recognized “three categories of alleged appellate counsel ineffectiveness: (1) denying access
to an appeal, (2) failing to raise issues, and (3) failing to present issues competently.” Id. at
604.
Townsend’s claim in this appeal falls within the second of these categories. He
contends in seeking post-conviction relief that Wilson, his appellate counsel, was ineffective
11
for failing to raise as an issue for appeal whether the denial of the motion for a directed
verdict at trial was erroneous. To succeed in a claim for post-conviction relief under such
circumstances, Townsend “must show from the information available in the trial record or
otherwise known to appellate counsel that appellate counsel failed to present a significant
and obvious issue and that this failure cannot be explained by any reasonable strategy.” Id. at
607. “[W]hen assessing these types of ineffectiveness claims, reviewing courts should be
particularly deferential to counsel’s strategic decision to exclude certain issues in favor of
others, unless such a decision was unquestionably unreasonable.” Bieghler v. State, 690
N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind. 1997) (citing Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986)).
Townsend’s petition for post-conviction relief centers on the trial court’s denial of his
motion for directed verdict as to Deviate Sexual Conduct, as a Class A felony. The standard
for granting or denying a motion for a directed verdict, properly called a motion for judgment
on the evidence, is set forth in Trial Rule 50. Upon motion for judgment on the evidence, a
court “shall withdraw” from the jury’s consideration those issues that “are not supported by
sufficient evidence.” Ind. Trial Rule 50(A).
Upon Townsend’s motion, the trial court determined there was sufficient evidence to
support a verdict for Deviate Sexual Conduct, as a Class A felony, and further instructed the
jury as to Deviate Sexual Conduct, as a Class B felony and lesser-included offense. Wilson,
acting as Townsend’s counsel on appeal, did not raise as an issue for appellate review the
trial court’s denial of Townsend’s motion. Wilson instead challenged the trial court’s
exclusion from evidence of testimony concerning Bates’s alleged drug use and the trial
12
court’s sentencing order.
Townsend now claims that the post-conviction court erred when it found that his
appellate counsel “believed there was ample evidence presented in the State’s case in chief
for the court to deny the motion for directed verdict and there was no basis to appeal that
issue.” (Appellant’s App. at 43-44.) Townsend goes on to argue that because there was no
evidence that he caused Bates to submit to deviate conduct when compelled by deadly force,
and because Wilson’s testimony at the post-conviction hearing did not reveal that he recalled
any specifics about his strategy in constructing Townsend’s appeal, the post-conviction court
accordingly erred when it denied relief.
We do not agree. Wilson’s testimony before the post-conviction court encompassed a
discussion of his decision-making when settling on issues to pursue upon appeal; he was not
able to recall specifically the issues involved in Townsend’s appeal. We cannot conclude
from this testimony that the post-conviction court lacked sufficient evidence that, at the time
he pursued Townsend’s appeal, Wilson determined there was sufficient evidence to sustain
the trial court’s denial of the motion for a directed verdict. Thus, we cannot conclude that the
trial court’s finding was erroneous.
Even if that finding was erroneous, however, such error was harmless. Townsend
argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict for deviate sexual conduct
where Bates was compelled to submit while he was armed with a deadly weapon. In doing
so, he directs us to Bates’s testimony at trial that he “laid the knife down, she never saw it
again and [he] never threatened to use the knife on her.” (Appellant’s Br. at 14.) Yet
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Townsend was not convicted of an offense requiring that the State prove he used or was
armed with a weapon because, as noted above, he was convicted of the lesser-included
offense of Deviate Sexual Conduct, as a Class B felony, which does not require such proof.
Townsend was thus not prejudiced when appellate counsel did not pursue as an issue
on appeal the denial of a motion as to an element of an offense for which Townsend was not
convicted. We therefore cannot conclude that the post-conviction court erred when it found
no ground for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, and accordingly affirm the denial of post-conviction relief on that basis.
Newly-Discovered Evidence
Townsend’s final issue on appeal challenges the post-conviction court’s conclusion
that he did not present newly-discovered evidence that would entitle him to post-conviction
relief.
Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1 permits the filing of a petition for post-conviction
relief by “(a) any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of
this state, and who claims … (4) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of
justice.” P-C.R. 1(a)(1)(4).
In order to obtain relief because of newly discovered evidence, the defendant
must show that (1) the evidence has been discovered since the trial; (2) it is
material and relevant; (3) it is not cumulative; (4) it is not merely impeaching;
(5) it is not privileged or incompetent; (6) due diligence was used to discover it
in time for trial; (7) the evidence is worthy of credit; (8) it can be produced on
a retrial of the case; and (9) it will probably produce a different result.
Webster v. State, 699 N.E.2d 266, 269 (Ind. 1998). We evaluate these factors “with care, as
14
the basis for newly discovered evidence should be received with great caution and the alleged
new evidence carefully scrutinized.” Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ind. 2006)
(quotations and citations omitted). The individual seeking post-conviction relief must bear
the burden of showing that all nine requirements are met. Id.
Here, Townsend submitted as newly-discovered evidence the transcript of the video-
recording of Bates’s interview with police shortly after Townsend’s commission of the
underlying offenses in this case. Townsend argued that the transcript had not been prepared
until after his trial, that he had been provided with neither a transcript nor a copy of the
recording for his use in preparing for the trial, and that he was therefore precluded from
effectively participating in his defense. The post-conviction court concluded that the
transcript was not newly-discovered evidence, but rather merely a transcription of a recording
that had already been disclosed to Lockwood during pre-trial discovery, and denied
Townsend’s petition.
We agree with the post-conviction court. Lockwood testified during the post-
conviction hearing that he had viewed the recording of Bates’s interview with police, that he
knew the substance of Bates’s statements and how they differed from Bates’s deposition and
trial testimony, and that he used the recording to prepare for cross-examination of Bates at
trial. That the transcript of the interview was prepared only after Townsend’s trial does not
mean that the transcript is newly-discovered evidence independent of the recording that
formed its basis. That is, the transcript is not evidence that has been discovered since trial.
See Webster, 699 N.E.2d at 269. Accordingly, we find no error in the post-conviction
15
court’s conclusion that the transcript was not newly-discovered evidence, and affirm the
court’s order denying post-conviction relief.
Conclusion
The post-conviction court did not err when it concluded that Townsend did not receive
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Nor did the post-conviction court err
when it concluded that Townsend was not entitled to post-conviction relief on the basis of
newly-discovered evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of Townsend’s
petition for relief.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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