Kenny L. Futch v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )


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  •  Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of
    Feb 07 2013, 9:29 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    tax court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                              ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    DAVID M. ZENT                                        GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Fort Wayne, Indiana
    MICHELLE BUMGARNER
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    KENNY L. FUTCH,                                      )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                          )
    )
    vs.                                   )       No. 02A03-1209-CR-381
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                    )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                           )
    APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Judge
    Cause No. 02D05-1111-FB-250
    February 7, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    VAIDIK, Judge
    Case Summary
    Kenny L. Futch was convicted of two counts of Class B felony dealing in cocaine
    and received two concurrent, seventeen-year sentences, with two years suspended to
    probation on each count.         On appeal, Futch contends that these sentences are
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. We conclude that
    Futch’s sentences are not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his
    character. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    On October 8, 2011, Detective Jamie Masters, an undercover narcotics detective
    with the Fort Wayne Police Department, was working with a confidential informant to
    purchase narcotics in controlled transactions. Detective Masters arranged to buy crack
    cocaine from Futch at his apartment. When Detective Masters and the informant arrived
    at the apartment, Futch opened the door and invited them inside. They followed Futch to
    a back room where a couch and folding table were set up. The informant told Futch she
    wanted a “hundred” – one hundred dollars of crack cocaine. Futch put three bags of
    crack cocaine on the table in front of Detective Masters and the informant, left the room,
    and then returned with three more bags, which he also placed on the table. The informant
    picked up the crack cocaine and handed it to Detective Masters, and they left Futch’s
    apartment. Detective Masters then dropped off the informant and went to the police
    station, where she sealed the crack cocaine in evidence bags, marked the bags with her
    initials, and sent them to the Indiana State Police lab for testing.
    2
    Two weeks later, Detective Masters and the same informant purchased another
    “hundred” of crack cocaine from Futch at his apartment. After this transaction, Detective
    Masters followed the same routine of sealing, marking, and sending the crack cocaine to
    the lab for testing. Lab tests confirmed that the substances sold to Detective Masters by
    Futch were indeed crack cocaine. On October 28, 2011, Detective Masters executed a
    search warrant for Futch’s apartment. Cocaine paraphernalia was found inside, and Futch
    was arrested.
    The State charged Futch with two counts of Class B felony dealing in cocaine. A
    jury found Futch guilty as charged. At sentencing, Futch recounted his criminal history
    in Michigan, which included a misdemeanor conviction for larceny and four felony
    convictions for possession of cocaine, carrying a concealed weapon, possession with
    intent to deal, and dealing in cocaine. PSI p. 4-5. Futch also had his probation revoked
    twice.1 Id. at 5. Defense counsel told the court that Futch suffered from substance-abuse
    issues and noted that Futch’s most recent felony conviction had occurred many years ago,
    in 1996. Counsel asked the court to impose the minimum sentence and argued that Futch
    “would do well in supervision . . . through probation or something of that sort.” Tr. p. 14.
    The State conceded that Futch’s most recent felony conviction occurred in 1996
    but explained that Futch had served a fifteen-year executed sentence after being
    convicted. Id. at 14-15. The State argued that Futch’s interactions with the legal system
    had not “decreased [] his ability to commit the same type of offenses” and “prior attempts
    1
    At sentencing, Futch claimed the presentence investigation report incorrectly stated that his
    probation had been revoked twice. Futch put forth no evidence that the report was incorrect, however.
    The court noted Futch’s argument: “I know you disagree with that, but that’s the information I am told
    objectively though the presentence investigation report.” Tr. p. 17.
    3
    at rehabilitation have failed.” Id. at 15. The State asked the court to impose a fifteen-
    year sentence.
    In summarizing the evidence, the court noted no mitigating factors.                As
    aggravating factors, the court noted Futch’s criminal history, specifically the “pattern of
    the same [or] similar offenses.” Id. at 17. The court also noted the “absolutely lethal
    combination” of weapon and drug-related offenses and past failed attempts at
    rehabilitation. Id. at 18. Finally, the court noted that the presentence investigation report
    had categorized Futch as high-risk to reoffend. Id.; PSI p. 7. In light of this evidence, the
    trial court sentenced Futch to seventeen years, with two years suspended to probation, on
    each count, to run concurrently, for a total executed sentence of fifteen years.
    Futch now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    On appeal, Futch argues that his sentences are inappropriate in light of the nature
    of the offenses and his character. We disagree.
    Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in imposing a
    sentence, Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize independent
    appellate review and revision of sentences through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which
    provides that a court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
    consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Reid
    v. State, 
    876 N.E.2d 1114
    , 1116 (Ind. 2007) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    ,
    491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
     (Ind. 2007)). The defendant has the
    4
    burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. 
    Id.
     (citing Childress v. State,
    
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006)).
    The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers,
    and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement
    of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.”
    Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “should focus on the forest—
    the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of
    counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” 
    Id.
     Whether a sentence is
    inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the
    crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a
    given case. 
    Id. at 1224
    . In assessing whether a sentence is inappropriate, appellate courts
    may take into account whether a portion of the sentence is ordered suspended or is
    otherwise crafted using any of the variety of sentencing tools available to the trial judge.
    Davidson v. State, 
    926 N.E.2d 1023
    , 1025 (Ind. 2010). These tools include probation,
    home detention, placement in a community corrections program, executed time in a
    Department of Correction facility, concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, and
    restitution/fines. 
    Id.
    The sentencing range for a Class B felony is six to twenty years, with ten years
    being the advisory term. 
    Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5
    . Here, the trial court sentenced Futch to
    two concurrent, seventeen-year sentences, with two years suspended to probation on each
    count. This is within the statutory range, and we note that the trial court ordered that a
    portion of both sentences be suspended.
    5
    Regarding the nature of the offenses, Futch sold crack cocaine to an undercover
    detective and confidential informant on two separate occasions. In these transactions,
    Futch sold at least two grams of crack cocaine. Although the nature of these offenses is
    not remarkable, Futch’s character does not help his cause.
    Futch has a history of criminal activity linked to his substance abuse. He has a
    misdemeanor conviction for larceny and three of his four felony convictions are related to
    drug charges; the remaining conviction is for carrying a concealed weapon. In addition,
    Futch’s probation has been revoked twice. Futch’s substance-abuse issues began with
    alcohol and marijuana abuse at age eighteen. By age twenty-six, Futch was smoking
    marijuana daily, and at that time also started using cocaine. Four years later, Futch was
    using cocaine four times per week and also abusing prescription medication. As the
    presentence investigation report states, there is a high risk that Futch will commit another
    offense. Futch has failed to convince us that his character warrants a reduction in his
    sentence.
    After due consideration of the trial court’s decision, including the fact that two
    years of each sentence was suspended, we cannot say that Futch’s concurrent, seventeen-
    year sentences are inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
    Affirmed.
    BAILEY, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02A03-1209-CR-381

Filed Date: 2/7/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014