Fernando Miranda v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Aug 26 2014, 9:45 am
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
FERNANDO MIRANDA, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1401-CR-10
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Kimberly J. Brown, Judge
Cause No. 49F07-1309-CM-62446
August 26, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
CASE SUMMARY
Appellant-Defendant Fernando Miranda appeals his convictions for Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and Class B misdemeanor public intoxication,
arguing that they are not supported by sufficient evidence. Specifically, Miranda claims
that Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana failed to prove that his resistance of a police
officer was “knowing or intentional” and “forcible,” as required by Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-
1. Finding evidence that, inter alia, Miranda knew a police officer was attempting to
handcuff him and that he pulled away from the officer, we conclude that sufficient evidence
supports Miranda’s Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement conviction. Miranda
also claims the State failed to prove that he breached the peace, as required by Ind. Code §
7.1-5-1-3(a)(3). Finding evidence, inter alia, that Miranda forcibly and repeatedly resisted
a police officer, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports Miranda’s conviction for
Class B misdemeanor public intoxication. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on February 20, 2013, Miranda called 911 to report that
he had been robbed of his billfold at an auto repair shop on West 10th Street in Indianapolis.
Officer Jon King of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) responded
to Miranda’s call in full police uniform and driving a marked IMPD patrol car. When
Officer King arrived at the auto repair shop, he found Miranda standing on the sidewalk
outside. Miranda was intoxicated, having been drinking beer at the auto repair shop in
celebration of his pending move to New Jersey.
Officer King began questioning Miranda, but their communication “wasn’t real
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effective.” Tr. p. 9. Miranda speaks Spanish and very little English. Officer King speaks
English and very little Spanish, the latter being learned as a part of his police training.
Miranda quickly became agitated, yelling, “No policia, no policia.” Tr. p. 10. Then,
suddenly, Miranda “stepped back into a fighting stance” and “balled up his fists” as if “he
was about to hit [Officer King].” Tr. p. 12. Officer King stepped away from Miranda, at
which point Miranda put his left hand into his pocket. Fearing Miranda was about to pull
a weapon from his pocket, Officer King grabbed Miranda’s left arm and tried to get him
into a position where he could be handcuffed.
Officer King twice told Miranda—in Spanish—to put his hands behind his back.
Miranda did not comply. Instead, he tensed his body, making it “extremely rigid.” Tr. p.
14. Unable to remove Miranda’s left hand from his pocket, Officer King delivered a knee
strike to one of Miranda’s thighs and took him to the ground. There, Officer King was able
to cuff Miranda’s right hand. Miranda, however, held his left hand underneath his body
and began pulling his right, cuffed hand away from Officer King. Officer King had to pull
on his handcuffs with a “significant amount of force” to get Miranda’s right hand back
behind his back. Tr. p. 16-17. With Miranda still holding his left hand underneath his
body, Officer King delivered a single punch to Miranda’s torso. At that point, Miranda’s
left hand came out from under his body, and Officer King was able to handcuff both hands.
Miranda later testified, “I couldn’t resist any longer, so, I just let him handcuff me.” Tr. p.
44.
The State charged Miranda with one count each of Class A misdemeanor resisting
law enforcement and Class B misdemeanor public intoxication. Following a bench trial on
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December 12, 2013, Miranda was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced
Miranda to 365 days of incarceration for his Class A misdemeanor resisting law
enforcement conviction, with 362 days suspended to supervised probation. For his Class
B misdemeanor public intoxication conviction, the trial court sentenced Miranda to 180
days of incarceration, with 176 days suspended to supervised probation. Miranda’s
sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Miranda challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for
Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and Class B misdemeanor public
intoxication.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not
that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence
to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this
structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Appellate
courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not
necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be
drawn from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal citations, emphasis, and
quotation marks omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be reached
based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence presented.” Baker v.
State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012).
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I. Whether Sufficient Evidence Supports Miranda’s Conviction for
Resisting Law Enforcement
Miranda argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement conviction. Indiana Code section 33-44.1-3-1(a)
provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally … forcibly resists, obstructs, or
interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer
is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties … commits resisting law
enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1).
A. Knowing or Intentional Resistance
Miranda first claims that the State failed to prove that he “knowingly or
intentionally” resisted Officer King. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1). “A person engages in
conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability
that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). “A person engages in conduct
‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.”
Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). The knowledge and intent behind a defendant’s actions may be
inferred from the circumstances. Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 270 (Ind. 2004).
We conclude that the evidence sufficiently supports a finding that Miranda
knowingly or intentionally resisted Officer King. Although Miranda speaks Spanish and
very little English, and Officer King speaks English and very little Spanish, the record
reveals that Officer King twice told Miranda—in Spanish—to put his hands behind his
back. Miranda also began pulling his right hand away from Officer King after it had
already been cuffed. Moreover, in his testimony regarding the incident with Officer King,
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Miranda stated, “I couldn’t resist any longer, so, I just let him handcuff me.” Tr. p. 44.
From this evidence, a reasonable fact finder could infer that Miranda was aware of a high
probability that he was resisting Officer King or that it was his conscious objective to do
so. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2.
B. Forcible Resistance
Miranda alternatively claims that the State failed to prove that he “forcibly” resisted
Officer King. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1). “[A] person ‘forcibly’ resists, obstructs, or
interferes with a police officer when he or she uses strong, powerful, violent means to
impede an officer in the lawful execution of his or her duties.” Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d
724, 727 (Ind. 2013). The requisite level of force, however, need not be “overwhelming
or extreme.” Id. “[A] modest exertion of strength, power, or violence” is sufficiently
forcible. Id.
We conclude that the evidence sufficiently supports a finding that Miranda acted
forcibly in resisting Officer King. The record reveals that, when Officer King first
attempted to handcuff him, Miranda tensed his body, making it “extremely rigid.” Tr. p.
14. See Johnson v. State, 833 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding forcible
resistance where defendant “stiffened up” when officers attempted to put him into a police
vehicle); see also Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ind. 2009) (finding no forcible
resistance where defendant refused to comply with officer’s order to present his arms for
cuffing but stating, “‘[S]tiffening’ of one’s arms when an officer grabs hold to position
them for cuffing would suffice.”). Further, after Officer King took Miranda to the ground,
Miranda held his left hand underneath his body. See Lopez v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1090, 1094
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(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“If the officers were unable to pull his arms out from under him, it is
reasonable to infer that he was forcibly resisting their efforts rather than remaining entirely
passive.”). Moreover, Miranda began pulling his right, cuffed hand away from Officer
King, who had to pull on his handcuffs with “a significant amount of force” to get
Miranda’s right hand back behind his back. See J.S. v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2006) (finding forcible resistance where juvenile “pulled,” “jerked,” and “yanked”
away from Officer, “making it impossible for [officer] to hold her hands”). This evidence
supports a finding that Miranda used “strong, powerful, violent means” to resist Officer
King. Walker, 998 N.E.2d at 727.
II. Whether Sufficient Evidence Supports Miranda’s Conviction for
Public Intoxication
Miranda also argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for public intoxication. Miranda was convicted under Indiana Code subsection
7.1-5-1-3(a), which, as amended in 2012, no longer criminalizes simply being intoxicated
in public. Stephens v. State, 992 N.E.2d 935, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The statute now
provides:
[I]t is a Class B misdemeanor for a person to be in a public place or a place
of public resort in a state of intoxication caused by the person’s use of alcohol
or a controlled substance (as defined in IC 35-48-1-9), if the person:
(1) endangers the person’s life;
(2) endangers the life of another person;
(3) breaches the peace or is in imminent danger of breaching the
peace; or
(4) harasses, annoys, or alarms another person.
Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3(a). Miranda does not contest that he was intoxicated in a public
place. He claims only that the State failed to prove that he endangered his life or that of
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another person; breached the peace or was in imminent danger of doing so; or harassed,
annoyed, or alarmed another person. Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3(a)(1)-(4).
The State claims Miranda’s forcible resistance of Officer King breached the peace.
“A breach of the peace includes all violations of public peace, order or decorum.” State v.
Hart, 669 N.E.2d 762, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Census Fed. Credit Union v. Wann,
403 N.E.2d 348, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)). “It is a violation or disturbance of the public
tranquility or order and includes breaking or disturbing the public peace by any riotous,
forceful, or unlawful proceedings.” Lemon v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1190, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007). “Thus, a breach of the peace may involve other offenses.” Id.; see e.g., Hart, 669
N.E.2d at 764 (holding that a person who operates a motor vehicle while intoxicated
commits a breach of the peace).
We conclude that the evidence sufficiently supports a finding that Miranda breached
the peace in imminent danger of breaching the peace in that the record reveals that Miranda
yelled at Officer King and then “stepped back into a fighting stance” and “balled up his
fists” as if “he was about to hit [him].” Tr. p. 12. This evidence supports a finding that
Miranda disturbed the public tranquility. Lemon, 868 N.E.2d at 1194.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Miranda’s
convictions for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and Class B misdemeanor
public intoxication. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
BARNES, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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