Robertson Fowler v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )


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  • FOR PUBLICATION
    FILED
    Jan 25 2013, 9:11 am
    CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    tax court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    STEPHEN T. OWENS                                GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Public Defender of Indiana                      Attorney General of Indiana
    DEIDRE R. ELTZROTH                              NICOLE M. SCHUSTER
    Assistant Chief Deputy Public Defender          Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana                           Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    ROBERTSON FOWLER,                               )
    )
    Appellant-Petitioner,                    )
    )
    vs.                               )       No. 49A05-1202-PC-68
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                               )
    )
    Appellee-Respondent.                     )
    APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Mark D. Stoner, Judge
    The Honorable Jeffrey L. Marchal, Judge Pro Tempore
    Cause No. 49G06-0609-PC-181103
    January 25, 2013
    OPINION ON REHEARING - FOR PUBLICATION
    MAY, Judge
    Robertson Fowler petitions for rehearing of our decision dated August 31, 2012,
    affirming the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.1 In that opinion, we held
    Fowler’s guilty plea precluded him from later challenging his sentence. We grant his
    petition for rehearing in order to acknowledge and address a subsequent decision by
    another panel of this court that reached a different result in resolving a similar allegation
    of error, and we reaffirm our original opinion.
    Fowler agreed to plead guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious
    violent felon and an habitual offender enhancement. The habitual offender enhancement
    was based on the same prior felony as the handgun possession count. When Fowler
    entered into his plea agreement, Indiana law permitted the State to use the same prior
    felony to support a charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon
    and an habitual offender enhancement. In exchange for Fowler’s guilty plea, two other
    felony charges were dismissed and his executed sentence was capped at thirty-five years.
    Fowler appealed the sentence. After the State filed its Appellee’s brief, and while
    Fowler still could have filed a reply brief, our Indiana Supreme Court decided Mills v.
    State, 
    868 N.E.2d 446
    , 450 (Ind. 2007), which held a defendant convicted of unlawful
    possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon may not have his or her sentence
    enhanced under the general habitual offender statute by proof of the same felony used to
    establish that the defendant was a serious violent felon.
    1
    Fowler v. State, 
    977 N.E.2d 464
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
    2
    Fowler’s sentence was affirmed on appeal, and his petition for post-conviction
    relief, which was premised on the Mills decision, was denied. We affirmed on the ground
    Fowler received a benefit when he entered into his plea bargain, so he could not now
    challenge the sentence as illegal. Fowler v. State, 
    977 N.E.2d 464
    , 468 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2012).
    In his petition for rehearing, Fowler directs us to Dugan v. State, 
    976 N.E.2d 1248
    ,
    1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), where another panel of this court held, soon after Fowler was
    decided, that Dugan was entitled to retroactive application of the Mills rule. That panel
    so held even though Dugan, like Fowler, pled guilty.
    Our Fowler decision is not inconsistent with Dugan. Dugan, like Fowler, pled
    guilty to being an habitual offender, but unlike Fowler, Dugan did not receive a favorable
    outcome from his guilty plea. “The only benefit that Dugan received was a guaranteed
    minimum sentence on the habitual offender enhancement, which was the illegal sentence
    at issue. This is not a case where other charges were dropped or reduced as a result of
    the guilty plea. As a result, we conclude . . . Dugan’s guilty plea does not preclude relief
    in this case.” Dugan, 976 N.E.2d at 1251-52 (emphasis added.)
    Fowler, by contrast, was “a case where other charges were dropped or reduced as
    a result of the guilty plea.” We accordingly grant Fowler’s petition for rehearing and
    reaffirm our original decision in all respects.
    NAJAM, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A05-1202-PC-68

Judges: Najam, Kirsch

Filed Date: 1/25/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/11/2024