R.C. v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Aug 08 2014, 9:05 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID BECSEY GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Zeigler Cohen & Koch Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
R.C., )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1401-JV-024
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION
The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, Judge
Cause No. 49D09-1307-JD-1920
August 8, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
FRIEDLANDER, Judge
R.C. was adjudicated a delinquent child for committing an act that would
constitute Resisting Law Enforcement1 as a class A misdemeanor if committed by an
adult. R.C. presents one issue for our review: Did the State present sufficient evidence
to support the true finding?
We affirm.
The facts favorable to the adjudication follow. R.C. was born on August 29, 1996.
On July 5, 2013, just after midnight, R.C. was walking northbound on Meridian Street.
Officer Christopher Faulds and other officers with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department encountered R.C. near the intersection of Meridian and New York Streets.
R.C. was with a group of about nine other individuals, some of whom appeared to be
juveniles. Officer Faulds’s attention was drawn to the group when, from a block away,
he heard loud voices and some noise coming from the group. Officer Faulds specifically
identified R.C. as one of the individuals being loud. Officer Faulds also noted that the
group was in the vicinity of “several apartment complexes.” Transcript at 9.
Officer Faulds and the other officers approached the group and asked them “to
stop the noise.” Id. The group did not respond to the request, and R.C. “just started to
walk away, ignoring and just kept going on.” Id. at 10. Officer Faulds then directed the
entire group to “stop.” Id. After a second order to stop, some of the individuals in the
group complied. R.C., however, continued walking. Officer Faulds attempted to stop
R.C. by reaching out and taking ahold of R.C.’s right upper arm. R.C. “jerked his arm
1
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-44.1-3-1(a) (West, Westlaw current with all 2014 Public Laws of the 2014 Second
Regular Session and Second Regular Technical Session of the 118th General Assembly).
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out of [Officer Faulds’s] hand and pushed [Officer Faulds] back and kept then kept [sic]
walking.” Id. at 11. The contact was “hard enough” that Officer Faulds nearly lost his
balance. Id.The other officers then attempted to place R.C. in handcuffs, at which point R.C.
started to kick and “flail his arms about.” Id. The officers had to “take [R.C.] to the
ground to get his limbs under control.” Id. Once on the ground, R.C. continued to kick
at the officers and also began spitting at them. The officers were eventually able to place
R.C. in handcuffs, at which point R.C. sat up and stopped struggling.
On July 8, 2013, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that R.C. was a
delinquent child for committing an act that would constitute class A misdemeanor
resisting law enforcement if committed by an adult. On November 13, 2014, the juvenile
court held a fact-finding hearing and adjudicated R.C. a delinquent child. A disposition
hearing was held on December 23, 2013. The juvenile court placed R.C. on probation
with suspended commitment to the Department of Correction.
On appeal, R.C. argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his adjudication.
Our standard of review in this regard is well settled.
When the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated to be a delinquent for
committing an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the State
must prove every element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon
review, we apply the same sufficiency standard used in criminal cases.
When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Instead we look to the
evidence of probative value and the reasonable inferences that support the
determination.
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A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted). Further,
the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness can provide sufficient evidence.
See McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 2001).
Here, the delinquency petition provided that R.C. did “knowingly or intentionally
forcibly resist, obstruct or interfere with a law enforcement officer, that is: Police officer
Christopher Faulds, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, who was lawfully
engaged in the execution of his duties as an officer.”2 Appellant’s Appendix at 18. One
“forcibly resists” law enforcement when “strong, powerful, violent means are used to
evade a law enforcement official’s rightful exercise of duties.” Stansberry v. State, 954
N.E.2d 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993)). The force necessary to sustain a conviction, however, need not rise to
the level of mayhem, and our Supreme Court has acknowledged that a “modest level
of resistance” may suffice. See Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind.
2009) (citing Johnson v. State, 833 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).
R.C. contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his adjudication because
the officers were not legally engaged in the performance of their duties when, without
explanation or warning, they grabbed him from behind, took him to the ground, and
placed him in handcuffs. R.C. maintains that under the circumstances, his response to the
conduct of the officers was reasonable.
2
See I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (“A person who knowingly or intentionally . . . forcibly resists, obstructs,
or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully
engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties . . . commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A
misdemeanor.”).
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We first consider whether Officer Faulds and the other IMPD officers were
“lawfully engaged” in the execution of their duties as police officers. It is well settled
that “police may, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain an individual for
investigatory purposes if, based on specific and articulable facts, the officer has a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” State v. Calmes, 894 N.E.2d
199, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted).
Here, the officers observed a group of individuals, some of whom appeared to be
teenagers, talking loudly and making noise as they walked along Meridian Street in
downtown Indianapolis shortly after midnight on Friday, July 5, 2013. The officers had
reasonable suspicion to believe that R.C. and others within the group were out past
curfew in violation of Ind. Code Ann. § 31-37-3-2 (West, Westlaw current with all 2014
Public Laws of the 2014 Second Regular Session and Second Regular Technical Session
of the 118th General Assembly). That statute provides that it is a curfew violation for a
child between fifteen and seventeen years of age to be in a public place after 11 p.m. on
Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday or before 5 a.m. on Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday, so long as the child does not have a legal
defense. Being before 5 a.m. on a Friday morning, the officers therefore saw R.C.
committing a delinquent act and had authority to stop him. See I.C. § 31-37-3-2 (West,
Westlaw current with all 2014 Public Laws of the 2014 Second Regular Session and
Second Regular Technical Session of the 118th General Assembly) (stating that a child
who commits a curfew violation commits a delinquent act).
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Officer Faulds also testified that the group caught his and the other officers’
attention by being loud and talking with raised voices in an area of downtown
Indianapolis where there were apartments. The officers therefore had reasonable
suspicion to believe that R.C. was committing an act that would be class B misdemeanor
disorderly conduct if committed by an adult. To be sure, the officers observed R.C.
making “unreasonable noise and continu[ing] to do so after being asked to stop.” See
Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-1-3 (West, Westlaw current through 2012 Second Regular
Session).
The officers were lawfully engaged in their execution of their duties as police
officers when they were patrolling streets in downtown Indianapolis and came upon a
group of individuals who the officers believed to be in violation of curfew and who were
being unreasonably loud for the location and time. Either of these offenses provided the
officers with authority to stop R.C. and inquire into their suspicions about his activity.
R.C.’s argument that he was grabbed from behind without explanation or warning, taken
to the ground, and placed him in handcuffs is merely an invitation for this could to
reweigh the evidence and adopt his version of events. This we will not do.
R.C. also argues that his conduct in response to the officers’ actions was
reasonable under the circumstances. While the encounter with R.C. was not initiated in
order to effect an arrest, we find the following helpful. The general rule in Indiana is that
“a private citizen may not use force in resisting a peaceful arrest by an individual who he
knows, or has reason to know, is a police officer performing his duties regardless of
whether the arrest in question is lawful or unlawful.” Shoultz v. State, 735 N.E.2d 818,
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823 (Ind. Ct. App. 818, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Casselman v. State, 472
N.E.2d 1310, 1315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)), trans. denied. When, however, an officer uses
unconstitutionally excessive force in effecting an arrest, that officer is no longer lawfully
engaged in the execution of his or her duty. Shoultz v. State, 735 N.E.2d 818.
On this point, we note that even after being ordered to stop a second time, R.C.
continued walking. Officer Faulds then reached out and touched R.C. on his shoulder, at
which point, R.C. pushed Officer Faulds with enough force that Officer Faulds nearly lost
his balance. Nothing about Officer Faulds’s conduct warranted being pushed by R.C. in
such manner. The other officers who witnessed the hostile reaction by R.C. attempted to
take control of the situation, and R.C. immediately responded by kicking and spitting at
the officers and flailing his arms.
Contrary to R.C.’s claim, the circumstances of this case are not akin to the
situation presented in Shoultz, wherein the defendant was only verbally aggressive with
the police officer and did not physically and with force interfere with the officer’s
investigation. Further, in Shoultz, the officer had “no basis” for concluding that Shoultz
had committed any crime before using considerable force against him. Id. at 824. Here,
Officer Faulds witnessed R.C. commit two delinquent acts. When approached, R.C.
physically pushed Officer Faulds such that he nearly lost his balance.
The situation did not escalate and the officers did not employ force on R.C. until
after R.C. acted in a forceful manner. Officer Faulds approached the group and asked
them to quiet down. The group did not comply, so Officer Faulds ordered the group to
stop. R.C. ignored this order as well, and when Officer Faulds attempted to stop him,
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R.C. responded by forcefully pushing Officer Faulds and then he continued to ignore the
order to stop by walking away. R.C.’s behavior was not reasonable under the
circumstances.
R.C. asserts that the force used against him was excessive.
Claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force in the
course of an arrest of a free citizen are analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and its “reasonableness”
standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871,
104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Because the Fourth Amendment test of
reasonableness is not capable of precise definition or mechanical
application, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight. 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. The
“reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20-
20 vision of hindsight. Id. However, the “reasonableness” inquiry in an
excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the
officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent
or motivation. 490 U.S. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. at 1872.
Shoultz v. State, 735 N.E.2d at 823-24.
The underlying offenses – a curfew violation and disorderly conduct – were
relatively innocuous. Nevertheless, it was after midnight when the police officers
approached a group of approximately ten individuals who were being loud and refusing
to comply with orders to quiet down and ultimately, to stop. The reaction of R.C. was to
immediately use physical force against the officer by shoving him. The officers, being
outnumbered, reasonably attempted to take control of R.C. and the situation. R.C. only
escalated the situation by kicking, flailing his arms, and spitting on the officers. There is
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nothing in the facts as presented by the State that indicates the officers used excessive
force under the circumstances.
In sum, the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that R.C. forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered with a law
enforcement officer while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of the
officer’s duties.
Judgment affirmed.
MATHIAS, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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