Jesse Doyle, Jr. v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )


Menu:
  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    Oct 09 2013, 8:52 am
    any court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                             ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    LEANNA WEISSMANN                                    GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Lawrenceburg, Indiana                               Attorney General of Indiana
    GEORGE P. SHERMAN
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    JESSE DOYLE, JR.,                                   )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                         )
    )
    vs.                                  )      No. 15A01-1303-CR-132
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                   )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                          )
    APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Judge
    Cause No. 15C01-1112-FA-32
    October 9, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BRADFORD, Judge
    CASE SUMMARY
    Over the course of an approximately three-year time period in 1995 to 1998,
    Appellant-Defendant Jesse Doyle, Jr. repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse with his
    approximately nine-to-twelve-year-old daughter, E.D. Doyle was subsequently charged with
    one count of Class B felony incest and one count of Class A felony child molesting. On
    January 8, 2013, Doyle pled guilty to one count of Class C felony incest. In exchange for
    Doyle’s guilty plea, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana agreed to downgrade the incest
    charge from a Class B felony to a Class C felony and to dismiss the Class A felony child
    molesting charge. The parties agreed that sentencing would be left to the discretion of the
    trial court.
    Prior to the pronouncement of Doyle’s sentence, Doyle indicated that he wished to
    withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied Doyle’s request and, on February 26, 2013,
    imposed an eight-year sentence. On appeal, Doyle contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying his request to withdraw his guilty plea. Doyle also contends that his
    eight-year sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    The factual basis entered during the January 8, 2013 guilty plea hearing provides that
    between September 1, 1995 and August 1, 1998, Doyle, a person eighteen years of age or
    older, engaged in sexual intercourse with E.D., knowing that E.D. was his biological
    daughter. This sexual abuse of E.D., who was approximately eight to twelve years old at the
    2
    time, occurred repeatedly during the alleged time period.1
    On December 20, 2011, the State charged Doyle with one count of Class B felony
    incest and one count of Class A felony child molesting. On January 8, 2013, after the jury
    had been selected but prior to the beginning of trial, the parties filed a “Negotiated Plea
    Agreement.” Appellant’s App. p. 65. The trial court conducted a guilty plea hearing during
    which the parties discussed the plea and set forth a factual basis. Pursuant to the terms of the
    plea agreement, the State agreed to amend the charging information to reduce the charge of
    incest from a Class B felony to a Class C felony. Doyle agreed to plead guilty to the Class C
    felony incest charge. The parties also agreed that sentencing should be left to the sole
    discretion of the trial court. During the guilty plea hearing, the parties also clarified that the
    Class A felony child molesting charge would be dismissed in exchange for Doyle’s guilty
    plea. Following the guilty plea hearing, the trial court accepted Doyle’s guilty plea and
    scheduled a sentencing hearing for February 21, 2013.
    During the February 21, 2013 sentencing hearing, the trial court heard testimony from
    E.D. and E.D.’s mother. Both E.D. and her mother testified about how the abuse had
    negatively affected E.D.’s life and requested that the trial court impose a maximum sentence.
    At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement
    and scheduled a pronouncement hearing for February 26, 2013.
    1
    E.D. reported the sexual abuse by Doyle after learning that Doyle had molested another child. With
    respect to the allegations relating to the other child, Doyle was subsequently convicted under Cause Number
    15C01-1105-FA-10 (“Cause No. FA-10”) of Class A felony attempted child molesting and Class C felony
    intimidation. Doyle was sentenced to an aggregate term of fifty years. Doyle’s Class A felony attempted child
    molesting conviction was subsequently affirmed on appeal. See Doyle v. State, 15A05-1301-CR-39 (Ind. Ct.
    App. Aug. 14, 2013).
    3
    At some point between the February 21, 2013 sentencing hearing and the February 26,
    2013 pronouncement hearing, Doyle sent two “Inmate Request Forms” to the trial court in
    which Doyle indicated that he wished to withdraw his plea. Appellant’s App. pp. 73, 81. In
    addition, during the pronouncement hearing, Doyle’s counsel indicated that Doyle wished to
    withdraw his guilty plea. In making this request, Doyle expressed the belief that his trial
    counsel had indicated that similar charges that were pending in Ripley County would be
    dismissed if he pled guilty in the instant matter. Doyle did not present any other evidence in
    support of his belief. The trial court subsequently denied Doyle’s request and continued with
    the pronouncement hearing. At the conclusion of the pronouncement hearing, the trial court
    sentenced Doyle to an eight-year term of imprisonment. The trial court further ordered that
    Doyle’s sentence in the instant matter should be served consecutively to the fifty-year
    sentence imposed in Cause No. FA-10.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
    Doyle contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to
    withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, Doyle claims that his plea was induced by an illusory
    promise that charges of a similar nature that were pending in Ripley County would be
    dismissed if he pled guilty in the instant matter.
    A request to withdraw a guilty plea prior to the pronouncement of a sentence is
    governed by Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b). Initially we note that Indiana Code section
    35-35-1-4(b) requires that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea be in writing and verified.
    4
    Doyle did not file a written verified motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Rather he filed two
    unverified inmate request forms and made an oral statement at the beginning of the
    pronouncement hearing, expressing his desire to withdraw his guilty plea. Despite Doyle’s
    failure to comply with the requirements of Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b), we will
    nonetheless review Doyle’s claims on the merits.
    After entry of a plea of guilty … but before imposition of sentence, the
    court may allow the defendant by motion to withdraw his plea of guilty … for
    any fair and just reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by
    reliance upon the defendant’s plea.… The motion shall state facts in support
    of the relief demanded, and the state may file counter-affidavits in opposition
    to the motion. The ruling of the court on the motion shall be reviewable on
    appeal only for an abuse of discretion. However, the court shall allow the
    defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty … whenever the defendant proves that
    withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
    Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b). Doyle does not claim, much less prove, that he has suffered a
    manifest injustice as a result of pleading guilty. As such, the grant or denial of Doyle’s
    motion was within the discretion of the trial court. See Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b).
    A trial court abuses its discretion as to plea agreements only “when the
    failure of the trial court to grant the motion would result in either a manifest
    injustice to the defendant or in substantial prejudice to the State.” Weatherford
    v. State, 
    697 N.E.2d 32
    , 34 (Ind. 1998). The trial court’s ruling on a motion to
    withdraw a guilty plea arrives in our Court with a presumption in favor of the
    ruling. Coomer v. State, 
    652 N.E.2d 60
    , 62 (Ind. 1995). One who appeals an
    adverse decision on a motion to withdraw must therefore prove the trial court
    abused its discretion by a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Weatherford, 697 N.E.2d at 34
    . We will not disturb the court’s ruling where it was based on
    conflicting evidence. 
    Id. Johnson v.
    State, 
    734 N.E.2d 242
    , 244-45 (Ind. 2000). Upon review, we will examine the
    statements made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was
    5
    offered freely and knowingly. Brightman v. State, 
    758 N.E.2d 41
    , 44 (Ind. 2001).
    In the instant matter, upon receiving the plea agreement, the trial court conducted a
    guilty plea hearing. During the guilty plea hearing, the trial court engaged Doyle in the
    following conversation regarding the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea:
    Court:             Is it your intention to withdraw your earlier plea of not
    guilty and enter a plea of guilty here today pursuant to
    the terms and conditions of this [plea agreement]?
    Defendant:         Yes, sir.
    ****
    Court:             You have been represented by [trial counsel], are you
    satisfied with his representation?
    Defendant:         Yes, sir, I am.
    Court:             All right. At this time I want to go over this proposed
    [plea agreement]…again, I will be reviewing that with
    you at this time. The [plea agreement] says the State of
    Indiana will amend Count I of the Charging Information
    to Incest, a Class C Felony, under Indiana Code 35-46-1-
    2, and I have received a proposed…a Motion to Amend
    and a proposed Order as well as a proposed Amended
    Information which would read, “I, [investigating
    detective], do affirm under penalties for perjury that on
    or about between September 1, 1995, and August 1,
    1998, in Dearborn County, State of Indiana, that you a
    person eighteen years of age or older, date of birth:
    11/18/64, did engage in sexual intercourse with E.D.
    when Jesse Doyle, Jr. knew that E.D. is related to him
    biologically as his daughter. All of which is contrary to
    the form of the statute in such cases and provided, to-wit:
    Indiana Code 35-46-1-3, and against the peace and
    dignity of the State of Indiana.” These charges are
    signed by [the investigating detective] and they’re
    approved by the Prosecuting Attorney’s office. Any
    questions about the nature of these allegations?
    Defendant:         No, sir.
    Court:             And, [trial counsel], is there any objection to the
    amendment as proposed?
    [Defense Counsel]: No, Your Honor.
    Court:             The Motion to Amend is granted. The [plea agreement]
    6
    again says that you would…continues and says that you
    would enter a plea of guilty to Amended Count I of the
    Charging Information, Incest, a Class C Felony, which
    I’ve just read to you, and furthermore it says that
    pursuant to your plea of guilty you would be sentenced
    by the Court at the sole discretion of the Court pursuant
    to Indiana sentencing laws. Do you understand that, sir?
    Defendant:         Yes.
    Court:             And, sir, this [plea agreement] appears to bear your
    signature. Did you sign it?
    Defendant:         Yes, sir, I did.
    Court:             Did you read it before you signed it?
    Defendant:         Yes, sir, I did.
    Court:             Did you discuss it with your attorney?
    Defendant:         Yes, sir.
    Court:             Have I correctly stated the terms of this [plea agreement]
    as you understand them to be?
    Defendant:         Yes, sir.
    Court:             Also, I need to advise you that…Counsel, there is a
    possibility that this sentence could be run consecutive
    with another sentence. Is that correct?
    [The State]:       Yes, Your Honor.
    [Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
    Court:             Recently imposed by this Court. Concurrent sentencing
    means that sentences for these different offenses would
    be served at the same time…that would be concurrent. If
    they were served consecutive, that means you would
    serve and complete one sentence, and after you’ve served
    and completed one sentence you would then serve and
    complete the other sentence, they would be served one in
    addition to the other, they would be stacked on top of
    each other. Do you understand the difference between
    concurrent and consecutive sentencing?
    Defendant:         Yes, sir.
    ****
    Court:             Okay. Sir, one other thing I do want to clarify with you,
    is it’s my understanding you also have charges of a
    similar nature pending in Ripley County. Is that correct?
    Defendant:         Yes, sir.
    Court:             And, that the issues involving concurrent and
    consecutive sentencing could very well apply in that
    jurisdiction as well. Do you understand that?
    7
    Defendant:             Yes, sir.
    Court:                 Based upon your conviction here. Do you understand?
    Defendant:             Yes, sir.
    ****
    Court:                 Have you or anyone else received any promises besides
    this [plea agreement] or been given anything of value to
    have you enter the plea of guilty you’re making here
    today?
    Defendant:             No, sir.
    Court:                 Has anyone forced or threatened or placed you or anyone
    else in fear to have you plead guilty to these charges?
    Defendant:             No, sir.
    Court:                 Is the plea you’re offering here today your own free
    choice and decision?
    Defendant:             Yes, sir.
    Court:                 Is it still your intention to plead guilty to the charge as
    amended?
    Defendant:             Yes, sir.
    Court:                 At this time I need to know, sir, how do you plead to the
    offense as amended of Incest, a Class C Felony?
    Defendant:             Guilty, Your Honor.
    Guilty Plea Hr. Tr. pp. 14-21 (second through sixth ellipses in original).
    Doyle’s statements indicate that Doyle did not expect for the Ripley County charges to
    be dismissed in light of his plea in the instant matter. The trial court clarified that the instant
    guilty plea could have sentencing ramifications for the Ripley County charges. Doyle
    responded affirmatively that he understood that, if he were found guilty of the charged
    conduct in Ripley County, consecutive sentencing could potentially apply because of his
    guilty plea in the instant matter. Nothing in the record apart from Doyle’s self-serving
    statements indicates that the parties agreed to or even contemplated the dismissal of the
    Ripley County charges as a part of Doyle’s plea deal.
    Furthermore, to the extent that Doyle likens his situation to that discussed in Lineberry
    8
    v. State, 
    747 N.E.2d 1151
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), we note that the instant matter can easily be
    distinguished from Lineberry. In Lineberry, the defendant pled guilty after being promised
    that he could proceed with the appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence
    from trial. The evidence demonstrated that both the defense and the State acknowledged that
    this promise was made to the defendant despite the fact that the defendant’s guilty plea would
    render any such appeal 
    moot. 747 N.E.2d at 1156-57
    . Again, in the instant matter, unlike in
    Lineberry, there is no evidence supporting Doyle’s self-serving claim that his plea was
    improperly induced by a promise that the Ripley County charges would be dropped.
    The court’s questions to Doyle during the above-quoted conversation between Doyle
    and the trial court suggest an appropriate attempt to probe beneath the surface of the plea
    agreement and, if not elicit Doyle’s true motivation for pleading guilty, at least determine that
    the plea was knowing and voluntary.            In addition, Doyle’s statements during said
    conversation adequately demonstrate that Doyle voluntarily and knowingly pled guilty. As
    such, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Doyle’s request to
    withdraw his guilty plea.
    II. Appropriateness of Sentence
    Doyle also contends that his eight-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
    of his offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “The Court may
    revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,
    the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
    character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “‘concentrate less on comparing the
    9
    facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on
    the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced,
    and what it reveals about the defendant’s character.’” Paul v. State, 
    888 N.E.2d 818
    , 825
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Brown v. State, 
    760 N.E.2d 243
    , 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),
    trans. denied). The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is
    inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 
    891 N.E.2d 174
    , 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
    With respect to the nature of Doyle’s offense, the record demonstrates that Doyle
    repeatedly compelled his then-nine-to-twelve-year-old daughter, E.D., to engage in sexual
    intercourse. Doyle violated a position of trust by repeatedly sexually abusing E.D. E.D.
    testified at the sentencing hearing about how Doyle’s actions had negatively affected her life.
    Specifically, E.D. stated the following:
    Over the course of my young life there have been events that have left me
    feeling emotionally, physically and socially withdrawn from the world. Those
    events have unfortunately been caused by my so-called father. He has not only
    degraded me by dirty acts, but has left me scared and uncomfortable…not only
    with myself, but at the time with my family and friends. As a young girl in my
    pre-teen years I was threatened into believing he would hurt me or my family,
    and out of fear I never spoke a word, that is when I became angry and hated
    the times he felt compelled to keep me away from a world that he deemed
    beneath him. It hurt me to no end growing up and not being able to indulge in
    things kids my own age were doing.… Going to school wasn’t always a good
    thing, there were times that I kept to myself and felt out of place.… At the
    time I was afraid to speak of these events to anybody, and with that I live
    everyday with this anger believing the consequences from not telling, but what
    I’ve come to realize is that my family would have believed me and stood by me
    and made it all right. I also go through every day with embarrassment and
    shame for the fact of what exactly happened and by the hands of my so-called
    father, a father that is supposed to love, cherish and protect their child. I don’t
    see where it says to molest, hurt or abuse them.… All these feelings and
    haunted words have been unspoken for too long. To feel shame…not just for
    me, but my family who never knew, and siblings who were just as scared as
    10
    me to speak up, more shame follows in the respect of a sister who later fell
    under the same abuse after mine began, and a brother who knew his dad’s dark
    secrets and never knew how to help his sisters.
    Sent. Tr. pp. 33-35 (first and last ellipses in original). Doyle, for his part, claims that while
    his actions were “distasteful,” they are of the type “one would expect” for a charge of incest.
    Appellee’s Br. P. 10. We disagree and note that we find Doyle’s actions to be nothing short
    of deplorable.
    With respect to Doyle’s character, Doyle claims that, notwithstanding his convictions
    for and pending charges relating to child molestation, his criminal history is relatively minor.
    Doyle argues that because he is someone who “struggles with a problem that has never been
    treated and he’s never before been sent to prison,” Appellant’s Br. Pp. 10-11, his character is
    such that would warrant an advisory sentence. We disagree.
    The record demonstrates that Doyle is a repeat child molester. In addition to the
    instant conviction, Doyle’s criminal record also includes a conviction for Class A felony
    attempted child molesting and pending charges in Ripley County for Class A felony child
    molesting and Class B felony incest. There are also allegations of uncharged acts of child
    molestation against Doyle’s other daughter. Doyle’s criminal history also includes prior
    convictions for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated, Class D felony
    intimidation, and Class C felony intimidation. This criminal history does not reflect
    positively on Doyle’s character.
    In light of the deplorable nature of Doyle’s criminal actions as well as Doyle’s history
    of being a repeat child molester, we conclude that Doyle’s eight-year sentence is wholly
    11
    appropriate.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    BAILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.
    12