Timothy E. Strowmatt v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Jul 21 2014, 9:14 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT, PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY E. STROWMATT GREGORY F. ZOELLER
New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JUSTIN F. ROEBEL
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TIMOTHY E. STROWMATT, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 71A03-1402-PC-70
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable John M. Marnocha, Judge
Cause No. 71D02-1401-PC-4
July 21, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
PYLE, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Timothy E. Strowmatt (“Strowmatt”), pro se, appeals the trial court’s order
dismissing his petition for writ of state habeas corpus.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred by treating Strowmatt’s habeas corpus petition
as a petition for post-conviction relief and dismissing it as an unauthorized
successive post-conviction petition.
FACTS
In December 2004, Strowmatt had a bench trial before the St. Joseph Superior
Court and was convicted of two counts of Class C felony attempted criminal confinement
and found to be an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Strowmatt to an aggregate
term of twenty-eight years (i.e., consecutive terms of eight (8) years for each conviction
with Count I enhanced by twelve (12) years for his habitual offender determination).
Thereafter, Strowmatt filed a direct appeal, and we affirmed his convictions in
September 2005. See Strowmatt v. State, 71A03-0501-CR-22 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 9,
2005), trans. denied. Strowmatt later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the
post-conviction court denied. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of post-
conviction relief to Strowmatt in June 2010. See Strowmatt v. State, 71A05-0910-PC-
587 (Ind. Ct. App. June 18, 2010), trans. denied.
On July 26, 2013, Strowmatt, who is incarcerated in Henry County, filed a petition
for writ of state habeas corpus with the Henry Circuit Court. In his petition, Strowmatt
alleged that he was “illegally confined at the New Castle Correctional Facility under an
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illegal and erroneous sentence[.]” (App. 13). Strowmatt alleged that the trial court
should order his “immediate release” based on the following allegations of sentencing
errors: (1) his two attempted criminal confinement convictions constituted a “single
episode of criminal conduct” and the trial court should have sentenced him pursuant to
INDIANA CODE § 35-50-1-2(c); (2) the trial court exceeded its authority by sentencing
him to the statutory maximum sentence of eight years for each attempted criminal
confinement conviction “without submitting the facts to a jury[;]” and (3) the trial court
erred in sentencing him to consecutive sentences because it failed to “explain its
reason(s)” for imposing consecutive sentences. (App. 13).
On July 30, 2013, the Henry Circuit Court determined that Strowmatt’s petition
was improperly attacking the validity of his convictions and sentence and should be
treated as a post-conviction petition. The Henry Circuit Court then transferred the matter
to the St. Joseph Superior Court. On January 22, 2014, the St. Joseph Superior Court
entered an order dismissing Strowmatt’s habeas corpus petition after determining that it
was an unauthorized successive post-conviction petition. Strowmatt now appeals.
DECISION
Strowmatt argues that the trial court erred by treating his habeas corpus petition as
a post-conviction petition and dismissing it as an unauthorized successive post-conviction
petition.
INDIANA CODE § 34–25.5–1–1 provides that “[e]very person whose liberty is
restrained, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire
into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered from the restraint if the restraint is
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illegal.” “‘The purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to bring the person in custody
before the court for inquiry into the cause of restraint.’” Partlow v. Superintendent,
Miami Correctional Facility, 756 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting O’Leary
v. Smith, 219 Ind. 111, 113, 37 N.E.2d 60, 60 (1941)), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
“One is entitled to habeas corpus only if he is entitled to his immediate release from
unlawful custody.” Id. (quoting Hawkins v. Jenkins, 268 Ind. 137, 139, 374 N.E.2d 496,
498 (1978)). “[A] petitioner may not file a writ of habeas corpus to attack his conviction
or sentence.” Id. When a petitioner files a habeas corpus petition challenging the
validity of his conviction or sentence, Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1 provides that such
a petition shall be “transfer[ed] . . . to the court in which the conviction took place” and
treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c). See
also Partlow, 756 N.E.2d at 980 (explaining that “a petitioner must file a petition for
post-conviction relief in the court of conviction (rather than a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the court in the county of incarceration) when he attacks the validity of his
conviction or sentence and/or does not allege that he is entitled to immediate discharge”),
(citing Ind. Post–Conviction Rule 1).
Here, while Strowmatt asserted in his habeas corpus petition that he was entitled to
immediate release, it is clear that his petition is challenging the validity of his sentence.
Indeed, in his appellate brief, Strowmatt asserts that either the Henry Circuit Court or the
St. Joseph Superior Court “could [have] correct[ed] the sentencing error(s) as raised.”
(Strowmatt’s Br. at 5). Because Strowmatt’s petition challenges the validity of his
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sentence, the trial court properly treated it as a post-conviction petition and transferred it
to the St. Joseph Superior Court where he was convicted and sentenced. See, e.g., Miller
v. Lowrance, 629 N.E.2d 846, 847 (Ind. 1994) (explaining that a petitioner’s habeas
corpus petition challenging the validity of his conviction and sentence fell within the
parameters of Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c), which required the trial court to transfer the
petition to court where he was convicted and sentenced), reh’g denied; Martin v. State,
901 N.E.2d 645, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the petitioner’s habeas corpus
petition that challenged his convictions and sentence was required to be transferred to the
court where he was convicted and sentenced).
The trial court also properly dismissed Strowmatt’s petition as an unauthorized
successive post-conviction petition. Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that when
a petitioner’s post-conviction “petition is not the first for post-conviction relief a
petitioner has filed, that petitioner must follow the procedure outlined in P-C.R. 1(12) for
filing successive petitions.” Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind. 2008). Under
Post-Conviction Rule 1(12), a petitioner must file, with the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme
Court and Indiana Court of Appeals, a petition seeking permission to file a successive
post-conviction petition as well as a proposed successive petition for post-conviction
relief. See P-C.R. l(12)(a). If a petitioner establishes a “reasonable possibility that [he] is
entitled to post-conviction relief,” this Court will authorize the filing of the successive
post-conviction petition, which is then filed in the court where the petitioner’s first post-
conviction relief petition was adjudicated. See P-C.R. l(12)(b), (c).
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Here, Strowmatt has already filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and this
Court affirmed the denial of that petition. Thus, upon receiving Strowmatt’s habeas
corpus petition and treating it as a post-conviction petition, the trial court properly
dismissed Strowmatt’s petition as an unauthorized successive petition. See State ex rel.
Woodford v. Marion Superior Court, 655 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Ind. 1995) (affirming the trial
court’s dismissal of a successive post-conviction petition where the petitioner had not
been given persmission to file the petition). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
dismissal of Strowmatt’s petition.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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