Miguel Castillo v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Jan 10 2013, 8:30 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
KRISTINA J. JACOBUCCI GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Newby, Lewis, Kaminski & Jones, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
LaPorte, Indiana
GEORGE P. SHERMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MIGUEL CASTILLO, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 46A03-1204-CR-158
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAPORTE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Kathleen B. Lang, Judge
Cause No. 46D01-1006-FB-131
January 10, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Miguel Castillo appeals his convictions and sentence after a jury found him guilty
of criminal confinement, as a Class B felony; battery, as a Class C felony; strangulation,
as a Class D felony; and for being an habitual offender. Castillo raises the following four
issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
Castillo’s mid-trial request for a competency evaluation;
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted
Castillo’s mid-trial request to proceed pro se;
3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offenses and his character; and
4. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it did not
specify to which conviction Castillo’s habitual offender adjudication
attached.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the late evening hours of June 10, 2010, Castillo restrained, severely beat, and
strangled his girlfriend, V.M., with whom he was living. After he had beaten V.M.,
Castillo sat on the front porch while V.M. called 9-1-1. When police arrived, Castillo
told the officer, “You might as well cuff me. . . . I beat the shit out of her.” Transcript at
115.
V.M. was transported to the emergency room at St. Anthony’s Hospital in
Michigan City, where she was treated for facial trauma. Her face was bruised and
swollen. There was also bruising around her neck, and she had a nasal fracture.
2
On June 18, 2010, the State charged Castillo with criminal confinement, as a Class
B felony; battery, as a Class C felony; and strangulation, as a Class D felony. The State
later alleged Castillo to be an habitual offender.
The trial court held Castillo’s jury trial between January 17, 2012, and January 19,
2012. After the State rested, Castillo moved to have his counsel withdrawn so Castillo
could proceed pro se. Before the court ruled on Castillo’s motion, Castillo’s counsel
moved to have Castillo evaluated for competency. The court, outside the presence of the
jury, heard testimony from an officer regarding Castillo’s recent behavior. The court
then denied Castillo’s motion for a competency evaluation, stating as follows:
During the entire proceeding, the Defendant has been taking notes. He has
had conversations at counsel table . . . about his defense. He may not agree
with the strategy. The strategy may be in conflict, and he has represented
to the Court that there are questions that have not been . . . asked that he felt
. . . should have been asked.
He was able to tell me in response to my questions what a habitual
criminal count was, what it might mean to him in terms of his sentence. He
told me what his three charges were correctly, and what class felony they
were. There is not any evidence on the record that Mr. Castillo does not
understand these proceedings or what’s going on.
Id. at 259. The court then granted Castillo’s motion to proceed pro se.
Following the trial, the jury found Castillo guilty as charged. The court entered its
judgment of conviction and sentenced Castillo to an aggregate term of thirty-five years
executed. This appeal ensued.
3
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Issue One: Competency
Castillo first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
mid-trial request for a competency evaluation. As we have explained:
The trial and conviction of one without adequate competence is a denial of
federal due process and a denial of a state statutory right as well. However,
. . . the right to a competency hearing pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1 is
not absolute. Such a hearing is required only when a trial judge is
confronted with evidence creating a reasonable or bona fide doubt as to a
defendant’s competency, which is defined as whether a defendant currently
possesses the ability to consult rationally with counsel and factually
comprehend the proceedings against him. Whether reasonable grounds
exist to order evaluation of competency is a decision that will be reversed
only if we find that the trial court abused its discretion. A trial judge’s
observations of a defendant in court are an adequate basis for determining
whether a competency hearing is necessary; such a determination will not
be lightly disturbed. Furthermore, predictable stress from facing one’s own
felony trial does not warrant a competency hearing. Finally, when the
circumstances do not indicate that a trial court should sua sponte order a
competency hearing, the defendant has the burden of establishing that
reasonable grounds for such a hearing exist.
Campbell v. State, 732 N.E.2d 197, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added; citations
and footnote omitted).1 When we review a trial court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion, we consider the evidence favorable to the decision and we will not reweigh
the evidence. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
As stated above, the trial court denied Castillo’s request for a competency
evaluation largely based on the court’s own observations of Castillo in court. On appeal,
1
We note that the trial court held a “competency hearing of sorts” when it permitted Castillo’s
counsel to call an officer as a witness. See Campbell, 732 N.E.2d at 202 n.1. But this evidentiary hearing
“was not a hearing in accordance with I.C. § 35-36-3-1, which requires the appointment of professionals
to examine a defendant and testify as to their opinion regarding competency.” Id. Nonetheless, the
court’s hearing “does indicate an effort by the trial court to ascertain all of the information . . . before
deciding that a hearing under I.C. § 35-36-3-1 was unnecessary. Such an inquiry further validates the trial
court’s conclusion.” Id.
4
Castillo’s arguments emphasize his own statements during his trial2 and seek to have this
court credit those statements above the trial court’s observations. This is, in effect, a
request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Id.
Further, the court’s observations of Castillo in court were “an adequate basis for
determining” that a competency hearing was unnecessary. Campbell, 732 N.E.2d at 202.
As the court observed, Castillo took notes throughout the proceeding and engaged his
counsel in determining the best strategy for his defense. And Castillo was both aware of
and understood the charges against him. Accordingly, based on the evidence most
favorable to the court’s decision, Castillo cannot demonstrate a reasonable or bona fide
doubt as to his competency. See id. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Castillo’s request for a competency evaluation.
Issue Two: Pro Se Representation
Castillo next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted his
mid-trial request to proceed pro se.3 The crux of Castillo’s argument here is his claim
that “[t]he right of self-representation must be asserted within a reasonable time prior to
the day on which trial begins.” Appellant’s Br. at 17 (emphasis original) (discussing
Russell v. State, 270 Ind. 55, 383 N.E.2d 309, 313-15 (1978)). That is, Castillo asserts
that his request to proceed pro se was an unlawful request. But Indiana law plainly
2
We also note that Castillo had been declared competent to stand trial prior to the
commencement of his trial.
3
The State does not suggest that this issue is precluded by the invited error doctrine.
5
allows a defendant to proceed pro se mid-trial if that is his choice. E.g., Minneman v.
State, 466 N.E.2d 438, 440-41 (Ind. 1984). Accordingly, this issue is without merit.4
Issue Three: Appellate Rule 7(B)
Castillo also contends that his thirty-five year aggregate sentence is inappropriate
in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Although a trial court may have
acted within its lawful discretion in determining a sentence, Article VII, Sections 4 and 6
of the Indiana Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a
sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007) (alteration original). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) requires the
appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his
offenses and his character. See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d
867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We assess the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition
of aggravators and mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence
imposed was inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
However, “a defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met
th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration
original).
4
Castillo does not argue that his request to proceed pro se was not made knowingly, voluntarily,
or intelligently. Indeed, the record shows that the trial court advised Castillo of the perils of self-
representation, and in granting Castillo’s request the court appointed Castillo’s counsel as stand-by
counsel. See Minneman, 466 N.E.2d at 440. In addition, insofar as Castillo’s argument on this issue is
premised on his request for a competency evaluation, for the reasons stated in Issue One we affirm the
trial court’s decision.
6
Moreover, “sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial
court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d
1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor
an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented. See id. at 1224. The principal
role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we
regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the
culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and
myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.
In sentencing Castillo, the trial court stated as follows:
This case involves a vicious incident of domestic violence. . . .
***
There are numerous aggravating factors. This is a crime of violence
resulting in serious physical injury to the victim. The harm suffered by the
victim was not only significant, it was greater than the elements necessary
to prove the commission of the charged offense. The numerous injuries to
the [v]ictim’s face and throat are far greater than what is required to prove a
conviction for Battery. Defendant has a significant criminal history with
previous convictions for Armed Robbery and Burglary, as a Class B
Felony. According to the Presentence Investigation, Defendant was on
probation . . . when he committed this offense.
March 8, 2012, Transcript at 4, 6. Again, the trial court ordered Castillo to serve thirty-
five years. In particular, the court ordered Castillo to serve twenty years on his Class B
felony conviction, with an additional fifteen years for being an habitual offender. The
trial court imposed eight years for the additional convictions, but ordered those years to
run concurrent with Castillo’s sentence for the Class B felony.
7
On appeal, Castillo asserts that the nature of the offenses is mitigated by his quick
surrender and his expressions of remorse.5 Castillo further states that he “suffers from
antisocial personality disorder that contributes to his episodes of physical aggression and
violence.”6 Appellant’s Br. at 20. We cannot agree that Castillo’s sentence is
inappropriate.
Regarding the nature of the offenses, Castillo was convicted of a Class B felony, a
Class C felony, and a Class D felony, and he was found to be an habitual offender. His
convictions arose from an argument he had with his girlfriend, which ended after Castillo
confined, restrained, severely beat, and strangled her. As a result of the attack, V.M.’s
eyes were almost swollen shut and she sustained a nasal fracture.
Regarding his character, Castillo has an extensive history of violent crime. He has
prior felony convictions for armed robbery and burglary, as well as several prior charges
of battery. Further, he committed the instant offenses while on probation in another
cause.
We cannot say that Castillo’s thirty-five year sentence is inappropriate. And
insofar as Castillo argues for additional mitigating circumstances, we note that the trial
court ordered eight years of Castillo’s sentence to run concurrent with Castillo’s sentence
on the Class B felony. We affirm Castillo’s sentence.
5
We do not consider Castillo’s assertions, based on his own statements and contrary to the jury’s
verdict, that V.M. struck him before he battered her.
6
We disagree with the State’s assertion that Castillo has not argued both prongs of Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B).
8
Issue Four: Habitual Offender Enhancement
Finally, Castillo argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it did
not specify to which of his three convictions the habitual offender enhancement attached.
It is true that, “[i]n the event of simultaneous multiple felony convictions and a finding of
habitual offender status, trial courts must impose the resulting penalty enhancement upon
only one of the convictions and must specify the conviction to be so enhanced.” Carter v.
State, 686 N.E.2d 834, 839 (Ind. 1997). But when a defendant’s convictions are affirmed
on appeal, and the sentences for those convictions are to run concurrently, we will not
remand for resentencing to apply an habitual offender enhancement to a specific offense.
See id.; see also Webster v. State, 628 N.E.2d 1212, 1214 (Ind. 1994), abrogated on other
grounds, Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999).
Here, as explained above, we affirm Castillo’s convictions. And, again, the trial
court’s sentences for each of the underlying felonies were ordered to run concurrently.
But while the trial court committed a “technical error” when it did not specify to which
conviction the habitual offender enhancement attached, see Webster, 628 N.E.2d at 1214,
it is clear from the trial court’s sentencing order that it attached the habitual offender
enhancement to Castillo’s Class B felony conviction. The court ordered a thirty-five year
executed term. That term can only consist of the sentence on the Class B felony
conviction, twenty years, enhanced by fifteen years for being an habitual offender. Thus,
remand on this issue is not necessary.
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Conclusion
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Castillo’s motion for a competency
evaluation and its grant of his motion to proceed pro se. We further hold that Castillo’s
sentence is not inappropriate, and that the trial court’s technical error in its sentencing
statement is not reversible error.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
10