Keith Crawford v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
VALERIE K. BOOTS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
J.T. WHITEHEAD
Deputy Attorney General
FILED
Indianapolis, Indiana
Jul 24 2012, 9:20 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
KEITH CRAWFORD, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1112-CR-648
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Steven R. Eichholtz, Judge
Cause No. 49G20-1106-FA-42703
July 24, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
KIRSCH, Judge
Keith Crawford (“Crawford”) appeals from his sentence for one count of dealing
cocaine1 as a Class A felony, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
find the hardship his incarceration would cause to his mother from losing the assistance he
provided to her in caring for Crawford’s paraplegic sister as a mitigating circumstance.
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts relevant to this appeal reveal that the State proved at trial that Crawford
knowingly delivered 0.0954 grams of cocaine to an undercover police officer within one
thousand feet of Indianapolis Public School #54 on September 21, 2010. Although the jury
found Crawford guilty of two charges, the trial court entered judgment of conviction only on
the count alleging that Crawford had committed the offense of dealing in cocaine as a Class
A felony, finding that the other charge merged with that count. At the conclusion of
Crawford’s sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years executed in
the Department of Correction with ten years suspended to probation and credit for time
served prior to sentencing. Crawford now appeals his sentence.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Trial courts are required to enter sentencing statements whenever imposing sentence
for a felony offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on
reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). The statement must include a reasonably detailed recitation of
the trial court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Id. If the recitation includes a
1
See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.
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finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must identify all
significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has
been determined to be mitigating or aggravating. Id.
Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are
reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the
decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id.
One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is by failing to enter a
sentencing statement at all. Id. Other examples include entering a sentencing statement that
explains reasons for imposing a sentence, including a finding of aggravating and mitigating
factors if any, but the record does not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits
reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or the
reasons given are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. Because the trial court no
longer has any obligation to “weigh” aggravating and mitigating factors against each other
when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in
failing to “properly weigh” such factors. Id. at 491.
Once the trial court has entered a sentencing statement, which may or may not include
the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, it may then “impose any sentence that is .
. . authorized by statute; and . . . permissible under the Constitution of the State of Indiana.”
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d). If the sentence imposed is lawful, this court will not reverse
unless the sentence is inappropriate based on the character of the offender and the nature of
the offense. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); Boner v. State, 796 N.E.2d 1249, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App.
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2003). The burden is on the defendant to persuade this court that his sentence is
inappropriate. Patterson v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1058, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Crawford argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find as a
mitigating circumstance the hardship that would be caused to his mother in the event he
received a sentence providing for a lengthy period of incarceration. The sentencing range for
a Class A felony is a fixed term of between twenty and fifty years with an advisory sentence
of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4. In this case, the trial court sentenced Crawford to a
fixed term of thirty years, with ten years suspended to probation.
At his sentencing hearing, Crawford presented testimony from his mother, Ada
Anderson, about her reliance upon Crawford for help. She testified that Crawford helped her
take care of her paraplegic daughter and served as a maintenance man at the childcare
business she operated. She testified that he had been working for her for approximately
eighteen years. On appeal, Crawford argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to find as a mitigating circumstance the hardship Crawford’s long-term incarceration
would cause his mother. We disagree.
In the trial court’s oral sentencing statement, the trial court expressed its consideration
of several factors. The trial court noted Crawford’s criminal history and that his current
conviction was his twenty-fourth adult conviction, and fourth felony conviction. The trial
court also considered the particular circumstances of the crime and concluded that
Crawford’s actions more closely resembled the acts prohibited by statute than most cases.
Crawford had to walk across the street near a school and completed the transaction while
children were playing on the playground while school was in session. The trial court
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observed that, while the amount of cocaine delivered was a relatively small amount, because
of Crawford’s prior criminal history, he was required to serve at least twenty years in the
Department of Correction. Immediately prior to imposing the sentence, the trial court
addressed the topic of Crawford’s assistance to his mother and the care required by his sister.
We note that trial courts are not required to state that all proffered mitigating
circumstances were considered, just those that are considered to be significant. Gray v. State,
790 N.E.2d 174, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Furthermore, a trial court is not required to find
mitigating factors or to accept as mitigating the circumstances proffered by a defendant. Id.
at 178. That said, the trial court’s oral sentencing statement in this case reflects that the trial
court considered the argument that Crawford’s mother and sister needed his assistance.
Although the trial court did not explicitly label the factors considered as aggravating or
mitigating, such was reflected in the actual sentence imposed. The trial court imposed the
advisory sentence and then suspended ten years of that sentence to probation. The executed
portion of Crawford’s sentence was the minimum provided for by statute, which Crawford
acknowledged could not be suspended further due to his criminal history. Moreover, his
criminal history and the particular circumstances of the crime, alone or in combination,
would have justified an enhanced sentence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when sentencing Crawford.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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