Tyson A. Hudson v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Dec 31 2013, 8:19 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID M. ZENT GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill Attorney General of Indiana
Fort Wayne, Indiana
RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TYSON A. HUDSON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A03-1305-CR-178
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable John F. Surbeck, Jr., Judge
Cause No. 02D06-1112-FC-390
December 31, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge
Case Summary
Tyson A. Hudson was convicted of battering his pregnant girlfriend. He now
appeals arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for Class C
felony battery on a pregnant woman and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. Finding
the evidence sufficient, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts most favorable to the verdicts are as follows. On December 2, 2011,
Hudson and Kenyota Pickett had been in a relationship for over six years and lived together
in a Fort Wayne apartment. They had a five-year-old son, and Kenyota was pregnant with
their second child.1
At some point on the evening of December 2, Hudson and Kenyota began arguing
about taking Hudson’s “sister” home.2 The argument started in the dining room but moved
to the bedroom to get away from Hudson’s “sister.” The argument escalated in the
bedroom. Hudson jumped on Kenyota; kicked her; pulled her hair, causing some hair plugs
to come out; and choked her by placing his hands around her neck, causing her to almost
lose consciousness. Tr. p. 71, 106, 137, 159; State’s Ex. 2.
When Kenyota stood up, she ran toward the door and opened it, but Hudson stopped
her. They went outside, and Hudson put Kenyota in the car even though Kenyota did not
want to go anywhere. Tr. p. 72. Kenyota was forced to stay in the car because the
1
Kenyota was seven months pregnant at trial—February 28, 2012. Tr. p. 2, 68. Working backward,
Kenyota was between four and five months pregnant on December 2, 2011. In any event, Hudson knew
that Kenyota was pregnant because he went with her to the Hope Center when Kenyota took a pregnancy
test.
2
This person was not Hudson’s sister but rather someone he referred to as his sister. Tr. p. 70.
2
passenger door did not work. While in the car, Kenyota called her mother, Kimberly
Pickett. Id. at 136. Kimberly could hear that Kenyota was crying and upset. Id. When
Kimberly asked Kenyota if everything was okay, Kenyota said that she and Hudson had
gotten into an argument. Kimberly started to ask more questions, but Kenyota hung up.
Kimberly called back and asked Kenyota if she was okay; Kenyota said no, but she did not
want to talk about it. Id. Kenyota told her mother that she and Hudson were taking his
“sister” home. Id.
After Hudson dropped off his “sister,” he and Kenyota returned to their apartment.
Kenyota went to sleep but was soon awakened by Hudson arguing with her again. Id. at
73. Kenyota got the car keys and left for her mother’s house. When Kenyota got to her
mother’s house, she stayed outside and talked to Hudson on the phone. Id. at 74. Hudson
coaxed Kenyota to come back home. When Kenyota arrived at their apartment, she stayed
in her car on the phone and continued to argue with Hudson. Eventually, Kenyota went
inside and fell asleep.
Kimberly called her daughter the following morning, December 3. Kimberly asked
Kenyota if she would like to go to lunch. Kenyota agreed and went to her mother’s house.
When Kenyota arrived, Kimberly immediately noticed “a big bruise on her forehead” and
“scratches around her neck.” Id. at 137. Kenyota also showed Kimberly her hair where
three hair plugs were missing. Id. Kenyota, who was upset and crying, told her mother
that Hudson had “jumped on” her and “grabbed her neck and held her down on the floor
by her head on the carpet and maybe even kicked her and choked her and was pulling her
hair.” Id. This caused Kimberly to cry. Kimberly immediately called Kenyota’s father,
3
Kenneth Brown, but because she could not get a hold of him, Kimberly, Kenyota, and some
family members went out to lunch.
About an hour later, Kenneth called Kimberly, and Kimberly handed the phone to
Kenyota. After the phone call, Kenneth, Kimberly, and Kenyota planned to go to
Kenyota’s apartment and call the police. Id. at 138. But when Kenyota hesitated, Kenneth
went to the apartment by himself. Id. at 138, 147. Kenneth waited outside the apartment
door and could hear Hudson threatening Kenyota over the phone. Specifically, Hudson
called Kenyota a “bit**” and told her that if she did not come home soon, “there would be
consequences.” Id. at 148. Upon hearing this, Kenneth entered the apartment, startling
Hudson. The two men started yelling at each other. Kenneth asked Hudson what happened
to Kenyota, and Hudson responded that he and Kenyota had been “rough housing” and
Kenyota fell off the bed. Id. at 151. Kenneth did not believe Hudson and warned Hudson
that he had “five seconds” before he “was going to blow his head off.” Id. Kenneth,
however, did not have a gun with him. According to Kenneth, Hudson quickly “retracted
his story” and admitted to inflicting “some violence” on Kenyota. Id. at 148, 151.
In the meantime, Kenyota drove to her apartment to find her father and Hudson
there. Id. at 79, 141. Fort Wayne Police Department Officer James Chambers was
dispatched to the apartment because of a 911 call and arrived shortly after Kenyota. Id. at
80, 116. Officer Chambers went inside the apartment and spoke with Hudson and Kenyota
together. Officer Chambers described Kenyota as “very timid,” “scared,” and “[q]uiet.”
Id. at 118. Officer Chambers left the apartment without making any arrests.
4
About thirty minutes later, when Hudson had left the apartment, Kenyota and her
mother called 911. Officer Chambers was dispatched back to the apartment. Id. at 80, 119.
When Officer Chambers arrived the second time, Kimberly was still “scared” and “very
timid.” Id. at 119. This time, though, Officer Chambers had a more in-depth conversation
with Kenyota. Id. Kenyota told Officer Chambers that she did not say anything during his
first visit because she was scared of Hudson. Id. Officer Chambers observed abrasions on
Kenyota’s neck and an abrasion on her forehead. Id. at 120. Officer Chambers took
pictures. See State’s Ex. 7-9. Kenyota told Officer Chambers that Hudson inflicted the
injuries. Tr. p. 121-22.
Several days later, on December 7, Kenyota met with Officer Robert Warstler, who
was working with the domestic-violence unit at the time. Kenyota told Officer Warstler
that Hudson had choked her, and she demonstrated how Hudson’s hands were around her
neck. Id. at 159. Kenyota also told Officer Warstler that she felt she was going to lose
consciousness and that Hudson told her “you are going to die,” at which point they fell
from the bed to the floor. Id.
The State charged Hudson with Class C felony battery on a pregnant woman, Class
D felony strangulation, and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. Before trial, the State
dismissed the strangulation charge.
At Hudson’s jury trial, Kenyota testified to a different version of events. According
to Kenyota, she became injured because Hudson “was holding me and trying to stop me
from hitting him, so we were like tussling . . . on the floor and I ended up getting a carpet
burn on my forehead.” Id. at 71. As for the scratches on her neck, Kenyota explained it
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this way: “I guess he tried to cover my mouth but his hands ended up around my neck and
I guess it slipped off my chain too . . . .” Id. Kenyota said that she called 911 the second
time because she wanted to get away from Hudson at the time and felt pressured to do so
because the officer told her she was risking custody of her children if she continued to have
a relationship with Hudson. Id. at 101-03. Kenyota admitted that she and Hudson were
“still madly in love” but maintained that what she told people earlier about the incident was
untrue. Id. at 104-05.
The jury found Hudson guilty of Class C felony battery and Class A misdemeanor
domestic battery. The trial court sentenced Hudson to an aggregate term of five years with
two years suspended. Sent. Tr. p. 15-16.
Hudson now appeals his convictions.
Discussion and Decision
Hudson contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his Class C felony
battery and Class A misdemeanor domestic-battery convictions.3 When reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, we neither
reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d
133, 135 (Ind. 2012). The evidence—even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences
drawn from it are viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction. Id. “[W]e affirm if
there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from
which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id.
3
We note that Hudson does not raise a double-jeopardy violation.
6
In order to convict Hudson of Class C felony battery on a pregnant woman as
charged here, the State had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally touched Kenyota,
who was pregnant and Hudson knew to be pregnant, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner,
resulting in bodily injury to Kenyota. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(8); Appellant’s App. p. 15.
In order to convict Hudson of Class A misdemeanor domestic battery as charged here, the
State had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally touched Kenyota, with whom he had
a child in common, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, resulting in bodily injury to
Kenyota. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1); Appellant’s App. p. 17.
Hudson only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for two elements. That is,
Hudson argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly
and intentionally touched Kenyota and that he caused bodily injury to Kenyota.
Appellant’s Br. p. 9. According to Hudson, he “does not dispute the additional elements
within the charging informations.” Id.
“A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it
is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2. “A person engages in conduct
‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he
is doing so.” Id. Hudson argues that it “was neither [his] conscious objective to batter
[Kenyota], nor was he aware of a high probability that he was doing so.” Appellant’s Br.
p. 9. Hudson points to Kenyota’s trial testimony that Hudson was holding her to prevent
her from hitting him, which caused the carpet burn to her forehead. He also points to
Kenyota’s trial testimony that he was only trying to cover her mouth and that the injury to
Kenyota’s neck was the result of his hands slipping.
7
The evidence most favorable to the verdicts shows that Hudson knowingly touched
Kenyota, resulting in bodily injury to her. Kenyota’s mother, Kimberly, testified at trial—
without objection—that Kenyota told her that Hudson had jumped on her, grabbed her
neck, held her down by her head on the carpet, kicked her, choked her, and pulled her hair.
Tr. p. 137. Kimberly observed a large bruise on Kenyota’s forehead, scratches on her neck,
and missing hair plugs. Officer Chambers testified at trial—without objection—that during
his second visit, he observed abrasions on Kenyota’s neck and an abrasion on her forehead.
Id. at 120. Officer Chambers took pictures. See State’s Ex. 7-9. Officer Chambers testified
that Kenyota told him that Hudson inflicted the injuries. Tr. p. 121-22. Likewise, Officer
Warstler testified at trial—without objection—that Kenyota told him that Hudson had
choked her, and she demonstrated how Hudson’s hands were around her neck. Id. at 159.
Kenyota also told Officer Warstler that she felt she was going to lose consciousness and
that Hudson told her “you are going to die,” at which point they fell from the bed to the
floor. Id. This evidence is sufficient to prove that Hudson knowingly touched Kenyota,
resulting in bodily injury to her.
As for Hudson’s other arguments—including that Kenyota testified to a different
version of events at trial, the police left the apartment the first time without arresting
anyone, and Kenyota felt pressured to pursue charges against Hudson to maintain custody
of her children—these are merely requests to reweigh the evidence. We therefore affirm
Hudson’s convictions for Class C felony battery and Class A misdemeanor domestic
battery.4
4
Because of this resolution, we do not need to address the State’s cross-appeal issue that the trial
court erred by allowing Hudson to file a belated notice of appeal.
8
Affirmed.
RILEY, J., and MAY, J., concur.
9