Mauricio Reyes-Flores v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


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  •  Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                      May 29 2014, 10:13 am
    court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                                 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    BRYAN LEE CIYOU                                          GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    LORI SCHMELTZER                                          Attorney General of Indiana
    Ciyou & Dixon, P.C.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    JESSE R. DRUM
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    MAURICIO REYES-FLORES,                                   )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                              )
    )
    vs.                                      )      No. 49A05-1310-CR-502
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                        )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                               )
    APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Kurt Eisgruber, Judge
    The Honorable Steven Rubick, Magistrate
    Cause No. 49G01-1209-FC-63636
    May 29, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    FRIEDLANDER, Judge
    Mauricio Reyes-Flores appeals his convictions of class C felony Criminal
    Recklessness1 and class A misdemeanor Domestic Battery.2 Reyes-Flores presents a single
    issue for our review: Was the evidence sufficient to support his convictions?
    We affirm.
    The facts favorable to the judgment establish that on July 13, 2011, Reyes-Flores was
    living in Indianapolis with his wife, Juana Rubio-Castillo. That morning, Reyes-Flores
    became angry with Rubio-Castillo while she was driving him to work. While the car was
    moving, Reyes-Flores began striking Rubio-Castillo in her head and face with his knuckles,
    causing her intense pain. Reyes-Flores then grabbed her hair and pushed her head under the
    steering wheel so that she could no longer see the road, and he continued hitting her. Reyes-
    Flores then grabbed the steering wheel and pulled it to one side, and Rubio-Castillo tried to
    pull it back the other way. Rubio-Castillo was able to apply the brakes and pull her head
    from beneath the steering wheel just as the car struck a tree. Rubio-Castillo suffered serious
    injuries a result of the accident, including a broken foot, a broken clavicle, injuries to her
    liver, and severe pain.
    As a result of these events, the State charged Reyes-Flores with class C felony
    criminal recklessness, class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and class A misdemeanor
    battery. Following a bench trial, the trial court found Reyes-Flores guilty as charged and
    1 
    Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-2-2
     (West, Westlaw current with all legislation of the 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 118th
    General Assembly (2014) with effective dates through May 1, 2014).
    2 I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3 (West, Westlaw current with all legislation of the 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 118th General
    Assembly (2014) with effective dates through May 1, 2014).
    2
    merged the battery charge into the domestic battery conviction. Reyes-Flores was sentenced
    on September 24, 2013. Reyes-Flores now appeals.
    Reyes-Flores argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
    convictions. Specifically, he argues that Rubio-Castillo’s testimony should be disregarded as
    incredibly dubious. The standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled; this court
    will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Jackson v. State,
    
    925 N.E.2d 369
     (Ind. 2010). Rather, we will consider only the evidence favorable to the
    judgment and all reasonable inferences therefrom. Alvies v. State, 
    905 N.E.2d 57
     (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2009). We will not reverse for insufficient evidence unless no rational fact-finder could
    have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark v. State, 
    728 N.E.2d 880
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to
    support a conviction, even where the witness in question is the victim. Ferrell v. State, 
    565 N.E.2d 1010
     (Ind. 1991).
    The doctrine of incredible dubiosity, however, allows a reviewing court to reevaluate
    the credibility of a witness when “a sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony
    and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence.” Fajardo v. State, 
    859 N.E.2d 1201
    ,
    1208 (Ind. 2007). “Application of the rule is rare and the standard to be applied is whether
    the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person
    could believe it.” 
    Id.
     The rule does not apply when testimony is corroborated by additional
    witnesses or circumstantial evidence. Thompson v. State, 
    765 N.E.2d 1273
     (Ind. 2002).
    3
    In order to convict Reyes-Flores of class C felony criminal recklessness as charged,
    the State was required to prove that he recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally inflicted
    serious bodily injury on Rubio-Castillo by means of a deadly weapon. I.C. § 35-42-2-2. Our
    Supreme Court has noted that a vehicle may be considered a deadly weapon. DeWhitt v.
    State, 
    829 N.E.2d 1055
     (Ind. 2005). Additionally, “serious bodily injury” is defined in
    relevant part as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes . . .
    extreme pain [or] permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily
    member or organ[.]” 
    Ind. Code Ann. § 35-31.5-2
    -292 (West, Westlaw current with all
    legislation of the 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 118th General Assembly (2014) with effective dates
    through May 1, 2014). Rubio-Castillo testified that, while she was driving the car, Reyes-
    Flores pushed her head under the steering wheel so that she could no longer see the road and
    then began pulling on the steering wheel. Rubio-Castillo also testified that as a result of the
    crash, she suffered a broken foot, a broken clavicle, an injury to her liver, and severe pain.
    At the time of trial, she continued to use a cane because her foot had not healed properly.
    This evidence was plainly sufficient to support a conviction for class C felony criminal
    recklessness.
    To convict Reyes-Flores of class A misdemeanor domestic battery as charged, the
    State was required to prove that he (1) knowingly or intentionally touched Rubio-Castillo in a
    rude, insolent, or angry manner, (2) resulting in bodily injury to Rubio-Castillo, and (3)
    Rubio-Castillo is or was living as if Reyes-Flores’s spouse. “Bodily injury” is defined as
    “any impairment of physical condition, including physical pain.” I.C. 35-31.5-2-29 (West,
    4
    Westlaw current with all legislation of the 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 118th General Assembly
    (2014) with effective dates through May 1, 2014). It is undisputed that Rubio-Castillo and
    Reyes-Flores were married and living together at the time of the offense. Rubio-Castillo
    testified that while she was driving Reyes-Flores to work, he began hitting her in her face and
    head and pulling her hair, causing physical pain and a large bruise to the right side of her
    head. This evidence was plainly sufficient to support a conviction for class A misdemeanor
    domestic battery.
    Nevertheless, in arguing for the application of the incredible dubiosity rule, Reyes-
    Flores insists that it was “physically impossible” for him to have pushed Rubio-Castillo’s
    head under the steering wheel and that Rubio-Castillo’s description of events would require
    Reyes-Flores “to have three (3) hands, one to hold her head down underneath the steering
    wheel, one to beat her and pull her hair, and one to hold the steering wheel in an attempt to
    gain control over the vehicle.” Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (emphases in original). The trial
    court rejected these arguments, and so do we. We find nothing inherently improbable about
    Rubio-Castillo’s testimony, and it was plainly sufficient to support Reyes-Flores’s
    convictions.
    Judgment affirmed.
    MATHIAS, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A05-1310-CR-502

Filed Date: 5/29/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021