Charles D. Stutz v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before FILED
any court except for the purpose of Dec 21 2012, 9:04 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
SCOTT KNIERIM GREGORY F. ZOELLER
The Law Office of Scott Knierim, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Danville, Indiana
GEORGE P. SHERMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CHARLES D. STUTZ, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 32A04-1205-CR-255
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HENDRICKS SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Stephenie D. LeMay-Luken, Judge
Cause No. 32D05-1202-FD-137
December 21, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
A jury convicted Appellant-Defendant Charles Stutz of Class D felony resisting
law enforcement and Class D felony intimidation after he refused an Indiana State
Trooper’s instruction to step out of his vehicle, subsequently led the Trooper on a twenty-
six-mile police chase, and later threatened to kill a Hendricks County Sherriff’s Corporal.
Stutz appeals his convictions, arguing that his right to a fair trial was violated when
members of the jury twice observed him in the custody of law enforcement officers. We
conclude that Stutz failed to demonstrate that a juror actually observed him while in
custody or that he was prejudiced by such an observation. Stutz also challenges the
admission of evidence that, prior to Stutz’s charged conduct, two witnesses told the
Trooper that Stutz had admitted to drinking alcohol and was behaving strangely.
Concluding that this testimony was relevant to the issue of why the Trooper approached
Stutz, and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by any prejudice it
may have caused, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of February 5, 2012, Mindy Reynolds was driving home from
work with Kristin Harasty and a third woman. The motorists were traveling westbound
on Interstate 70 from Indianapolis to Plainfield, and, as they exited the interstate via the
ramp to Ronald Regan Parkway, one of the tires on Reynolds’s vehicle “exploded.” Tr.
p. 154. Reynolds pulled to the side of the road and began considering her options. Only
a few minutes later, Stutz, driving a tow truck, happened upon the motorists and offered
to change the flat tire. Reynolds accepted his offer.
Indiana State Police Trooper Evan Joyner arrived on the scene just before Stutz
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finished changing the tire. After first speaking with an Indiana Department of
Transportation employee, who also had stopped to help, Trooper Joyner spoke to the
motorists. Harasty and Reynolds told Trooper Joyner that Stutz had admitted to them
that he had been drinking alcohol that evening and that he had been behaving strangely.
Suspecting that Stutz had been driving under the influence of alcohol, Trooper Joyner
approached Stutz, who by then was seated in the driver’s seat of his tow truck, and asked
for his identification. Trooper Joyner verified Stutz’s identity and then asked Stutz to
step out of his truck. Stutz asked why, and Trooper Joyner repeated his instruction to
step out. When Stutz asked why a second time, Trooper Joyner retreated to the rear of
the truck. At this time, Stutz “squealed the tires” and drove off. Tr. p. 218.
Trooper Joyner ran backed his patrol car, informed dispatch of Stutz’s flight, and
then followed Stutz with his car’s emergency lights and siren activated. Stutz did not pull
over. Instead, he led Trooper Joyner on a twenty-six-mile police chase through
Hendricks County, during which Stutz traveled as fast as seventy-five miles per hour,
drove in the lane of oncoming traffic, and failed to stop at numerous stop lights and stop
signs. The chase ended in Plainfield, where Trooper Joyner and two Plainfield Police
Officers were able to box in Stutz’s tow truck and bring it to a stop.
Plainfield Police Officers extracted Stutz from his tow truck and forced him to the
ground. Stutz resisted the officers’ attempts to put him in handcuffs, but he eventually
was subdued. Once in custody, Stutz was taken to the Hendricks County Jail, where he
angrily commented to Trooper Joyner: “Next time [I’m] going to be armed.” Tr. p. 234.
Hendricks County Sherriff’s Corporal Kris Allen then transported Stutz to a hospital to
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receive medical treatment for a non-serious laceration on his brow. At the hospital, Stutz
was “enraged” and said to Corporal Allen, “I’ll kill that trooper,” “And I’ll kill you too.”
Tr. p. 311. Stutz also commented, “I was good in the police chase[, and if that ever
happens again], ‘I’ll see how good I am in a gun battle.’” Tr. p. 346. Once back at the
jail, Stutz stated several more times, “I’m going to kill that trooper.” Tr. p. 312.
On February 7, 2012, the State charged Stutz with two counts of Class D felony
resisting law enforcement and one count each of Class D felony intimidation, Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class A misdemeanor criminal recklessness,
Class A misdemeanor aggressive driving, Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and
Class B misdemeanor reckless driving. During proceedings on these charges, Stutz twice
alleged that members of the jury had observed him in the custody of law enforcement,
requesting a mistrial on each occasion. The first alleged sighting occurred during jury
selection, when, Stutz claimed, he was seen wearing jail clothes and being escorted to the
restroom by a Sheriff’s Deputy. The second occurred during trial; Stutz claimed a juror
saw him being placed into and removed from a police vehicle outside the courthouse.
The trial court denied both of Stutz’s mistrial motions.
Also during trial, Stutz repeatedly objected under Evid. R. 401 and 403 to the
admission of evidence concerning what the motorists told Trooper Joyner prior to his
approaching Stutz. Harasty testified that she told Trooper Joyner that Stutz was “acting
like he was on something,” “told us that he had been drinking,” and “made weird, lewd
comments and faces … to us.” Tr. p. 180. The trial court sustained Stutz’s objection “as
to character” and instructed the jury not to consider the testimony about Stutz’s
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comments1 in forming its conclusion. Tr. p. 181.
Harasty went on to testify that she told Trooper Joyner that Stutz “did something
weird with his tongue,” “raised his eyebrows up and down,” and “made a weird … wide
grin.” Tr. p. 183. The trial court overruled Stutz’s objection to these statements,
admitting them for the purpose of establishing Trooper Joyner’s motive for approaching
Stutz. Harasty continued:
[H]e told us not to be scared over and over again and not to call the police
over and over again. He also said, “I’m sorry for getting so close to you;
I’ve been drinking a lot of beer and eating a lot of food tonight. Don’t be
scared and don’t call the cops. You shouldn’t be afraid of me. This is my
business. I have a legitimate business[;] you shouldn’t be scared of me.”
Tr. p. 184.
Reynolds similarly testified that she told Trooper Joyner that Stutz was “acting
very erratic, talking to himself, sticking his face up to the passenger-side window …
while he was changing the tire and that he told us … when he first pulled up that he had
been … out drinking” because it was Super Bowl Sunday. Tr. p. 164. The trial court
overruled Stutz’s objection to this testimony as well.
The jury found Stutz guilty of one count each of Class D felony resisting law
enforcement, Class D felony intimidation, and Class A misdemeanor criminal
recklessness. The jury also determined Stutz to be a habitual offender. Ultimately, the
trial court vacated Stutz’s conviction for Class A misdemeanor criminal recklessness and
sentenced Stutz to consecutive terms of three years each on the remaining two counts.
Stutz’s intimidation sentence was enhanced by four years because of his habitual offender
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The trial court later sustained Stutz’s objection to a line of questioning regarding Stutz’s
inappropriate facial expressions.
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status, giving him a total sentence of ten years of incarceration. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Denying Stutz’s Motions for a Mistrial
Stutz argues that his motions for a mistrial should have been granted based on his
allegations that one or more jurors saw him in the custody of law enforcement. “The
decision to grant or deny a mistrial lies within the discretion of the trial court.” Ortiz v.
State, 741 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (Ind. 2001). “The trial court’s determination will be
reversed only when an abuse of discretion can be established.” Francis v. State, 758
N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 2001). “To prevail, the appellant must show that he was placed in
a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected.” Id. “The gravity
of the peril is determined by the probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision.” West
v. State, 758 N.E.2d 54, 56 (Ind. 2001). “There must be more than mere speculation that
the event in question happened and that the juror was prejudiced before a mistrial may be
ordered.” Trotter v. State, 838 N.E.2d 553, 558 (Ind. Ct. 2005) (citing Harris v. State,
231 N.E.2d 800, 807 (Ind. 1967)).
Here, Stutz presented no evidence that any juror saw him while in custody other
than his general contentions that one did. As such, we can only speculate as to the
identity of the particular juror, the degree of observation, and the likelihood of prejudice.
We note, however, that “[a] juror’s view of a defendant in a jail uniform in the custody of
police does not necessarily prejudice the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.”
Id. “Jurors should not be surprised to see defendants in the custody of police while in the
courthouse.” Id. Because Stutz has not demonstrated that a juror observed him while in
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custody or that any harm resulted from such a sighting, we cannot say the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Stutz’s motions for a mistrial.
II. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Admitting the Motorists’ Testimony
Stutz argues that the trial court erred in admitting Harasty’s and Reynolds’s
testimony that they told Trooper Joyner that Stutz stated to them that he had been
drinking alcohol that evening and that he was behaving strangely. “The admission or
exclusion of evidence is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will
reverse only upon abuse of that discretion.” Johnson v. State, 671 N.E.2d 1203, 1205
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
Stutz claims that Harasty’s and Reynolds’s testimony is not relevant to Stutz’s
charged conduct of resisting law enforcement and intimidation, which occurred after the
motorists spoke with Trooper Joyner. We disagree. “[E]vidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence” is considered
relevant under Evid. R. 401. “The trial court is accorded with wide latitude in ruling on
the relevancy of evidence.” Wallace v. State, 486 N.E.2d 445, 446 (Ind. 1985). Here,
Harasty’s and Reynolds’s testimony is relevant to the issue of why Trooper Joyner
approached Stutz after arriving on the scene. Trooper Joyner testified that he approached
Stutz because he believed Stutz might be driving under the influence of alcohol, and the
motorists’ testimony provides a basis for that belief. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting this evidence
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Stutz also claims that the motorists’ testimony places him in a bad light and is
unfairly prejudicial. “Relevant evidence is admissible, Evid. R. 402, unless its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, Evid. R. 403.”
Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 124 (Ind. 1999). “The evaluation of whether the
probative value of a particular item of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice is a discretionary task best performed by the trial court.” Bostick v.
State, 773 N.E.2d 266, 271 (Ind. 2002). Here, we are not persuaded that Harasty’s and
Reynolds’s testimony created a substantial risk of unfair prejudice, especially in light of
Stutz’s own testimony at trial. Stutz admitted that he disobeyed Trooper Joyner’s
instruction to step out of his tow truck and that he drove off instead. Stutz also admitted
that he refused to pull over when Trooper Joyner pursued him and that he led officers on
a lengthy police chase. Additionally, Stutz testified that he made statements to Corporal
Allen about arming himself for future encounters with law enforcement, lending credence
to Corporal Allen’s testimony that Stutz made a threat on Corporal Allen’s life. We
cannot say that the admission of Harasty’s and Reynolds’s testimony was an abuse of
discretion.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.
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