In the Matter of the Parent-Child Relationship of: A.C. (Minor Child) and E.C. (Mother) and R.C. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT (MOTHER): ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARIANNE WOOLBERT GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT (FATHER): ROBERT J. HENKE
CHRISTINE REDELMAN
WESLEY D. SCHROCK Deputy Attorney Generals
Anderson, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
May 28 2014, 9:49 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF THE )
TERMINATION OF THE PARENT- )
CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: )
)
A.C. (MINOR CHILD) )
AND )
E.C. (MOTHER) AND R.C. (FATHER) )
) No. 48A02-1310-JT-875
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. )
)
THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )
CHILD SERVICES, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY
The Honorable G. George Pancol, Judge
Cause No. 48C02-1305-JT-16
May 28, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
E.C. (“Mother”) and R.C. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the
involuntary termination of their parental rights to their child, A.C. Mother and Father
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Mother and Father are the biological parents of A.C., who was born on June 5,
2010. On December 27, 2011, when A.C. was one and a half years old, the Department
of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Father was incarcerated1 and Mother,
who was caring for A.C. alone, had recently suffered a nervous breakdown requiring
hospitalization.2 The report also stated that Mother had attempted suicide by drinking
household cleaning liquids in July 2011 and again in November 2011 and suffered from
mental health problems and drug abuse.
On December 28, 2011, DCS Family Case Manager Russell Beatty (“FCM
Beatty”) visited Mother’s home. Mother admitted to FCM Beatty that she had attempted
suicide twice that year and had suffered a nervous breakdown. Mother showed her
prescription medication to FCM Beatty and told him that she had been diagnosed with
PTSD, anxiety, ADHD, panic attacks, lumbar/back pain, and possibly bi-polar disorder.
Mother also told FCM Beatty that Mother’s parental rights had been involuntarily
1
Father was incarcerated on a probation violation for a diluted drug screen. Father’s probation was part
of his sentence for a 2006 conviction for domestic violence committed against his ex-wife.
2
Mother and two of her older children were victims of a house fire on December 19, 2003. On
December 18, 2011, police found Mother lying on the ground in the middle of a public street, screaming.
Mother’s hospitalization was apparently prompted by the impending arrival of the anniversary of the 2003
house fire, as well as Father’s recent incarceration.
2
terminated with regard to her other four children.3 FCM Beatty observed A.C. to be
“happy, healthy, and content.” Appellant Father’s App. p. 3. FCM Beatty also visited
Father in jail. Father told FCM Beatty that he was concerned for the safety of A.C. in
Mother’s care.
Two days later, on December 30, 2011, DCS detained A.C. on an emergency basis
and placed her with her paternal grandparents (“Grandparents”). On January 3, 2012,
after the trial court’s authorization, DCS filed its affidavit of probable cause for A.C.’s
detention and a verified petition alleging A.C. is a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”).
The petition alleged that Mother had twice attempted suicide in 2011, that Mother
reported that she had suffered a nervous breakdown in December 2011, that Mother
reported various mental and physical health problems, that Mother’s parental rights to
four other children had already been terminated, that Father was incarcerated on a
probation violation, that Father was on probation due to his conviction for domestic
violence against his ex-wife, and that Father was concerned for A.C.’s safety while she
was in Mother’s care. The trial court held a detention hearing on January 4, 2012.
Parents appeared at the hearing, were found to be indigent, and were appointed counsel.
Parents admitted the allegations in the CHINS petition and A.C. was adjudicated a
CHINS.
3
Mother entered into a program of Informal Adjustment due to allegations of medical neglect and
hygiene issues with four of her other children and her home in 2006. In December 2006, DCS detained
the four children after Mother was arrested for Neglect of Dependents for Operating a Motor Vehicle
while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident. The children were adjudicated as CHINS in
December 2006. As ordered by the trial court, Mother completed a substance abuse program but relapsed.
She neither completed a psychological evaluation nor secured suitable housing or stable employment and
was arrested several times while the case was pending. She also failed to visit her children for more than
a year. Her parental rights were terminated to those four children on May 29, 2009.
3
On February 8, 2012, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. At the hearing,
the court approved DCS’s permanency plan of reunification, removed A.C. from Parents’
care, and maintained A.C.’s placement with Grandparents. The court also ordered
Parents to: (1) participate in counseling; (2) complete a drug and alcohol assessment and
follow all of the recommendations of that assessment; (3) complete a psychological
evaluation and follow the recommendations of that evaluation; (4) obtain and maintain a
legal and regular source of income; (5) visit with A.C. regularly; (6) abstain from illegal
drug use; (7) submit to random drug screens; and (8) obey the law.
Pursuant to the court’s order, Mother received substance abuse treatment at Aspire
Indiana (“Aspire”), a local mental health center, from April to August 2012. However,
during and after her participation in the therapy program, she tested positive on four of
ten random drug screens for medications for which she had no prescription, including
oxycodone, oxymorphone, hydrocodone, and Xanax. Mother also participated in a
cognitive-behavioral group therapy program at Aspire beginning in March 2012, but she
missed most of her appointments and sometimes failed to take her prescribed medication.
Her prognosis for this therapy program was guarded and poor. Eventually, she was
discharged from Aspire due to her withdrawal from services.4
Father completed substance abuse and mental health evaluations at Aspire. In
August 2012, he also completed a substance abuse and mental health group therapy
program at Aspire, although he regularly failed to test positive for his prescribed mental
4
Both Mother and Father stopped participating in services at Aspire after DCS filed its petition to
terminate parental rights.
4
health medications and although, while he was in the program, he had a positive drug
screen for unprescribed hydrocodone, temazepam, oxycodone, and oxymorphone and
Xanax. In September 2012, after Father completed that group therapy program, he began
participating in an anxiety and depression group therapy program. He was discharged
unsuccessfully after he stopped attending in April 2013.
On July 11, 2012, the trial court held a review hearing. At the hearing, the court
found that Parents had not “enhanced their ability to fulfill their parental obligations,”
“participated in services consistently,” or “maintained contact with DCS.” DCS Exhibit
13. Some six months later, on January 2, 2013, the trial court held a permanency hearing.
At the hearing, the court approved DCS’s permanency plan, which was still, at this point,
A.C.’s reunification with Parents.
During the six month period between July, 2012, and January, 2013, Parents were
permitted supervised visits with A.C. at Grandparents’ home. However, Parents visited
A.C. inconsistently. In November 2012, the supervised visits were moved to Aspire’s
offices. Parents began visiting there with A.C. consistently but were at least twenty
minutes late to nearly every visit. Beginning in the winter of 2012-2013, Parents were
permitted to visit with A.C. in their own home, but those visits were often cut short when,
usually without any apparent provocation, Mother would begin to act inappropriately and
childishly in front of A.C., screaming, crying, throwing objects, and crawling under
furniture. Approximately a month after the home visits began, FCM Weir discovered a
“very thick furry mold” covering the walls in several rooms of Parents’ home.
Thereafter, Parents’ visits with A.C. returned to Aspire offices, where Parents missed
5
many of their scheduled visits. The visits ended in April 2013, after a visit supervisor
determined that Mother’s agitation and outbursts during the visits upset and endangered
A.C. Parents were permitted to visit A.C. at Grandparents’ home, but Parents’ only visit
with A.C. after the Aspire supervised visits ended was on A.C.’s birthday.
On May 16, 2013, DCS filed a motion to modify the February 2012 dispositional
order and, two weeks later, on May 31, 2013, filed a petition for involuntary termination
of parental rights. After a June 26, 2013 hearing on DCS’s motion to modify the
dispositional order, the trial court granted DCS’s motion, finding that, since entry of the
dispositional decree, Parents have “continue[d] to have substance abuse problems,” had
to end visits early due to Mother’s behavior, had stopped visiting A.C. altogether, and
had “been very evasive with DCS,” moving several times and not reporting their change
of address to DCS. The order stated that reunification services would no longer be
provided for Parents.
On September 3, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on DCS’s petition to
terminate parental rights. On the date of this hearing, both Mother and Father were
unemployed with no stable source of income, were separated, and both were without a
home of his or her own. Mother was living with her former landlord, and Father was
living with his daughter and granddaughter. At the hearing, FCM Weir testified that
Parents “never reached the point that it was safe [to visit with A.C.] unsupervised.” Tr. p.
19. She stated that there were no overnight visits between A.C. and Parents because “it
just wasn’t a safe situation . . . with [Mother’s] mental health issues and her behavior.”
Id. She stated that A.C. is “doing very well” in Grandparents’ care. She testified that the
6
circumstances which prompted A.C.’s removal from Parents’ home have not been
alleviated “at all.” Id. at 20. She opined that continuation of the parental relationship
was a threat to A.C.’s well-being because “she sees you know mom screaming and
car[ry]ing on and then [A.C.] becomes upset and [A.C. has] made the statement in visits
several times that mom’s sick and she [gets] upset when mommy gets like that.” Id.
Court appointed special advocate Kelsey Antrim (“CASA Antrim”), was
appointed by the trial court on August 1, 2013, and after reviewing all of the court reports
from A.C.’s CHINS case, testified that her recommendation was that parental rights be
terminated. CASA Antrim stated, “I think it’s important for especially as young as she is
to have that stability and permanency in her life.” Tr. p. 85.
Following the hearing on DCS’s petition to terminate parental rights, the trial
court issued an order terminating Parents’ parental rights. The court’s findings of fact
provided, in relevant part:
10. Father received substance abuse group therapy at Aspire, but had
positive drug screens after completion of his recommended therapy.
11. Mother received substance abuse group therapy at Aspire, but had
positive drug screens before and after completion of her recommended
therapy.
12. DCS administered ten (10) random drug screens to Father. He tested
positive on five (5) of them for medications for which he had no valid
prescription, including hydrocodone, temazepam, oxycodone, and
oxymorphone.
13. DCS administered ten (10) random drug screens to Mother. She tested
positive on four (4) of them for medications for which she had no valid
prescription, including oxycodone, oxymorphone, hydrocodone, and Xanax.
7
14. Father made only moderate progress during his depression/anxiety
group therapy at Aspire. He attended roughly half of his scheduled
meetings, and his prognosis was guarded. However, once DCS filed its
petition to terminate parental rights, Father failed to return to Aspire and
was discharged due to his withdrawal from services.
15. Mother made no progress in her dialectical behavior group therapy at
Aspire. She attempted to engage in the recommended therapy on three
separate occasions, but was unsuccessful each time. She missed most
appointments, was occasionally medication noncompliant, and her
prognosis was guarded and poor. Eventually, Mother failed to return to
Aspire and was discharged due to her withdrawal from services.
16. On three occasions, a supervised visit had to be stopped due to
Mother’s agitation and vocal outbursts upsetting the Child. Once DCS filed
its petition to terminate parental rights, Mother failed to return to Aspire
and she was discharged due to her withdrawal from services.
17. On the date of final hearing, Parents were still able to have supervised
visitation with Child in the pre-adoptive home, but Parents maintained only
minimal contact with Child.
18. On June 5, 2012, Mother plead[ed] guilty to public intoxication and was
sentenced to 363 days probation.
19. On August 6, 2013, Mother plead[ed] not guilty to operating while
intoxicated, her license was suspended, and her case was set for trial.
20. Mother’s parental rights were terminated to four (4) prior children in
2009.
21. Parents have never had an overnight visit or a trial home visit with
Child due to a general lack of stability.
22. On the date of final hearing, Parents were unemployed and had no
stable source of income with which to support and maintain Child.
Appellant Father’s App. pp. 22-25.
The trial court made the following conclusions of law:
Based on the foregoing and pursuant to Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2), the
Court determines that the child, [A.C.], has been removed from the care and
8
custody of her Parents, [] for more than six (6) months under a dispositional
decree. The Court also finds that there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in Child’s removal from Parents, and the reasons
for placement outside the home, will not be remedied as Parents did not
successfully complete the positional orders issued by this Court. At this
time, Parents are not in a position to provide the care that Child requires.
Child has been in relative care since December 30, 2011—more than
twenty (20) months—and Parents are not any closer to having Child return
to their care than when Child was first removed. As such, this Court finds
that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
well-being of Child. Specifically, Parents have failed to demonstrate that
they are ready, willing, and able to care for Child. The Indiana Department
of Child Services has never been in a position to recommend that Child be
reunified with Parents. Termination is in the best interest of Child. Finally,
the Indiana Department of Child Services has a satisfactory plan for Child,
which is adoption.
Appellant Father’s App. p. 28.
Mother and Father now appeal.5
Standard of Review
On appeal, Mother and Father both argue that DCS failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the conditions that resulted in A.C.’s removal would not be
remedied, that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to A.C., or that
termination of parental rights is in A.C.’s best interests. Father also challenges the trial
court’s findings of facts.
We begin our review by acknowledging that when reviewing a termination of
parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses.
In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider
5
Mother and Father filed separate appellate briefs. We admonish Father’s appellate counsel that
counsel’s deliberate ommission of certain facts important to our analysis fails to comply with Indiana
Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(b), which requires that appellate briefs provide a narrative and fair statement of
the facts in a light most favorable to the judgment.
9
only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id.Moreover, in deference to the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will
set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly
erroneous. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
Here, in terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, the trial court entered
specific factual findings and conclusions. When a trial court’s judgment contains specific
findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review.
Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005).
First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we
determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly
erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by
inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and
inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.
Discussion and Decision
“The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B.,
666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must
subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the
circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and
physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child
should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child,
10
parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her
parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.
Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, the
State is required to allege and prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted
in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home
of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a
child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
“The State’s burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear
and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting
Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2). If the trial court finds that the allegations in a petition described
in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
Initially, we observe that Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires a trial
court to find that only one of the three elements of subsection (b)(2)(B) has been
established by clear and convincing evidence before properly terminating parental rights.
See L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209. Because we find them to be dispositive, we limit our review
to Father’s challenge of the court’s findings of fact and to Parents’ allegations of error
pertaining to subsections (b)(2)(B)(i) and (b)(2)(B)(ii) of Indiana’s termination statute,
11
namely, whether DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable
probability that (1) the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal will not be
remedied and (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
well-being of the child.
I. Findings of Fact
Father challenges the trial court’s findings that Father’s progress in therapy is
“moderate” and his prognosis is “guarded,” arguing (1) that Aspire employees who
testified at the termination hearing stated that he completed his services and (2) that those
witnesses did not use the words “moderate” or “guarded.” However, Father’s argument
amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See In re D.D.,
804 N.E.2d at 365. Father ignores the fact that the trial court also considered
documentation submitted by Aspire which indicated that Father attended approximately
half of his scheduled depression and anxiety group therapy sessions and was ultimately
discharged unsuccessfully from the program with a prognosis of guarded. Furthermore,
the evidence shows that, once DCS filed its petition to terminate parental rights, Father
abandoned the services altogether. Because the record contains facts that support the
challenged findings, we conclude that Father has not shown that these findings are clearly
erroneous.
II. Conditions Remedied
Mother and Father argue that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that the
conditions justifying A.C.’s removal are not likely to be remedied. When determining
whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child’s removal
12
and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must
judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination
hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d
509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. In so doing, the trial court may consider the
parent’s response to the services offered through the Department of Child Services. Lang
v. Starke County Office of Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007), trans. denied. Additionally, DCS is not required to rule out all possibilities of
change; rather, it need establish “only that there is a reasonable probability that the
parent’s behavior will not change.” In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007).
Mother argues that her own behavior does not indicate that “she is unwilling to
cooperate with [DCS]” and, therefore, the trial court improperly terminated her parental
rights. Appellant Mother’s Br. at 13. She attempts to excuse her lack of compliance with
the ordered reunification services by contending, “At the time of the termination hearing
Mother did not complete all services due to the fact DCS had stopped paying for them
and she did not have the money to pay herself to continue.” Id. She maintains that she
“want[s] to get her life straightened out,” and emphasizes that she obtained counseling on
her own after DCS stopped paying for the services and that she completed a substance
abuse evaluation at Aspire. Id. at 15. Finally, she argues:
Mother was not given sufficient opportunity to heal from her trauma. She
was held to the same standard for completion of services as people who had
not been through what she had that deeply affected her. She was treated as
if there were no serious issues she had survived and that she should respond
as a typical person who had not been through what she had would.
13
Id.
Father argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
conditions that resulted in A.C.’s removal would not be remedied because there was “no
evidence at trial that Father had disobeyed the law,” he “completed his [substance abuse]
group therapy,” he “never missed a visit” with A.C., he “followed the recommendations”
of the drug and alcohol assessment by Aspire; he completed a psychological evaluation,
submitted to random drug screens, and because “there was never any testimony from any
witness suggesting that Father used illegal drugs.” Appellant Father’s Br. at 12-13.
Father admits that he has not obtained or maintained a regular source of income but
argues that his “failure to comply with this one item is not enough upon which the Court
could base its conclusion.” Id. at 14.
The record demonstrates that neither Mother nor Father completed a psycho-
parenting evaluation and only participated in home-based therapy services for about a
month. Both Mother and Father were unemployed, with no source of income or home of
their own. After A.C. was removed from Parents’ home, Parents visited A.C.
inconsistently, were often late, and eventually stopped visiting A.C. altogether. Both
Mother and Father have criminal histories,6 and Mother’s parental rights were terminated
with regard to her four other children, even after she was offered services for three years.
6
On June 5, 2012, Mother pleaded guilty to public intoxication. She was sentenced to 178 days,
suspended to 363 days of probation. On August 13, 2013, Mother pleaded not guilty to Class A
misdemeanor and Class C misdemeanor operating while intoxicated and Class A misdemeanor driving
while suspended. Mother’s license was suspended and her case was scheduled to be tried in October
2013.
14
FCM Weir testified that Mother and Father have moved frequently in an attempt to evade
DCS. FCM Weir also testified that Mother and Father never exercised any unsupervised
visits with A.C. because they “never reached the point that it was safe [A.C.],” and that
the reasons that prompted A.C.’s removal were “not at all” alleviated. Tr. pp. 19-20.
The trial court made numerous and detailed findings indicating that both Mother
and Father have a history of serious substance abuse and mental health problems. Both
Parents failed to complete their behavior therapy programs. Even after receiving
substance abuse counseling, Mother and Father tested positive for unprescribed
medication and failed to test positive for prescribed mental health medication. Despite
the extensive services offered to them since A.C. was removed, including substance
abuse treatment, mental health treatment, counseling, and supervised visitation, Parents
were not able to remedy the circumstances which led to A.C.’s removal, to the degree
that even an unsupervised visit with A.C. would have been unsafe. Therefore, Parents
failed to adequately demonstrate that the trial court erred in concluding that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions necessitating A.C.’s removal will be remedied.
See In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming trial court’s
determination that there was a reasonable likelihood that conditions which led to
placement of children who had been removed from their mother’s home in foster care,
rather than with their father, would not be remedied, so that termination of father’s
parental relationship was warranted; father had not provided housing or support for his
children, at time of termination hearing had not obtained facilities to house his children,
had failed to appear for numerous hearings, had not sought any services, and had visited
15
children only three times); see also Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 372 (“[A] pattern of
unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing
social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support[s] a finding that there
exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.”)
Although we recognize that Father and Mother did participate in some services,
simply going through the motions of receiving services alone is not sufficient if the
services do not result in the needed change, or only result in temporary change. “Where
there are only temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall
progress, the court might reasonabl[y] find that under the circumstances, the problematic
situation will not improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Under these facts and circumstances, we conclude that DCS presented ample
evidence to support the trial court’s determination that there is a reasonable probability
the conditions resulting in A.C.’s removal from Father’s and Mother’s care will not be
remedied. The parents’ arguments to the contrary amount to an invitation to reweigh the
evidence, which we may not do. See Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 149 (stating that trial court is
vested with responsibility of resolving conflicting testimony and an appellate court may
not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility).
III. Threat to Child’s Well-Being
Termination of parental rights is proper where the child’s emotional and physical
development is threatened. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans.
denied. The court need not wait until a child is harmed irreversibly such that her
physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired. Id.16
A trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the time of
the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re
J.T., 742 N .E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The trial court must also
“evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future
neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly
considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history
of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.
A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002), trans. denied.
Here, the record shows that Mother has a history of serious mental health issues
and has repeatedly behaved inappropriately in front of A.C., causing A.C. to become
upset. The record also indicates that Mother and Father have failed to take initiative to
address their mental health problems by taking their prescribed medications or
completing mental health treatment programs. Furthermore, positive drug screens
indicate that Mother and Father have failed to address their substance abuse problems,
despite having received counseling. Both Mother and Father are unemployed, with no
housing of their own.
Parents’ arguments here amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which
we will not do. Thus, based on the record, we are satisfied that the facts support the trial
court’s conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to
A.C.’s well-being.
17
IV. Best Interests of Child
Finally, both Mother and Father argue that the trial court’s conclusion that
termination was in A.C.’s best interest was clearly erroneous. In determining whether
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to
look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. In re
J.C., 994 N.E.2d 2778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “A parent’s historical inability to provide
adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the
same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the
child’s best interests.” Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an
important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of
the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best
interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
We have already noted both Parents’ financial and housing instability, failure to
successfully complete a majority of the court-ordered reunification services, and
unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues. Furthermore, both FCM Weir and
CASA Antrim testified that terminating the parent-child relationship would be in A.C.’s
best interest. Based on the totality of the evidence, we conclude that there is sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s findings and ultimate determination that termination
of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights is in A.C.’s best interests. See In re B.J., 879
N.E.2d 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming trial court’s conclusion that termination of
mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests; evidence showed that, at the
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time of the termination hearing, mother had not completed court-ordered services, which
included intensive outpatient program for her substance abuse problem and mental health
treatment for her depression, and children were progressing well in their new home); see
also In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004) (evidence supported conclusion that termination of mother’s parental rights
was in child’s best interests; evidence demonstrated that mother had history of substance
abuse and mental health problems; despite extensive services offered to mother, including
substance abuse treatment, psychiatric evaluations, psychiatric care, medications,
counseling, housing, and financial assistance, mother failed to adequately demonstrate a
change in the conditions that necessitated child’s continued removal, and, during
therapeutic visitations between child and mother, child’s counselor had concerns that
mother placed child in an adult role and made inappropriate comments in front of child).
Conclusion
The specific findings set forth above clearly and convincingly support the trial
court’s determination that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions leading to
A.C.’s removal will not be remedied and that continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to A.C.’s well-being. These conclusions, in turn, support the trial court’s
ultimate decision to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to A.C. For all of
these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights.
Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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