Idowa Hood v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of May 28 2014, 9:38 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ANTHONY C. LAWRENCE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
LARRY D. ALLEN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IDOWA HOOD, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 48A02-1309-CR-828
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Angela Warner Sims, Judge
Cause Nos. 48C01-9710-CF-210 & 48C01-9801-CF-8.
May 28, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Chief Judge
Case Summary
A trial court’s sentencing order must include, among other things, the amount of
credit time a defendant has earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing. In
this case, the trial court simply estimated Idowa Hood’s pretrial credit time rather than
calculating the precise amount of pretrial credit time he had earned. We conclude that
this was error and therefore reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
Hood pled guilty to Class B felony burglary in April 1998. The trial court
sentenced Hood to eight years in the Department of Correction, with six years executed
and two years suspended to probation.
The State had charged Hood with Class A felony arson just before he pled guilty
to burglary. In May 2000, a jury found Hood guilty of Class A felony arson, and the trial
court sentenced Hood to thirty years in the DOC, with twenty-five years executed and
five years suspended to probation. The trial court ordered Hood’s arson sentence to run
consecutive to his burglary sentence.
In September 2009, Hood’s arson sentence was modified to allow him to serve the
remainder of that sentence in a work-release program. Hood’s placement in the work-
release program was revoked less than a year later when Hood absconded from the
program. The trial court ordered Hood to serve the remainder of his arson sentence in the
DOC, with five years suspended to probation.
Two years later, in August 2011, the trial court found that Hood had violated his
probation by possessing cocaine. Appellant’s App. p. 20 (CCS). However, the State later
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notified the court that the substance at issue had been tested and was not, in fact, cocaine.
Id. at 21. The trial court returned Hood to probation and noted that he would receive
credit for “the time he was incarcerated.” Id.
In March 2013, Hood was arrested and charged with two counts of Class A
misdemeanor battery. The State filed probation-violation notices in Hood’s arson and
burglary cases. Hood’s troubles continued: three months later, on June 7, he was charged
with Class C felony intimidation, Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury,
and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The State amended its previously filed
probation-violation notices to include these three new charges. Hood was incarcerated
awaiting a hearing on the alleged violations.
The probation-violation hearing took place on August 27, 2013. At the hearing,
the trial court concluded that Hood had violated his probation in the arson and burglary
cases. As a result, the court revoked three years of Hood’s five-year suspended sentence
in the arson case. The court concluded that once served, those three years would
complete Hood’s arson sentence, and Hood would then serve probation for his burglary
conviction:
[T]he Court’s gonna revoke [] three years under the . . . [arson] case to the
Department of Correction[]. I’m gonna return you to probation—we’re
gonna close you out on that case. Three [] years, you’re done. The Court’s
already taken into consideration coming up with the three (3) years,
potential other credit time that he would have had. Because we had the five
(5) years, although I think there’s some credit time that he’s afforded.
Court’s just gonna take—[w]rap all that up into consideration. I’m gonna
do three (3) years. Close him out. And then you’ve got the two (2) years
of probation to return to under the . . . [burglary] case. Okay? That’ll be
the order of the Court.
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Tr. p. 107-08 (emphasis added). In its sentencing order, the trial court stated that Hood
“receives no credit time as the Court took into account his credit time in determining
[the] revocation period.” Appellant’s App. p. 43.
Hood filed a pro se motion to correct sentence, seeking credit for the days he was
incarcerated awaiting the probation-violation hearing. See id. at 49. The trial court
denied Hood’s motion, noting that “there were some discrepancies . . . as to [] Hood’s
credit time to be applied under this case primarily due to the fact that [Hood] has
previously been sanctioned in this case[, and] that was later set aside after lab results
confirmed a negative test for the presence of cocaine.” Id. at 60. Nonetheless, the court
stated that it “took into account [Hood’s] credit time, including the credit time [Hood] is
now requesting be applied[,] in determining [Hood’s] back up time or ‘revocation period’
as stated in the [court’s] order.” Id.
Hood now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Hood contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct
sentence.1 He argues that the court erred when it “failed to give [him] pretrial detention
credit earned for incarceration . . . and rather stated that it had considered said credit in
imposing sanctions . . . .” Appellant’s Br. p. 5.
1
Hood’s use of a motion to correct sentence was appropriate. “When a motion to correct
sentence presents a claim that may be resolved by considering only the face of the judgment and the
applicable statutory authority without reference to other matters in or extrinsic to the record, such a
motion may be expeditiously considered and corrections made without invoking post-conviction
proceedings.” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Ind. 2004) (motion to correct sentence was proper
vehicle for appellate challenge where defendant claimed that the trial court failed to comply with Indiana
Code section 35-38-3-2(a)).
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We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations using the
abuse-of-discretion standard. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). An
abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3(a),
a person earns one day of credit time for each day the person is imprisoned for a crime or
confined awaiting trial or sentencing. “Indiana Code section 35-38-3-2(b)(4)
unequivocally declares that the trial court sentencing judgment ‘must include’ the amount
of credit earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing.” Robinson v. State, 805
N.E.2d 783, 791 (Ind. 2004). “This determination serves to memorialize any
modifications in credit time class or credit time imposed by local prison authorities upon
a person confined before trial and sentencing.” Id. at 792. Because pretrial credit time is
a matter of statutory right, trial courts generally do not have discretion in awarding or
denying such credit. Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(citing Weaver v. State, 725 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g denied).
Here, there is no dispute that Hood has earned pretrial credit time.2 At Hood’s
probation-revocation hearing, the trial court stated that it had “already taken into
consideration coming up with the three (3) years, potential other credit time that [Hood]
would have had. Because we had the five (5) years, although I think there’s some credit
time that he’s afforded. Court’s just gonna take—[w]rap all that up into consideration.”
Tr. p. 107. The trial court’s language indicates that it simply estimated Hood’s pretrial
credit time and incorporated it into his sentence. This technique does not comport with
2
Though the State argues that it is unclear how much pretrial credit time Hood has earned, see
Appellee’s Br. p. 10, it does not dispute that Hood has earned pretrial credit time.
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Section 35-38-3-2(b)(4)’s “unequivocal[] declar[ation] that the trial court sentencing
judgment ‘must include’ the amount of credit earned for time spent in confinement before
sentencing.” Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 791.
Although the precise amount of pretrial credit time Hood has earned may be
slightly difficult to calculate—particularly in light of Hood’s incarceration for a probation
violation that ultimately proved not to be a violation—Hood has a statutory right to the
precise amount of pretrial credit time he has earned. We conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion. We reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to
resentence Hood and calculate his pretrial credit time in accordance with Indiana Code
section 35-38-3-2(b)(4).
Reversed and remanded.
NAJAM, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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