Michael Seacat v. Goodrich Corporation ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
May 08 2014, 9:49 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
RICHARD R. FOX SHARON FUNCHEON MURPHY
STEVEN A. GUSTAFSON Robinson Wolenty & Young
New Albany, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MICHAEL SEACAT, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1310-EX-910
)
GOODRICH CORPORATION, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE INDIANA WORKER’S COMPENSATION BOARD
The Honorable Linda Peterson Hamilton, Chairman
Cause No. C-216341
May 8, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
PYLE, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Michael Seacat (“Seacat”) appeals the order of the Worker’s Compensation Board
(“the Board”) denying his application for worker’s compensation benefits.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Whether the Board erred in denying Seacat’s application for worker’s
compensation benefits.
FACTS
Emily Smith (“Smith”), the human resources manager for Goodrich Corporation
(“Goodrich”) in Jeffersonville, Indiana, discovered that there was an increase in muscular
strains among factory employees. In response, Goodrich implemented a stretching
program similar to one at a Goodrich plant in Phoenix, Arizona. Employees could
perform recommended stretches during voluntary sessions twice a day for five to ten
minutes. Stretching usually took place inside of the factory, but they were conducted
outside on warmer days. Supervisors led the morning sessions while employees who had
been trained in supervised sessions led the afternoon stretch break.
On June 27, 2012, Seacat and a number of other Goodrich employees participated
in the afternoon stretch break. Seacat testified that during the afternoon sessions,
employees stretched for one to two minutes then engaged in other activities. His group of
employees, including Jimmy Tyler (“Tyler”), whom Seacat claimed was his team leader,
played hacky sack. As the employees returned to work, someone called out Seacat’s
name. Seacat turned around and saw a hacky sack coming toward him. Seacat stated that
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he “went to go kick it and [his] foot planted into the ground.” (Tr. 8). Seacat injured his
ankle, and his coworkers called for an ambulance.
On July 16, 2012, Seacat filed a claim for worker’s compensation benefits. Seacat
and Goodrich agreed to submit the matter to the Board in order to determine if Seacat’s
injury was compensable.
On February 28, 2013, a single member of the Board conducted a hearing on
Seacat’s claim. There, Smith testified that the only other authorized activity during the
stretch break was walking a lap around the building to warm up before starting the
stretches. In addition, Smith stated that neither she nor management knew or approved of
any other activities during the stretch break. Smith further stated that, contrary to
Seacat’s testimony, Tyler was a machine operator like Seacat and not a team leader.
Finally, Smith stated that the stretch breaks were voluntary, and employees were
expected to continue working if they chose not to participate.
On April 11, 2013, the hearing officer issued the following order:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiff was not in the course of his employment when his injury
occurred on June 27, 2012. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was
engaged in horseplay and was injured as a result of this unauthorized
activity.
2. Defendant did not acquiesce to the activity of playing hackey [sic]
sack, and therefore, the employee was no longer engaged in an
activity fulfilling the duties of employment or while engaged in
doing something incidental thereto.
ORDER
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED; by the Worker’s Compensation
Board of Indiana that Plaintiff shall take nothing by way of this
Application.
(App. 2-4). Seacat sought review of the hearing officer’s findings before the Board.
However, the Board upheld the decision of the hearing officer. Seacat now appeals.
DECISION
Seacat claims that his injury is compensable because (1) it occurred during an
employer-sponsored exercise break, and (2) Goodrich acquiesced to other unauthorized
activities that took place during the exercise break. Goodrich argues that Seacat was not
engaged in any activity that was related to his employment when he injured his ankle.
In reviewing a challenge to a decision of the Board, this Court is bound by the
factual determinations of the Board and may not disturb them unless the evidence is
undisputed and leads inescapably to a contrary conclusion. Kovatch v. A.M. General, 679
N.E.2d 940, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. We neither reweigh the evidence,
nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 943. “We must disregard all evidence
unfavorable to the decision and must consider only the evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom which support the Board’s findings.” Id. The burden rests with the
claimant to prove a right to compensation under the Worker’s Compensation Act.
Danielson v. Pratt Industries, Inc., 846 N.E.2d 244, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). If the
Board reaches a legitimate conclusion from the evidential facts, we cannot disturb that
conclusion, although we may prefer another legitimate result. R.L. Jefferies Trucking Co.
v. Cain, 545 N.E.2d 582, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied. “Although we are not
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bound by the Board’s interpretation of the law, we will reverse the Board’s decision only
if the Board incorrectly interpreted the [Worker’s Compensation] Act.” Krause v.
Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, 866 N.E.2d 846, 851 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007), trans. denied.
The Worker’s Compensation Act (“the Act”) requires employers to provide their
employees with “compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and
in the course of employment[.]” Ind. Code § 22-3-2-2(a). An injury “arises out of”
employment when a causal nexus exists between the injury sustained and the duties or
services performed by the injured employee. Outlaw v. Erbich Products Co., Inc., 742
N.E.2d 526, 530 (Ind. Ct. App 2001), trans. denied. An accident occurs “in the course of
employment” when it takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the
employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is fulfilling the duties of
employment or while engaged in doing something incidental thereto. Id. A claimant
seeking compensation must prove both elements; neither alone is sufficient. Conway v.
Sch. City of East Chicago, 734 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.
Here, we find that Seacat failed to prove that his injury arose out of and in the course of
his employment.
Concerning whether Seacat’s injury arose out of his employment, the hearing
officer found to the contrary because Seacat was engaged in horseplay at the time of his
accident. In response, Seacat elaborately attempts to explain why hacky sack is not
horseplay, but he does not address whether there was a causal nexus between his playing
hacky sack and the duties he performs as a machine operator.
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The record supports the hearing officer’s finding that Seacat’s injury did not arise
out of his employment. For example, Goodrich sent an email to all of its employees
detailing the time and location of stretch breaks. Goodrich also posted pictures of the
recommended stretches on bulletin boards in work areas. On cross examination, Seacat
admitted that the stretch breaks were designed for stretching. Seacat attempted to argue
that Goodrich acquiesced in other activities during the stretch break because other
workers were playing basketball, and his team leader, Tyler, participated in the games of
hacky sack. However, the record shows that (1) Goodrich implemented a voluntary
wellness program consisting of a fitness center and a basketball court; (2) employees
could take part in the wellness program after signing a waiver; (3) Seacat signed this
waiver approximately two months before he was injured; (4) a waiver was not required to
participate in the stretch breaks; and (5) Tyler was a machine operator, not a team leader.
Finally, and perhaps most telling, Seacat testified that hacky sack did not occur during the
morning stretch breaks, when supervisors were more likely to be present. As a result, the
evidence supports the hearing officer’s conclusion that Goodrich did not acquiesce in
Seacat’s game of hacky sack, and that Seacat’s injury did not arise out of his
employment.
Because Seacat cannot establish that his injury arose out of his employment, we
need not address whether his injury was also an accident that occurred “in the course of
employment.” We affirm the decision of the Board.
Affirmed.
Friedlander, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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