Claude F. Hudson v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 07 2014, 9:29 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DARREN BEDWELL GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MICHAEL GENE WORDEN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CLAUDE F. HUDSON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 84A01-1305-CR-197
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Michael J. Lewis, Judge
Cause No. 84D06-1204-FB-1187
May 7, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, Claude Hudson (Hudson), appeals the denial of his credit
time.
We reverse and remand.1
ISSUE
Hudson raises one issue on appeal which we restate as follows: Whether the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied Hudson credit time for time spent in a mental
health facility.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 7, 2012, Joshua Mast (Mast) returned home to find Hudson inside his
home, standing at the foot of his bed wearing his jacket. Mast asked Hudson why he was
at his house, and Hudson told Mast that had knocked and nobody answered so he thought
it was fine to go in. Mast then asked Hudson to leave. Hudson left wearing Mast’s jacket.
On April 12, 2012, the State filed an Information charging Hudson with Count I,
burglary, a Class B felony, Ind. Code § 35–43-2-1(b)(i), and Count II, theft, a class D
felony, I.C. § 35–43-4-2. On May 2, 2012, Hudson requested for an evaluation to
determine whether he is competent to stand trial. On September 26, 2012, at the
competency hearing, the trial court ordered Hudson to be committed to the Department of
1
We recognize that the State filed a verified motion for remand, and we accordingly grant their motion in this
opinion.
2
Mental Health Family and Social Services Administration. On October 15, 2012, Hudson
was transported from the Vigo County Jail to the Logansport State Hospital (Hospital). On
December 20, 2012, Hudson was certified competent and on December 27, 2012, the trial
court ordered him transported back to jail. On February 25, 2013, a jury was empaneled
and sworn in. On February 26, 2013, the jury found Hudson guilty as charged on both
Counts. On April 10, 2013, the trial court sentenced Hudson to six years executed in the
Indiana Department of Correction. The trial court gave Hudson 295 days of credit time on
Count I and dismissed Count II. The credit time awarded for Count I did not include the
period from October 15, 2012, to December 27, 2012, when Hudson was confined at the
Hospital for mental evaluation. (Appellant’s App. p. 164). Hudson now appeals.
Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Hudson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give him
credit time for the time he was confined at the Hospital from October 15, 2012 to December
27, 2012.
We begin by noting that the standard for review of a trial court’s sentencing decision
is an abuse of discretion. Groves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1229, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
The trial court abuses its discretion if its “decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances.” Id.
Indiana law provides that a person earns “one (1) day of credit time for each day the
person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.” See I.C. § 35–
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50–6–3(a). “[C]onfinement in this context includes time a criminal defendant spends in a
mental health facility as a part of the criminal proceedings.” State v. Davis 898 N.E. 2d
281,289 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Ind. Ct. App.1997).
The State concurs with Hudson that the trial court erred for not awarding credit to
Hudson from October 15, 2012 to December 28, 2012 when he was confined at the Hospital
for mental evaluation. The record shows that the trial court awarded a total of 295 days of
credit time. The breakdown for the credit time as per the abstract of the judgment was as
follows: 192 days from April, 7, 2012, the day Hudson was arrested, to October 15, 2012,
when he was transported to the Hospital; 90 days from December 28, 2012 to March 27,
2013, spent at the jail where Hudson was awaiting the trial; and lastly, 13 days from March
28, 2013 to April 9, 2013, spent at the jail where Hudson was awaiting sentencing. Based
on this breakdown, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to include
the period from October 15, 2012 to December 27, 2012, when Hudson was confined at
the Hospital as credit time.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to award
Hudson credit time from October 15, 2012 to December 27, 2012 when he was confined
at the Hospital.
We reverse and remand.
VAIDIK, C. J. and MAY, J. concur
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