Adam W. Powell v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before Apr 10 2014, 9:20 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
ADAM W. POWELL GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JUSTIN F. ROEBEL
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ADAM W. POWELL, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 38A02-1304-IF-316
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE JAY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Max C. Ludy, Jr., Judge
Cause No. 38D01-1209-IF-2
April 10, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
CASE SUMMARY
On March 5, 2012, Portland Police Officer Joshua Stephenson observed a vehicle
parked adjacent to the Jay County Courthouse in Portland. The vehicle caught Officer
Stephenson’s attention because it had a “homemade” license plate. An individual, later
identified as Appellant-Defendant Adam W. Powell, got in the vehicle and drove away
before Officer Stephenson could verify whether there were any other identifying marks or
stickers on the vehicle.
Officer Stephenson soon thereafter observed the vehicle traveling near 200 South and
U.S. Highway 27. Officer Stephenson initiated a traffic stop. During the course of the traffic
stop, Officer Stephenson determined that Powell had committed four infractions.
Specifically, Officer Stephenson determined that (1) Powell was driving the vehicle without a
valid driver’s license, (2) the vehicle was not properly registered, (3) Powell could not
provide proof of financial responsibility, and (4) the window tint was darker than that
permitted by the traffic code. Powell was cited for each of the above-stated infractions.
Powell contested the validity of the citations, after which the State formally charged
Powell with one count each of Class A infraction driving while suspended, Class C infraction
failure to register, Class A infraction operating a motor vehicle without financial
responsibility, and Class C infraction window tint violation by a driver. On March 8, 2013,
following a bench trial, the trial court found that Powell had committed each of the charged
infractions. The trial court imposed a $100 fine for each infraction and recommended that the
Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) suspend Powell’s driver’s license for a period of
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one year.
On appeal, Powell challenges the trial court’s alleged ex post facto application of the
statutory definition of the term “operate.” Powell also contends that the regulations relating
to the infractions in question violate certain constitutional rights. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 5, 2012, at approximately 5:40 p.m., Officer Stephenson observed a “mid
90’s” gray Chevy Blazer parked adjacent to the Jay County Courthouse that had a
“homemade” license plate. Tr. pp. 5, 6. The license plate “was covered by a plastic
covering, slightly tinted” and stated “private property.” Tr. p. 5. While Officer Stephenson
was attempting to approach the vehicle to determine whether there were any other identifying
marks or stickers, an individual got in the vehicle and drove away.
A short time later, Officer Stephenson observed the Chevy Blazer traveling near 200
South and U.S. Highway 27. Officer Stephenson initiated a traffic stop. When Officer
Stephenson approached the vehicle, the driver identified himself as Powell. During the
course of the traffic stop, Officer Stephenson determined that Powell had committed four
infractions, including that (1) Powell was driving the vehicle without a valid driver’s license,
(2) the vehicle was not properly registered, (3) Powell could not provide proof of financial
responsibility, and (4) the window tint was darker than that permitted by the traffic code.
Powell was cited for each of the above-stated infractions.
Powell contested the validity of the citations. The State then formally charged Powell
with one count each of Class A infraction driving while suspended, Class C infraction failure
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to register, Class A infraction operating a motor vehicle without financial responsibility, and
Class C infraction window tint violation by a driver. Following initial proceedings in the
Portland City Court, on September 19, 2012, the city judge recused himself and the case was
transferred to the Jay Superior Court. The State subsequently refiled the charges in the Jay
Superior Court.
Powell failed to appear for a bench trial on January 25, 2013. On February 2, 2013,
Powell moved to dismiss the charges, alleging that “the Portland City Court is defined as
being not a court of record. Therefore it lacks the authority to impose fines for supposed
traffic violations, thus failing to establish subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.”
Appellee’s App. p. 13 (emphasis in original). The trial court subsequently denied Powell’s
motion. On March 8, 2013, following a bench trial, the trial court found that Powell
committed the charged infractions. The trial court ordered Powell to pay a $100 fine for each
of the four infractions. The trial court also recommended that the BMV suspend Powell’s
driver’s license for a period of one year. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Claim Relating to the Definition of the Term “Operate”
Powell contends that the trial court erred in determining that he committed the charged
infractions because the statutory definition of the term “operate” in effect at the time Powell
was cited for the infractions related only to the operation of motorboats. In raising this
contention, Powell asserts that the trial court unlawfully applied a statutory definition of the
term operate that was adopted after he committed the charged infractions. While we
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generally agree that both the United States and Indiana Constitutions prohibit ex post facto
application of laws in criminal matters, we disagree with Powell’s contention that the trial
court committed an ex post facto application of the law in the instant matter.
Although there was no statutory definition of the term “operate” in the traffic code at
the time Powell committed the infractions, “[u]ndefined words in a statute are given their
plain, ordinary, and usual meaning, unless the construction is plainly repugnant to the intent
of the legislature or of the context of the statute.” Hinojosa v. State, 781 N.E.2d 677, 680
(Ind. 2003) (citing Ind. Code § 1-1-4-1). The Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
defines operate as “to cause to function usu[ally] by direct personal effort : WORK <~ a car>.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1581 (14th ed. 1961). Moreover, this court has
previously held that “to operate a vehicle is to drive it or be in actual physical control of it
upon a highway.” Hampton v. State, 681 N.E.2d 250, 251 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Based upon these definitions, it is clear from the record that Powell was operating a
vehicle when he was cited for the charged infractions. The undisputed evidence
demonstrates that Powell was driving the Chevy Blazer when Officer Stephenson initiated
the traffic stop. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that
Powell committed the charged infractions.
II. Remaining Constitutional Claims
Powell also contends that he could not be found to have committed the charged
infractions because the regulations creating and defining the infractions violate certain
constitutional rights, including the right to own property, the right to travel, and the right to
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contract. Initially, we note that the failure to file a pre-trial motion to dismiss raising the
constitutional challenge results in waiver of the issue on appeal. Payne v. State, 484 N.E.2d
16, 18 (Ind. 1985). In the instant matter, Powell did not include any challenge to the
constitutionality of the regulations relating to motor vehicles in his pre-trial motion to
dismiss. As such, he has waived the asserted constitutional challenges on appeal. See
Wiggins v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (providing that defendant waived his
claim that the statute in question was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous because he did
not raise the claim in his pre-trial motion to dismiss).
However, waiver notwithstanding, we conclude that Powell has failed to establish that
the challenged regulations relating to motor vehicles are unconstitutional. An individual does
not have a fundamental right to drive. See Mitchell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 112, 116 (Ind.
1995); Schrefler v. State, 660 N.E.2d 585, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Terpstra v. State, 529
N.E.2d 839, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). Rather, driving privileges are an entitlement which
may be withheld, suspended, or revoked by the State for reasons involving public safety.
Schrefler, 660 N.E.2d at 587-88. Further, because the law recognizes no fundamental right
to drive, the State need only show that the law bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
state interest. Mitchell, 659 N.E.2d at 116.
In Terpstra, we noted that the Indiana Supreme Court has previously held that the
State has both a legitimate and compelling interest in highway safety and, as a result, it may
write regulations promoting highway safety. 529 N.E.2d at 846 (citing Ruge v. Kovach, 467
N.E.2d 673, 681 (Ind. 1984)).
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The statute concerning driver’s licenses ensures a driver’s ability to maneuver
a motor vehicle on public roads in Indiana, thus promoting public safety. The
statutes concerning the registration of vehicles protect the owners of motor
vehicles, persons holding liens and the public. VanNatta v. Crites (1978), 178
Ind. App. 113, 381 N.E.2d 532, 537. Since our state legislature has the power
to enact these statutes and these statutes further a compelling state interest,
they must be upheld.
Id. at 846-47.
We also believe that the State’s legitimate interest in promoting highway safety bears
a rational relationship to the regulations concerning proof of financial responsibility and the
level of window tint permissible on Indiana roadways. Similar to the regulations concerning
vehicle registration and the licensing of drivers, these regulations seek to protect both the
owners of motor vehicles and others whom they might encounter while traveling on Indiana’s
roadways. Thus, we conclude that Powell has not met his burden of overcoming the
presumption of constitutionality.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
RILEY, J., and ROBB, J., concur.
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