Sheaff Brock Investment Advisors, LLC v. David Morton , 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 143 ( 2014 )

FOR PUBLICATION Apr 07 2014, 9:15 am
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
ANDREW M. MCNEIL THOMAS B. BLACKWELL
JONATHAN L. MAYES Hopper Blackwell, PC
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
SHEAFF BROCK INVESTMENT ADVISORS, LLC, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 29A02-1306-CC-553
)
DAVID MORTON, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HAMILTON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Steven R. Nation, Judge
Cause No. 29D01-1203-CC-2302
April 7, 2014
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sheaff Brock Investment Advisors, LLC (“Sheaff Brock”) appeals the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of David Morton on Morton’s claims that Sheaff
Brock breached its employment agreement with Morton and violated Indiana’s Wage
Claims Act. Sheaff Brock presents two issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that Sheaff Brock
breached its contract with Morton.
2. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that Morton’s
additional compensation under the employment agreement
constitutes a wage under the Wage Claims Act.
Morton cross-appeals and presents two issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in
favor of Sheaff Brock on Morton’s constructive fraud claim.
2. Whether Morton is entitled to appellate attorney’s fees.
We affirm.1
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 1, 2010, Morton began his employment with Sheaff Brock as an
investment advisor representative. Morton’s duties included providing prospective
clients with information about Sheaff Brock’s investment styles and strategies. If a
prospective client elected to open an account with Sheaff Brock, the client signed an
investment advisory agreement (“investment agreement”). At that point, Morton had
fulfilled his duties as an investment advisor representative, and other Sheaff Brock
employees assumed responsibility for servicing the client’s needs.
1
We held oral argument on March 17, 2014.
2
Most of Sheaff Brock’s clients were referred by TD Ameritrade, which assessed
an annual investment management fee against client account balances on a quarterly
basis. TD Ameritrade, on behalf of Sheaff Brock, assessed the management fees at the
start of each quarter. Clients who opened new accounts during a quarter were assessed a
management fee for the pro-rated number of days remaining in the quarter, and clients
who left during a quarter received a credit against the management fee for the pro-rated
number of days remaining in the quarter. Because assessments were subject to proration,
Sheaff Brock did not finally settle each client’s account and determine the management
fees due on account balances until the end of each quarter.
Morton was an at-will employee, but he also had an employment agreement with
Sheaff Brock that provided in relevant part as follows:
3. Changes in Terms and Conditions of Employment. The terms and
conditions of your employment may be amended from time to time, as the
needs of the Employer may require. . . .
4. Amount and Payment of Compensation. During the term of this
agreement, Employer shall pay the following:
• An annual guaranteed draw of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00),
paid in accordance with the Employer’s normal payroll policies and
procedures.
• Additional compensation will be paid as follows:
50% of the net management fees paid to Employer during the first year of
Employer providing investment management services to a client as a direct
and proximate result of your marketing efforts which result in the client
entering into an investment advisory agreement with the Employer.
20% of the net management fees paid to Employer thereafter from the
continuing retention of Employer to provide investment management
services to a client as a direct and proximate result of your marketing
efforts with the client.
3
The above fee arrangement will also be subject to a pro rata adjustment for
any increase or decrease in management fees as a result of capital addition,
capital withdrawal, management termination, management fee discount or
any other management fee adjustments and deductions.
Appellant’s App. at 23-24 (emphases added).
In approximately March 2011, the owners of Sheaff Brock, Ronald Brock and
David Gilreath, told Morton that they were going to restructure his additional
compensation. Instead of 50% of the net management fees paid during the first year and
20% of the net management fees paid thereafter, Sheaff Brock would pay Morton 30%
during a client’s first year and 10% thereafter. The new percentages were to be applied
both to existing and new client accounts. To help Morton through the transition, Sheaff
Brock temporarily increased Morton’s guaranteed draw to $250,000 per year. In
November 2011, Sheaff Brock announced that, effective January 1, 2012, Morton and the
other investment advisor representatives would each be assigned a territory constituting
one-third of the country. And Sheaff Brock told Morton that he would receive 50% of
the net management fees obtained from his assigned territory during a client’s first year
and 20% thereafter.
In early 2012, Sheaff Brock learned that Morton had concerns about the
company’s financial health and was looking to start a new business himself.
Accordingly, Sheaff Brock terminated Morton’s employment. On March 7, Morton filed
a complaint against Sheaff Brock alleging breach of contract, unpaid wages, and
constructive fraud. Morton also sought declaratory judgment on the issue of whether the
non-compete and non-solicitation clauses in his contract with Sheaff Brock were valid.
Sheaff Brock filed an answer and counterclaim alleging breach of contract and breach of
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fiduciary duty. On November 5, Sheaff Brock moved for summary judgment, and
Morton filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
Following a hearing on all pending motions on March 11, 2013, the trial court
granted in part and denied in part Sheaff Brock’s summary judgment motion and granted
in part and denied in part Morton’s cross-motion for summary judgment. In particular,
the trial court concluded that Sheaff Brock did not breach its contract with Morton when
it prospectively changed the compensation structure for Morton’s additional
compensation. But the trial court concluded that Sheaff Brock breached the contract
when it applied those changes to client accounts already under management at the time
the new compensation structure was implemented. The trial court also concluded that
Morton’s additional compensation constitutes a wage under the Wage Claims Act; that
Morton’s constructive fraud claim is without merit; and that neither party is entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of whether the non-compete and non-solicitation clauses
are invalid. This appeal and cross-appeal ensued.2
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Standard of Review
Our standard of review for summary judgment appeals is well established:
When reviewing a grant [or denial] of summary judgment, our standard of
review is the same as that of the trial court. Considering only those facts
that the parties designated to the trial court, we must determine whether
there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact” and whether “the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In answering these
questions, the reviewing court construes all factual inferences in the non-
moving party’s favor and resolves all doubts as to the existence of a
material issue against the moving party. The moving party bears the
2
The judgment is a final judgment under Trial Rule 56(C).
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burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;
and once the movant satisfies the burden, the burden then shifts to the non-
moving party to designate and produce evidence of facts showing the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ind. 2009)
(citations omitted). The party appealing a summary judgment decision has the burden of
persuading this court that the grant or denial of summary judgment was erroneous.
Knoebel v. Clark Cnty. Superior Ct. No. 1, 901 N.E.2d 529, 531-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Where, as here, the facts are undisputed and the issue presented is a pure question of law,
we review the matter de novo. See Crum v. City of Terre Haute ex rel. Dep’t of Redev.,
812 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The fact that the parties have filed cross-
motions for summary judgment does not alter our standard for review, as we consider
each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012).
Issue One: Breach of Contract
Sheaff Brock first contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that it
breached its contract with Morton when, in 2011, it changed the additional compensation
structure and applied the changes to existing client accounts going forward. Sheaff Brock
maintains that Morton did not have a vested interest in the additional compensation once
each quarter ended and had not secured any future business for Sheaff Brock as a result
of his work in signing clients. Thus, Sheaff Brock claims that Morton “did not possess a
right to future additional compensation at a specific rate, so when Sheaff Brock
restructured Morton’s pay at the start of a quarter (that is, before Morton earned
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anything), it did not retroactively change Morton’s compensation.” Appellant’s Brief at
22.
The trial court found in relevant part that
the employment was “at will” and the Agreement reserved the right of the
Employer to prospectively amend or change the compensation structure
under the Agreement as needed. The ability to amend or change the
compensation structure only applied prospectively to new accounts and did
not apply to accounts that were already under management.
Appellant’s App. at 10.
Sheaff Brock points out that, “as a general rule, a person employed on a
commission basis is entitled to his commission on business he has secured even though
payment is not received by the employer until a later date.” See Wells Fargo Ins., Inc. v.
Land, 932 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). But here, Sheaff Brock maintains,
Morton’s work did not secure anything.3 As Sheaff Brock explains it:
Morton’s additional compensation is unlike a specific purchase (e.g. crop
insurance) or the typical sale in which specific services are provided (e.g.
orthopedic surgery). When Morton signed up a new Sheaff Brock client
after Brock and Gilreath provided him with the opportunity to make the
sales presentation, the client signed an investment advisory agreement. The
client agreement yielded nothing more than an expectancy interest in any
earnings that may be attributed to that client. In other words, even if the
client signed an investment advisory agreement with Sheaff Brock, nothing
obligated the client to stay with Sheaff Brock for any period of time or
guaranteed any amount of compensation to Sheaff Brock. The client was
free to leave the following day at no cost to the client.
The simple fact is that Morton’s right to Additional Compensation
accrued in the same fashion as Sheaff Brock’s right to fees accrued.
Although TD Ameritrade assessed fees at the beginning of each quarter and
issued quarterly payment to Sheaff Brock for the upcoming quarter, Sheaff
Brock recorded the entire payment as a liability on its books because the
3
Morton contends that Sheaff Brock did not make this argument to the trial court and the issue is
waived. But Sheaff Brock directs us to its Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, where
it made the same argument to the trial court. Accordingly, Morton’s contention is without merit.
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fees had not yet been earned. As each day concluded, Sheaff Brock (and
therefore Morton) earned 1/90th of the fees for that client at that point
(rounding the number of days in a quarter down to 90). However, the fees,
and Morton’s accrued Additional Compensation, were not fully earned, or
vested, until the conclusion of each quarter because there could be reason
for other adjustments. Once the quarter ended, the fees were fully earned
by Sheaff Brock, and Morton’s right to Additional Compensation fully
vested for the prior quarter. So, Sheaff Brock could not, on the last day of
the quarter, retroactively reduce the percentage payable to Morton; it could,
however, implement that change for the new quarter going forward.
Appellant’s Brief at 24-25 (emphases added, citations omitted). And Sheaff Brock points
out that, under paragraph 3 of the employment agreement, it was entitled to amend
Morton’s compensation “from time to time” as Sheaff Brock’s “needs . . . may require.”
Appellant’s App. at 23.
But Morton maintains that his right to the additional compensation at the
contracted-for percentage vested once a client signed an investment agreement with
Sheaff Brock. Morton contends that “[o]nce he had fully performed under the agreement
it was a breach of the agreement for Sheaff Brock to refuse to pay him according to the
terms in place at the time he performed his labor.” Appellee’s Brief at 31 (emphasis
added). In support of that contention, Morton relies on our supreme court’s opinion in
Highhouse v. Midwest Orthopedic Institute, P.C., 807 N.E.2d 737 (Ind. 2004), and on
this court’s opinions in Wells Fargo, 932 N.E.2d at 195, and Vector Engineering &
Manufacturing Corp. v. Pequet, 431 N.E.2d 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). In Highhouse, our
supreme court stated that, absent some other arrangement or policy, when an employer
makes an agreement to provide compensation for services the employee’s right to
compensation vests when the employee renders the services. 807 N.E.2d at 739. And in
Wells Fargo and Pequet, this court observed that, as a general rule, a person employed on
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a commission basis is entitled to his commission on business he has secured even though
payment is not received by the employer until a later date. 932 N.E.2d at 200; 431
N.E.2d at 505. This general rule may be altered by a written agreement or by the conduct
of the parties that clearly demonstrates a different compensation scheme. Id.Here, nothing in the parties’ agreement altered the general rule. See id. The
agreement provided that Morton would be paid a certain percentage of net management
fees after a client entered into an investment agreement with Sheaff Brock. Thus, Sheaff
Brock did not have discretion to change the fee percentages owed to Morton on a client’s
account after that client had signed an investment agreement. Likewise, there is no
designated evidence that the parties’ conduct demonstrated a different compensation
scheme. See id. We hold that Morton had secured business for Sheaff Brock, and
Morton’s interest in the additional compensation vested, when the client signed an
investment agreement and that Morton was entitled to additional compensation based on
the fee percentages in effect at that time. The trial court did not err when it entered
summary judgment in favor of Morton on his breach of contract claim with regard to
those clients already under management.
Issue Two: Wage Claims Act
Sheaff Brock also contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that
Morton’s additional compensation constitutes a “wage” under the Wage Claims Act (“the
Act”). Indiana Code Section 22-2-9-1(b) provides that the term “wages” under the Act
means all amounts at which the labor or service rendered is recompensed, whether the
amount is fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or in any other
9
method of calculating such amount. In his complaint, Morton alleged that Sheaff Brock
violated the Act, which provides in relevant part that, whenever any employer separates
any employee from the payroll, the unpaid wages or compensation of such employee
shall become due and payable at the regular pay day for the pay period in which
separation occurred. See Ind. Code § 22-2-9-2. Morton contends that Sheaff Brock owes
him unpaid additional compensation under the terms of his employment agreement.
Failure to make payment subjects the employer to liquidated damages of up to double the
amount of wages due and attorney’s fees. I.C. §§ 22-2-5-2, -9-4(b).
The trial court found that Morton’s additional compensation is a wage and
concluded in relevant part as follows:
n. That the Additional Compensation was earned based upon work
performed by the Plaintiff and was not produced as part of a team effort.
Such team effort only came after the account had been secured and the
Plaintiff’s sale efforts were completed.
o. That the Additional Compensation based on the unambiguous language
of the Agreement was mandatory and not discretionary and was not based
on the financial success of the Defendant.
p. That as to the payment being calculated or being paid within ten days,
the Defendant would bill the clients at the beginning of each quarter.
However, such amount would remain a liability until the end of the quarter
when the fee was earned. Such fees were not earned until the end of the
quarter for the reason that the Plaintiff could not collect payments until the
end of the quarter or at termination. The Defendant has testified that the
percentage owed to the Plaintiff was calculated using a set formula at the
end of the quarter when the fee is a “sum certain.” Therefore, the Court
finds that the designated evidence before the Court is that the amount is
calculated to a “sum certain” at the end of the quarter when the fee was
earned. Therefore, the Court finds that the Additional Compensation is a
“wage” because it is capable of being calculated and paid within ten days of
the end of the quarter.
Appellant’s App. at 11-12.
10
The name given to the method of compensation is not controlling. Gress v.
Fabcon, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Rather, we will consider the
substance of the compensation to determine whether it is a wage. Id. We have
recognized that wages are something akin to the wages paid on a regular periodic basis
for regular work done by the employee. Id. In other words, if compensation is not linked
to the amount of work done by the employee or if the compensation is based on the
financial success of the employer, it is not a “wage.” Id.In Highhouse, our supreme court observed that a bonus is a “wage” under the Act
if it is not linked to a contingency such as the financial success of the company. 807
N.E.2d at 740. Also, to qualify as a wage, the compensation must be connected to the
work performed by the employee. Wank v. St. Francis College, 740 N.E.2d 908, 912
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. Other factors for determining whether compensation
is a wage are whether it can be calculated and paid within ten days of having been
“earned” and whether it is paid with regularity. See Highhouse, 807 N.E.2d at 740. This
court has also held that, where compensation is mandatory rather than discretionary, it is
a wage. See, e.g., Quezare v. Byrider Finance, Inc., 941 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011) (noting discretionary nature of compensation plan supported conclusion that bonus
payments were not wages), trans. denied; see also Pyle v. Nat’l Wine & Spirits, 637
N.E.2d 1298, 1301 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding bonus system was discretionary and
therefore bonuses were not wages).
Here, both the terms of the employment agreement and the parties’ conduct
establish that Morton’s additional compensation was a wage because it was directly
11
connected to his work recruiting prospective clients, it was mandatory, and it was not tied
to Sheaff Brock’s financial success. First, the undisputed designated evidence establishes
that Morton’s compensation was directly related to his efforts in acquiring new customers
for Sheaff Brock. When the client signed an investment agreement, the client’s assets
were placed under Sheaff Brock’s management, and Morton’s work on that account was
done. Morton’s employment agreement provided that additional compensation would be
paid “as a direct and proximate result of [Morton’s] marketing efforts, which result[ed] in
the client entering into an investment advisory agreement with the Employer.”
Appellant’s App. at 24. Second, it is undisputed that Morton’s additional compensation
was not discretionary but was paid regularly following the end of each quarter. And
third, whether Morton would be paid additional compensation was not dictated by Sheaff
Brock’s financial success. Morton’s employment agreement provided that “Employer
shall pay” and that “[a]dditional compensation will be paid” as a direct and proximate
result of Morton’s marketing efforts. Id. at 23-24. Finally, as the trial court found,
Morton’s additional compensation was based only on his effort and was not produced as
part of a team effort.
But the question remains whether the amount of Morton’s additional
compensation could be calculated and paid within ten days of having been “earned.” In
its argument, Sheaff Brock uses the words “accrued,” “vested,” and “earned,” but the
controlling term here is the statutory term, “earned.” See I.C. § 22-2-5-1.4 Employee
4
Indiana Code Section 22-2-9-4(b) of the Wage Claims Act provides in relevant part that the
provisions of Indiana Code Section 22-2-5-2 of the Wage Payment Act apply to claims brought under the
Wage Claims Act. And Indiana Code Section 22-2-5-2 provides in relevant part that an employer must
pay wages to an employee “as provided in” Indiana Code Section 22-2-5-1, which includes the
12
compensation and payment arrangements vary widely, and no Indiana case has defined
the term “earn” for purposes of the Act. Indeed, in Highhouse, our supreme court used
the term in quotation marks and considered alternative hypotheticals where the plaintiff
had “earned” his purported wage both at the time he had rendered services to a patient
and at the time the patient later paid his bill. 807 N.E.2d at 740. We conclude that when
compensation is earned for purposes of the Act is not a fixed concept but is a fact-
sensitive determination.
Nevertheless, the common denominator of a valid claim under the Wage Claims
Act is that the compensation is “earned” when the amount of wages owed by the
employer has been fixed and the employee has the right to payment of a sum certain, that
is, a liquidated sum. We reach that conclusion by considering the statutory provisions
that require payment of a wage within ten days after the wage is earned and provide for
liquidated damages based on a percentage of that wage. See I.C. §§ 22-2-5-2, -9-4(b). In
other words, the wage is earned when the amount is settled and it becomes due, after
which the wage must be paid on time or the employer may be subject to a statutory
penalty under the Act. Id.
Here, again, Morton’s contract right to additional compensation accrued and was
vested, albeit in an amount to be determined, when he recruited a client who signed an
investment agreement with Sheaff Brock. Morton then “earned” the right to payment of
specific wages, to payment of a liquidated sum that Sheaff Brock owed him, at the end of
requirement that an employer shall pay an employee “for all wages earned to a date not more than ten
days prior to the date of payment.” (Emphasis added).
13
each quarter when that sum could be determined. Indeed, as Sheaff Brock describes it in
its brief on appeal,
Morton’s right to Additional Compensation accrued in the same fashion as
Sheaff Brock’s right to fees accrued. Although TD Ameritrade assessed
fees at the beginning of each quarter and issued quarterly payment to Sheaff
Brock for the upcoming quarter, Sheaff Brock recorded the entire payment
as a liability on its books because the fees had not yet been earned. As each
day concluded, Sheaff Brock (and therefore Morton) earned 1/90th of the
fees for that client at that point (rounding the number of days in a quarter
down to 90). However, the fees, and Morton’s accrued Additional
Compensation, were not fully earned . . . until the conclusion of each
quarter because there could be reason for other adjustments.
Appellant’s Brief at 24-25 (emphasis added). Thus, by Sheaff Brock’s own assessment,
Morton did not and could not earn the additional compensation until the end of each
quarter. And it is undisputed that the amount due at that time was readily ascertainable
within ten days. During each quarter, Morton was paid advances on account toward his
additional compensation, but his additional compensation was not earned until his
accounts were reconciled at the end of each quarter.
We agree with the trial court and hold that, in light of all of the designated
evidence in this case, Morton’s additional compensation was a wage for purposes of the
Wage Claims Act. The additional compensation was connected to Morton’s work, was
mandatory, was not tied to Sheaff Brock’s financial success, could be calculated to a sum
certain at the end of the quarter, and could be paid regularly within ten days of that
calculation. In fact, not only could Morton’s additional compensation be calculated
within ten days of the date earned, but the course of conduct between the parties shows
that Sheaff Brock regularly calculated the additional compensation within ten days
14
following the end of each quarter. The trial court did not err when it entered summary
judgment in favor of Morton on his wage claim.
CROSS-APPEAL
Issue One: Constructive Fraud
Morton contends on cross-appeal that the trial court erred when it entered
summary judgment in favor of Sheaff Brock on Morton’s constructive fraud claim.
Morton maintains that Sheaff Brock committed constructive fraud “by failing to provide
honest, accurate documentation to Morton of the amount of commissions he was owed,
despite repeated requests for such documentation.” Appellee’s Brief at 33. And Morton
seeks punitive damages on this claim.
The elements of constructive fraud are: (1) a duty owing by the party to be
charged to the complaining party due to their relationship; (2) violation of that duty by
the making of deceptive material misrepresentations of past or existing facts or remaining
silent when a duty to speak exists; (3) reliance thereon by the complaining party; (4)
injury to the complaining party as a proximate result thereof; and (5) the gaining of an
advantage by the party to be charged at the expense of the complaining party. Fiederlein
v. Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Here, again, the trial court concluded that Morton’s constructive fraud claim was
merely a repackaging of his breach of contract claim. It is well settled that a breach of
contract claim may not lead to an award of punitive damages. Tobin v. Ruman, 819
N.E.2d 78, 86 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Rather, only if the claimant proves that
the conduct of the breaching party independently establishes the elements of a common
15
law tort for which punitive damages are allowed may the claimant receive punitive
damages. Id. Thus, a claimant who brings both a breach of contract and a fraud claim
must prove that (1) the breaching party committed the separate and independent tort of
fraud; and (2) the fraud resulted in injury distinct from that resulting from the breach. Id.While “[b]reaches of contract will almost invariably be regarded by the complaining
party as oppressive, if not outright fraudulent,” the claimant must nonetheless prove the
independent tort to recover punitive damages. Id. (quoting Epperly v. Johnson, 734
N.E.2d 1066, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).
Morton’s constructive fraud claim is based on allegations that Sheaff Brock did
not provide “documentation from which Morton could determine whether or not he was
being paid appropriately” and that Morton was “forced to rely upon false and deceptive
documentation” provided by Sheaff Brock. Appellee’s Brief at 35; Appellant’s App. at
343. But Morton does not allege that he sustained an injury distinct from that alleged in
his breach of contract claim. See Tobin, 819 N.E.2d at 86. In particular, in support of his
constructive fraud claim, Morton contends only that he “clearly has been injured in an
amount of hundreds of thousands of dollars as a result of the lies and omissions of Sheaff
Brock.” Appellee’s Brief at 35. Morton did not make cogent argument or designate
evidence to establish that Sheaff Brock’s actions constitute the separate and independent
tort of constructive fraud. The trial court did not err when it entered summary judgment
in favor of Sheaff Brock on this issue.
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Issue Two: Appellate Attorney’s Fees
Finally, Morton contends that he is entitled to appellate attorney’s fees. Sheaff
Brock acknowledges that Morton is entitled to appellate attorney’s fees if he prevails on
his claim under the Wage Claims Act. Because we hold that the trial court did not err
when it entered summary judgment in favor of Morton on his wage claim under the Act,
Morton is entitled to appellate attorney’s fees.
Conclusion
The trial court did not err when it concluded that Sheaff Brock breached its
contract with Morton when it unilaterally applied an amended compensation structure to
client accounts already under management. And the trial court did not err when it
concluded that Morton’s additional compensation constitutes a wage under the Wage
Claims Act. Accordingly, Morton is entitled to attorney’s fees, including appellate
attorney’s fees. Finally, the trial court did not err when it entered summary judgment in
favor of Sheaff Brock on Morton’s constructive fraud claim. Thus, we remand to the trial
court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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