David A. Wilson v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,                                          Jul 19 2013, 6:33 am
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                             ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    GLEN E. KOCH, II                                    GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Martinsville, Indiana                               Attorney General of Indiana
    KARL M. SCHARNBERG
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    DAVID A. WILSON,                                    )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                         )
    )
    vs.                                  )      No. 55A05-1211-CR-606
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                   )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                          )
    APPEAL FROM THE MORGAN SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Jane S. Craney, Judge
    Cause No. 55D03-1204-CM-532
    July 19, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    PYLE, Judge
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    David A. Wilson (“Wilson”) appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor
    Resisting Law Enforcement. 1
    We affirm.
    ISSUE
    Whether sufficient evidence supports Wilson’s conviction.
    FACTS
    On April 17, 2012, Officer Christopher Hobbs (“Officer Hobbs”), Officer Blake
    Long (“Officer Long”) and his brother Sergeant Matthew Long (“Sgt. Long”) went to
    945 South Colfax Street in Martinsville, Indiana to execute an arrest warrant for Wilson.
    The officers had previously received information that Wilson was staying at this address.
    When the officers arrived, they surrounded the house. Officer Hobbs covered the back
    door, and Sgt. Long and Officer Long went to the front door. Sgt. Long knocked and
    announced that police were present and that they had an arrest warrant. He ordered
    everyone to exit the house and come outside. Officer Long noticed an individual come to
    the window, lock it, and then retreat back into the home. Officer Long recognized that
    the person was wearing a seashell bracelet and ring.
    None of the occupants of the home complied with Sgt. Long’s request. He then
    went to the car and retrieved his canine partner, Fero. When he returned to the front door
    and announced the presence of the canine three individuals exited the house. Officer
    Long and Sgt. Long, accompanied by Fero, then entered the house. The officers noticed
    1
    
    Ind. Code §35-44.1-3
    -1(a)(3)
    2
    a partial stairway that led to a converted attic space. Again, they announced loudly for
    any occupants to present themselves or face the risk of being bitten by Fero. Three
    additional occupants came out and surrendered themselves to the police. None of the
    individuals who surrendered themselves were wearing the seashell bracelet and ring that
    Officer Long had previously noticed. Because the entry to the attic was through a crawl
    space, Sgt. Long took Fero back to the car. Officer Long notified Sgt. Long that there
    was still another person in the house.
    Sgt. Long, along with Lieutenant Brent Worth (“Lt. Worth”), entered the attic in
    an effort to apprehend the individual. First, Lt. Worth made the announcement that they
    were the police and that anyone there should surrender. Next, Sgt. Long switched places
    with Lt. Worth, announced himself, and saw Wilson’s feet under the insulation. He
    ordered Wilson to come forward, but Wilson attempted to move further in the opposite
    direction under the insulation. At that point, Sgt. Long retrieved his taser and shocked
    Wilson two times, after which Wilson surrendered himself to police.
    On April 18, 2012, the State charged Wilson with resisting law enforcement, a
    Class A misdemeanor. A jury trial was held on October 24, 2012, where a guilty verdict
    was returned. On October 31, 2012, Wilson was sentenced to 365 days with 300 day
    executed in the Morgan County Jail.
    DECISION
    Wilson argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for
    resisting law enforcement.
    3
    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
    conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and
    reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not
    that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence
    to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve
    this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting
    evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the [jury’s verdict].
    Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder
    could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It
    is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may
    reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.
    Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted).
    A person commits Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if he
    knowingly or intentionally, flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by
    visible or audible means, including operation of the law enforcement officer’s siren or
    emergency lights, identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop. 
    Ind. Code § 35
    - 44.1- 3-1(a)(3). “Flight” in the context of the resisting law enforcement statute is
    “understood to mean a knowing attempt to escape law enforcement when the defendant is
    aware that a law enforcement officer has ordered him to stop or remain in place.”
    Wellman v. State, 
    703 N.E.2d 1061
    , 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).          To convict Wilson of
    resisting law enforcement, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Wilson fled from Sgt. Long, after Sgt. Long identified himself and ordered Wilson to
    stop.
    4
    A. Sufficiency of Arrest Warrant for Entry
    Wilson contends that he was not required to exit the residence when the officers
    called for occupants to exit because the officers did not have a warrant specifically for the
    945 Colfax Street address. Our Supreme Court has recognized that an arrest warrant
    founded on probable cause gives the police “limited authority to enter a dwelling in
    which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” Duran v.
    State, 
    930 N.E. 2d 10
    , 15 (Ind. 2010). The belief is judged on the information available
    to the officers at the time of entry and need not prove to have been correct in hindsight.
    Id at 15. Officer Hobbs testified that the police had received information that Wilson was
    residing at the Colfax Street address. At the time the officers went to execute the arrest
    warrant, they possessed a reasonable belief that 945 Colfax Street was where Wilson had
    been staying. Additionally, the record reflects that Wilson did not contradict or object to
    the State’s evidence regarding the officer’s reasonable belief at trial. A party must show
    that it gave the trial court a bona fide opportunity to pass upon the merits of a claim
    before seeking an opinion on appeal. Cavens v. Zaberdac, 
    849 N.E.2d 526
    , 533 (Ind.
    2006). Therefore this issue is waived.
    B. Flight
    Wilson asserts that the act of moving his legs in an enclosed attic is not a knowing
    attempt to flee from a law enforcement officer who has commanded him to show himself
    and come to the officer. Wilson’s argument depends on the holding in Vanzyll v. State,
    978 N.E. 2d at 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).            In Vanzyll, officers were conducting
    surveillance of a home, after receiving information that Vanzyll was residing there. The
    5
    officers secured the home prior to obtaining neither an arrest nor search warrant. The
    officers knocked and announced, at which time, Vanzyll opened and shut the door and
    retreated back into the home. The door was left ajar and the officers proceeded to enter
    and commanded Vanyzll to exit the home and surrender himself.               Vanzyll did not
    initially comply with the order, but after a female companion surrendered herself,
    Vanzyll did as well. The court held that Vanzyll did not resist law enforcement because
    he was not given a command to stop. In addition, the officers did not have a warrant.
    Therefore, Vanzyll was not obligated to answer when the officers knocked on the door.
    We find that this case is distinguishable from Vanzyll and much more like
    Wellman. In Wellman, the officers were conducting a legitimate and lawful investigation.
    Wellman exited his home to speak with police who ordered him to remain outside.
    Wellman did not comply with the order and retreated back into his home. Therefore,
    Wellman was found guilty of resisting law enforcement. Wellman, 
    703 N.E.2d 1061
    .
    Unlike Vanzyll, and much like Wellman, the facts before us show the officers had
    a valid arrest warrant that they were attempting to execute. The warrant for Wilson’s
    arrest made their presence at 945 Colfax both lawful and legitimate. When Officer Long
    spotted Wilson at the window, he ordered him to exit the home, but Wilson locked the
    window. Next, when Sgt. Long found Wilson in the attic, he instructed him to come out
    of the insulation and make himself known. Wilson did not comply, but attempted to
    scoot himself further into the insulation in the attic, thus constituting his flight from Sgt.
    Long. Because there was probative evidence from which the jury could have found
    6
    Wilson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Class A misdemeanor resisting law
    enforcement, we affirm his conviction.
    Affirmed.
    KIRSCH, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 55A05-1211-CR-606

Filed Date: 7/19/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014