Steven Gates v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 09 2013, 6:22 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
STEVEN GATES GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Plainfield, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JOSEPH Y. HO
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
STEVEN GATES, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1208-CR-685
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, Judge
The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, Magistrate
Cause No. 49G01-1107-FB-51856
July 9, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DARDEN, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Steven Gates appeals the denial of his request for credit time for the completion of
various programs while he was in the Marion County Jail awaiting trial. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Gates was arrested on July 21, 2011, and later charged with Class B felony
robbery, Class C felony battery, and being a habitual offender. On May 2, 2012, the day
scheduled for trial, Gates pleaded guilty to Class B felony robbery and being a habitual
offender pursuant to a plea agreement in which the State agreed to dismiss the battery
charge as well as charges pending in another cause number. The plea agreement
provided for a sentence of sixteen years, with fourteen years to be served at the
Department of Correction and two years to be served on home detention. The trial court
accepted the plea, entered judgments of conviction, and later sentenced him according to
the terms of the agreement.
On August 10, 2012, Gates filed a pro se Motion for Additional Earned Credit
Time. In the motion, he requested credit time pursuant to the educational credit time
statute for certain programs he had completed while in the Marion County Jail. He
attached several certificates of completion to the motion. The trial court denied the
motion, stating that “credit decisions regarding educational and vocational programs are
properly left to the discretion of the Department of Correction which is in the best
position to determine the relative merits of these programs, and this Court will not
second-guess the Department’s decision in this regard.” Appellant’s App. p. 88. Gates
now appeals.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION
As an initial matter, we note that we treat Gates’s denominated Motion for
Additional Earned Credit Time as a petition for post-conviction relief. See Young v.
State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1256 (Ind. 2008) (treating Young’s Verified Petition for
Educational Credit Time as a petition for post-conviction relief because “post-conviction
proceedings are the appropriate procedure for considering properly presented claims for
educational credit time”). When appealing the denial of post-conviction relief, the
petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a
conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Bethea v. State, 983
N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2013).
Gates contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his request for
credit time under Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.3 (2012) for certificates of completion
he received while he was in the Marion County Jail awaiting trial. However, no
provision of this statute grants credit time for Gates’s certificates. We presume he relies
on Section 35-50-6-3.3(b), but that provision imposes requirements on certificates not
met or shown here:
(b) In addition to any credit time that a person earns under subsection (a) or
section 3 of this chapter, a person may earn credit time if, while confined by
the department of correction, the person:
(1) is in credit Class I;
(2) demonstrates a pattern consistent with rehabilitation; and
(3) successfully completes requirements to obtain at least one (1) of
the following:
(A) A certificate of completion of a career and technical
education program approved by the department of correction.
(B) A certificate of completion of a substance abuse program
approved by the department of correction.
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(C) A certificate of completion of a literacy and basic life
skills program approved by the department of correction.
(D) A certificate of completion of a reformative program
approved by the department of correction.
(Emphases added). Gates was not confined by the Department of Correction when he
earned his certificates, nor has he shown that the programs he completed are approved by
the Department of Correction.
Gates nonetheless claims Murphy v. State, 930 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),
adopted in full by Murphy v. State, 942 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. 2011), entitles him to relief. In
that case, the defendant asked the sentencing court to grant him educational credit time
for receiving his general educational development diploma (“GED”) while in pretrial
confinement, but the court told him that he should submit his request to the Department
of Correction. On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
agreeing with this Court that the trial court is the proper authority to determine whether a
defendant who completes an educational degree before sentencing is entitled to
educational credit time. Murphy, 942 N.E.2d at 819.
Murphy involved educational credit time for a GED. Educational credit time for a
GED is governed by Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.3(a), which does not require that the
GED be earned while confined by the Department of Correction or that the GED be
approved by the Department of Correction. Murphy is thus inapplicable here.
Because Gates is not entitled to receive educational credit time under Indiana
Code section 35-50-6-3.3 for certificates of completion he received while he was in the
Marion County Jail awaiting trial, he has not shown that the evidence as a whole leads
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unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction
court.
CONCLUSION
We therefore affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.
MAY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
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