Charles D. Gilliam v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of                         Jun 04 2013, 8:15 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the
    case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    JEFFREY L. SANFORD                               GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    South Bend, Indiana                              Attorney General of Indiana
    AARON J. SPOLARICH
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    CHARLES D. GILLIAM,                              )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                      )
    )
    vs.                                )      No. 71A03-1210-CR-432
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                       )
    APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable R.W. Chamblee, Jr., Judge
    Cause No. 71D08-1201-FD-55
    June 4, 2013
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SULLIVAN, Senior Judge
    Charles D. Gilliam appeals his jury conviction of receiving stolen property, a
    Class D felony. 
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2
    (b) (2009). We affirm.
    In the early morning hours of January 14, 2012, South Bend resident Rosa Garza
    went outside and saw that someone had broken into her garage through a window. Her
    snow blower had been stolen. Garza saw a trail through the snow where the snow blower
    had been dragged away. The last time Garza had seen the snow blower was at 5:00 p.m.
    the previous evening.
    Garza called the police, and Officer Corey Calvert went to her house. He and
    other officers followed the snow blower’s tracks through the snow, which led through
    alleys and backyards into a fenced yard and up to the back door of a house. An officer
    knocked on the house’s front door. Gilliam opened the door. When Calvert asked him
    about a “stolen snow blower,” Gilliam “said he knew what [Calvert] was talking about
    and he had a snow blower in his possession.” Tr. p. 100. Gilliam’s girlfriend retrieved
    Garza’s snow blower from the kitchen and brought it to the officers. Gilliam told the
    officers that two men had arrived at his house with the snow blower and asked if he
    would like to purchase it. He was only able to provide a “brief description” of each male.
    
    Id. at 110
    . As he was being transported to jail, Gilliam pointed out a possible residence
    for the two men.
    The State charged Gilliam with receiving stolen property. A jury convicted him,
    and the trial court sentenced him accordingly. This appeal followed.
    Gilliam raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the evidence is sufficient to
    sustain his conviction. When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we
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    do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Joslyn v. State, 
    942 N.E.2d 809
    , 811 (Ind. 2011). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
    inferences supporting the verdict, and we will affirm if the evidence and reasonable
    inferences could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty
    beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
    In order to convict Gilliam of receiving stolen property as a Class D felony, the
    State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gilliam (1) knowingly or
    intentionally (2) received, retained, or disposed of (3) the property of another person (4)
    that has been the subject of theft. See 
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2
    (b).
    To sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the State must show that the
    defendant had knowledge of the stolen character of the property. Stone v. State, 
    555 N.E.2d 475
    , 477 (Ind. 1990). Knowledge that property is stolen may be inferred from the
    circumstances surrounding the possession.       
    Id.
       Furthermore, attempts to conceal
    evidence may be considered by the jury as revealing consciousness of guilt.             
    Id.
    Knowledge of the stolen character of property may not be inferred solely from the
    unexplained possession of recently stolen property. Fortson v. State, 
    919 N.E.2d 1136
    ,
    1143 (Ind. 2010).
    Here, Gilliam argues the evidence fails to establish that he knew the snow blower
    had been stolen. We disagree. The snow blower’s tracks led directly to the back door of
    Gilliam’s residence. Taking at face value Gilliam’s statement to Calvert that he bought
    the snow blower, then the circumstances of the purchase are that two individuals who
    3
    Gilliam hardly knew arrived at his back door in the evening, unsolicited, to ask if he
    wanted to buy it. These are questionable circumstances, to say the least.
    Next, Gilliam placed the snow blower in his kitchen instead of leaving it outside,
    which a reasonable finder of fact could have interpreted as concealment. Finally, when
    Calvert asked Gilliam about a “stolen” snow blower, Gilliam told Calvert he knew what
    Calvert was talking about. Tr. p. 100. This is sufficient evidence for a reasonable finder
    of fact to conclude that Gilliam knew the snow blower was stolen. Gilliam argues that
    the police should have investigated the two men who sold him the snow blower, but this
    is a request to reweigh the evidence, which we may not do.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Affirmed.
    ROBB, C.J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 71A03-1210-CR-432

Filed Date: 6/4/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014