Bennie Gavin v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the Jun 05 2013, 10:10 am
purpose of establishing the defense of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the
law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
LAURA M. TAYLOR GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JOSEPH Y. HO
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
BENNIE GAVIN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1211-CR-00565
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Annie Christ-Garcia, Judge
Cause No. 49F24-1107-FD-48508
June 5, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
ROBB, Chief Judge
Case Summary and Issues
Bennie Gavin appeals his convictions of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a
Class D felony, and operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentrate equivalence (“ACE”)
of 0.15 or more, a Class D felony, and his habitual substance offender enhancement.
Gavin raises the following restated issues for our review: 1) whether the evidence was
sufficient to sustain his operating while intoxicated conviction and habitual substance
offender enhancement, and 2) whether his convictions for operating while intoxicated and
operating with an ACE of 0.15 or more violate principles of double jeopardy.
Concluding that the evidence was sufficient but there was a double jeopardy violation, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
On July 7, 2011, Gavin rear-ended a car driven by Cynthia Goedesky after she
pulled in front of him. Tobias Dennison, a security guard at a nearby food pantry,
approached the crash scene. When he leaned into Gavin’s car to make sure the occupants
of the car1 were okay, he smelled the odor of alcohol. Dennison and Goedesky both
called police to report the accident. About forty-five minutes later, Gavin flagged down
Officer Timothy Elliot who was driving by. Officer Elliot noticed that a strong odor of
alcohol was coming from Gavin’s breath and person, and that he had a “little bit of a
slurred speech,” bloodshot and glassy eyes, and unsteady balance. Transcript at 63.
Gavin told him that he had not been drinking that day but that he had been drinking the
night before. Gavin failed two field sobriety tests and refused to perform a third sobriety
test. Officer Elliot began to read Gavin the Indiana implied consent law but was unable
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There was a female passenger riding along with Gavin.
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to finish doing so because Gavin was angry and yelling. Gavin was then arrested and
transported to Wishard Hospital. Officer Robert Ferguson read Gavin the implied
consent law at Wishard but Gavin refused to take the chemical test. After obtaining a
warrant, a blood test was performed, showing that Gavin had an alcohol concentration of
0.18 grams per 100 milliliters of blood.
The State charged Gavin with operating a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner
that endangers a person, as a Class A misdemeanor and as a Class D felony because of a
prior conviction; operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more, as a Class A
misdemeanor and as a Class D felony because of a prior conviction; and driving while
suspended, a Class A misdemeanor; and filed an habitual substance offender
enhancement.2 A multi-phase jury trial took place. Gavin testified that he had not had
anything to drink since 2008 and explained that the accident took place due to Goedesky
pulling in front of him suddenly. He also testified that he had a liver condition that
caused his eyes to be red and glassy. Gavin was convicted of operating a vehicle while
intoxicated, a Class D felony,3 and operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more, a
Class D felony,4 and determined to be an habitual substance offender.5 The trial court
sentenced Gavin to two years for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and enhanced his
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Gavin was also charged with public intoxication but that charge was dismissed prior to trial.
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The jury found Gavin guilty of the lesser included offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a
Class C misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(a), and of operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a prior conviction
of operating while intoxicated, a Class D felony, Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3(a), but the trial court merged these two
counts.
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The jury found Gavin guilty of operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more, a Class A misdemeanor,
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(b), and of operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.15 or more with a prior conviction of
operating while intoxicated, a Class D felony, Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3(a), but the trial court merged these two counts.
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The jury found Gavin not guilty of driving while suspended.
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sentence by three years for being an habitual substance offender for a total sentence of
five years. Gavin now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is well-settled. We do not reweigh
the evidence or assess witness credibility for ourselves. Boggs v. State, 928 N.E.2d 855,
864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. We consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Id. It is not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; the evidence is sufficient if an
inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. We will affirm the
conviction unless no reasonable finder of fact could find the elements of a crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.B. Operating While Intoxicated
Gavin argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of
operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Indiana Code section 9-30-5-2(a).
Intoxication is defined as being “under the influence of (1) alcohol . . . so that there is an
impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person’s
faculties.” Ind. Code § 9-13-2-86. The State is required to establish that the defendant
was impaired, regardless of his blood alcohol content. Fields v. State, 888 N.E.2d 304,
307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Impairment can be established by presenting evidence of the
following:
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(1) the consumption of significant amounts of alcohol; (2) impaired
attention and reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) the odor of alcohol
on the breath; (5) unsteady balance; (6) failure of field sobriety tests; (7)
slurred speech.
Id. at 307 (quoting Ballinger v. State, 717 N.E.2d 939, 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).
Here, the State relied upon the testimony of three witnesses to establish that Gavin
was impaired. Dennison testified that he smelled alcohol when he leaned into Gavin’s
vehicle. Officer Elliot testified that he observed that Gavin had a strong odor of alcoholic
beverage on his breath and person, slurred speech, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and
unsteady balance. Gavin also failed two field sobriety tests administered by Officer
Elliot. Finally, Officer Ferguson testified that he noticed an odor of alcohol coming from
Gavin and that he had slurred speech and watery and bloodshot eyes. This evidence was
sufficient to satisfy the State’s burden of proving that Gavin was intoxicated beyond a
reasonable doubt. See id. at 307-08 (finding evidence that the defendant smelled of
alcohol, had slurred speech, had a dazed look, had red and watery eyes, and failed three
field sobriety tests was sufficient to sustain his operating while intoxicated conviction).
In his brief, Gavin points to alleged differences between his conduct and that of
the defendant in Staley v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.6
He argues that unlike the defendant in Staley, he sought police help after the accident, did
not attempt to elude the police, and did not stagger from or lean on his car during his
interaction with the police. However, the State was not required to prove that Gavin did
not seek help, eluded police, or staggered from the car in order to satisfy its burden of
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We note that in Staley, the defendant was convicted of operating while intoxicated in a manner that
endangered a person, a Class A misdemeanor, 895 N.E.2d at 1251, while, here, the jury found Gavin guilty of the
lesser included offense of operating while intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor. As noted above, Gavin’s conviction
was elevated to a Class D felony due to his prior operating while intoxicated conviction.
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proving that Gavin was intoxicated.7 More importantly, this argument is simply an
invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses, which
we cannot do on appeal. See id. at 1251. The evidence was sufficient to sustain Gavin’s
conviction of operating while intoxicated.
C. Habitual Substance Offender
Gavin also argues that the State failed to prove that he is an habitual substance
offender. The habitual substance offender statute provides that a person who commits
two prior unrelated substance offenses is subject to a sentence enhancement of three to
eight years upon a conviction for a third unrelated offense. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-10.
Gavin does not contest that he has two prior unrelated substance offenses. Instead, he
argues that because of the allegedly insufficient evidence supporting his operating while
intoxicated conviction in this case—which was relied upon by the State as the third
unrelated substance offense—his habitual substance offender enhancement cannot stand.
Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Gavin’s operating while
intoxicated conviction, it follows that the evidence was sufficient to prove his habitual
substance offender enhancement. We therefore affirm both convictions.
II. Double Jeopardy
A. Standard of Review
We generally consider the issue of whether multiple convictions violate double
jeopardy to be a matter of law for de novo review by appellate courts. See Spears v.
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In fact, Officer Elliot testified that Gavin had unsteady balance and that his hand consistently touched his
car as he approached him.
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State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1166 (Ind. 2000). The analysis of double jeopardy claims under
the Indiana Constitution is governed by Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 50-52 (Ind.
1999), in which our supreme court set forth the statutory elements test and the actual
evidence test. And “[e]ven where no constitutional violation has occurred, multiple
convictions may nevertheless violate the ‘rules of statutory construction and common law
that are often described as double jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test
set forth in Richardson.’” Vandergriff v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1084, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (citing Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied. These
rules fall within five categories, which were first enumerated by Justice Sullivan in his
concurrence in Richardson. See id. at 1088.
B. Same Act
Gavin argues, and the State concedes, that his convictions for operating while
intoxicated and operating with an ACE of 0.15 or more violate principles of double
jeopardy. While the parties disagree as to which principle of double jeopardy these
convictions violate, we find persuasive the State’s argument that because the same
behavior—operating a vehicle while intoxicated—formed the basis for both convictions,
they fall within the category described by Justice Sullivan in his concurrence in
Richardson as “[c]onviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same
act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished.” 717
N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., concurring). A violation of double jeopardy principles
requires that we vacate the conviction with the less severe penal consequences. Moala v.
State, 969 N.E.2d 1061, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). In this case, both convictions were
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Class D felonies, but the trial court did not sentence Gavin for operating a vehicle with an
ACE of 0.15 or more. See id. at 1066 (“the severity of the penal consequences has
largely been determined by the class of crime or by the length of the sentence imposed”).
We therefore remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the operating with an
ACE of 0.15 or more conviction and leave the operating while intoxicated conviction
standing.
Conclusion
The evidence was sufficient to sustain Gavin’s operating while intoxicated
conviction and his habitual substance offender enhancement. However, as the State
concedes, his convictions for operating while intoxicated and operating with an ACE of
0.15 or more violate double jeopardy principles. Thus, we reverse and remand with
instructions for the trial court to vacate Gavin’s conviction for operating a vehicle with an
ACE of 0.15 or more, but affirm in all other respects.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and CRONE., J., concur.
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