Tony Monks v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of May 24 2013, 9:12 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARK K. PHILLIPS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Boonville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KARL M. SCHARNBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TONY MONKS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 87A01-1209-CR-405
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE WARRICK CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable David O. Kelley, Judge
Cause No. 87C01-1104-FB-1067
May 24, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge
Case Summary
Tony Monks (“Monks”) presents this discretionary interlocutory appeal from the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained when law enforcement officers
entered his apartment to serve a warrant and discovered methamphetamine precursors. We
affirm.
Issue
Monks presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence was improper because officers:
(a) violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by entering the apartment; or
(b) violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution by eliciting incriminating statements before providing Miranda
warnings.1
Facts and Procedural History
On April 1, 2010, Sergeant Aaron Bennett of the Warrick County Sheriff’s
Department (“Sergeant Bennett”) went to a residence on Fourth Street in Newburgh, Indiana
to serve an arrest warrant on Emily Duke (“Duke”). He was accompanied by three
Newburgh Police Department officers, Chief of Police Brett Sprinkle, Assistant Chief of
Police Tiger Williams, and canine officer Chad Bailey.
The officers went to the door of the apartment listed on the warrant as Duke’s
1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda established that a suspect subject to custodial
interrogation has the right to consult with an attorney, a “procedural safeguard” not itself protected by the
Constitution but a “measure to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.”
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 456 (1994).
2
residence and knocked several times. They could hear floorboards creaking as they
continued to knock. After some time, the officers went downstairs and contacted the
building maintenance manager. He was located in the apartment directly below Duke’s
apartment. He confirmed that Duke lived upstairs and stated that, while he had last seen
Duke two days earlier, he had heard someone walking around upstairs while the officers were
knocking.
Sergeant Bennett went back upstairs and knocked again. He announced the officers’
presence and warned that if the door was not opened it would be forced open. Receiving no
response, Sergeant Bennett went downstairs and obtained the apartment key from the
maintenance manager. Sergeant Bennett unlocked the door to Duke’s apartment but
discovered that the door had been dead bolted. The officers kicked in the door.
The officers then encountered a woman in the doorway, later identified as Joyce
Mathis (“Mathis”), who is Monks’s mother. The smell of ether was immediately detectable.
On a bar separating the living room and kitchen, there was a clear liquid in a Mason jar,
aluminum foil, salt, gloves, baggies, and a two-liter bottle containing white residue. Monks,
who had been in the shower, was allowed to dress and sit beside Mathis on the sofa.
Sergeant Bennett retrieved consent to search forms, which he read aloud to Mathis and
Monks. They each signed the consent to search form.
During the ensuing search, the officers found items including rubber tubing,
pseudoephedrine, lithium batteries, methamphetamine, a coffee grinder, Liquid Fire,
denatured alcohol, and glass jars. Monks volunteered that the items being recovered
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belonged to him and not to his mother. Monks additionally volunteered the information that
he was not manufacturing methamphetamine but would clean filters and baggies to extract
and concentrate methamphetamine residue for his personal use.2 At one point, Sergeant
Bennett “may have” asked Monks to identify an item. (Tr. 22.) Monks was taken to a police
vehicle for transport to jail. It was at that time that he was first read his Miranda rights.
After the warning, Monks “repeat[ed] the things that he’d been saying earlier on.” (Tr. 64.)
The State charged Monks with Possession of Methamphetamine with the Intent to
Manufacture or Deliver,3 Possession of Precursors,4 and Manufacture of or Dealing in
Methamphetamine.5 The State also alleged him to be a habitual substance offender.6
On March 16, 2012, Monks filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the
apartment entry was illegal, and that all the evidence obtained from the entry, including any
testimony of his incriminating statements to officers, should be suppressed. On July 2, 2012,
a hearing was conducted. On July 12, 2012, the trial court entered an order denying the
motion to suppress evidence.
On August 8, 2012, Monks moved the trial court to certify its order for interlocutory
appeal, and the trial court granted the motion on August 23, 2012. We accepted jurisdiction,
2
Chief Sprinkle explained that a person can extract residual methamphetamine from a coffee filter by soaking
it in denatured alcohol or ether and then using salt and Liquid Fire to create hydrochloride gas. A tube is
inserted into a plastic soda bottle and hydrochloride gas forms. As the gas bubbles, the solid particles fall to
the bottom. The process results in a “smoke off bottle.” (Tr. 65.)
3
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2).
4
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-14.5(e).
5
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1).
6
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-10.
4
and this appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Monks brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, contending that the entry into his apartment violated the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.7 In particular, he claims that the officers lacked a reasonable
belief that the subject of the warrant was present and no exigent circumstances existed to
support a warrantless entry.8 He also claims that, once they were inside, officers elicited
incriminating statements without first providing a Miranda warning.
Entry into Apartment
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress similarly to other sufficiency
issues. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 358 (Ind. 2005). We determine whether
substantial evidence of probative value exists to support the trial court’s ruling. Id. We
review de novo a trial court’s ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we
give deference to a trial court’s determination of the facts, which will not be overturned
unless clearly erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008). Thus, we do
not reweigh the evidence, but consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s
ruling. Id. However, in reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we must also consider
uncontested evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Jackson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 615,
7
He does not develop a separate argument under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
8
The existence of exigent circumstances is among the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Holder v. State,
847 N.E.2d 930, 936 (Ind. 2006). A warrant is unnecessary when the “‘exigencies of the situation make the
needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.’” Id. at 936–37 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
5
618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. We will affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is
sustainable on any legal grounds that are apparent in the record. Richardson v. State, 848
N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part, that
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This
federal right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961). The fundamental purpose
of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy that citizens
possess in their persons, their homes, and their belongings. Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327,
330 (Ind. 2006) (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)). The principal protection
against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by
the Fourth Amendment. Alspach v. State, 755 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans.
denied.
Here, the officers were armed with a warrant for the arrest of Duke. “An arrest
warrant founded on probable cause gives the police ‘limited authority to enter a dwelling in
which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”’ Duran v.
State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 15 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603
(1980)). The belief is judged on the information available to the officers at the time of their
entry and need not be proven correct in hindsight. Id. As a general proposition, “reason to
believe” involves something less than probable cause. Id. However, entry into a home to
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execute an arrest warrant, in the absence of exigent circumstances, and based on “reasonable
belief” may require more than the “reasonable suspicion” of an investigative stop. Id. at 16.
Given the circumstances presented in Duran, the Court declined to “further explore
the potential differences in the quality of information available required to meet probable
cause, reasonable belief, and reasonable suspicion” but, for purposes of the opinion, adopted
the terminology of the majority of courts and used “reasonable belief” to refer to the quality
of information required to enter a home to execute an arrest warrant. Id. As for the
substance of what is to be reasonably believed, the Court noted that most jurisdictions require
that the police (1) have a reasonable belief that the dwelling is the residence of the subject of
the warrant, and (2) that the subject is present at the time the officers attempt to enter on
authority of the warrant. Id.
Monks claims that in this instance the officers lacked a reasonable belief that Duke
was present in the apartment because an officer had driven past on several occasions in the
week preceding the entry but had not seen Duke’s vehicle. However, the evidence most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling indicates that the officers proceeded to the address listed
on the warrant for Duke and heard movement inside. Receiving no response to knocks, the
officers contacted the building maintenance manager. The maintenance manager was able to
verify that the apartment in question was occupied by Duke; he also reported having heard
movement in the apartment as the officers knocked and requested entry. From these
circumstances, a law enforcement officer could form the reasonable belief that Duke was
inside the apartment.
7
The officers had a warrant for the arrest of Duke at a location that proved to be her
residence; entering the apartment to effect that arrest upon reasonable belief that she was
inside did not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. We cannot conclude that the
trial court erred in denying Monks’s motion to suppress evidence in this respect.
Pre-Miranda Statements
Monks was first read his Miranda rights when he was taken in the police vehicle for
transport to jail. He claims that pre-Miranda statements were elicited in violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Miranda warnings must be given to a person in police custody before interrogation;
however, officers are not required to give Miranda warnings unless the defendant is both in
custody and subject to interrogation. Campos, 885 N.E.2d at 602.
Monks was not being questioned by an officer when he spontaneously claimed
ownership of the items in the apartment and professed to be harvesting methamphetamine for
personal use. Apart from this volunteered information, Monks has not identified a question
to which he provided an incriminating response or to which he related the substance of the
allegedly incriminating response. Because Monks did not provide incriminating information
while undergoing custodial interrogation, there was no Miranda violation.
Conclusion
Police did not violate Monks’s Fourth Amendment rights by entering his apartment to
serve an arrest warrant. Monks was not subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda
warnings, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Thus, the
8
trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
9