Quinn Nelson v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
FILED
Dec 07 2012, 9:26 am
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata, CLERK
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
VALERIE K. BOOTS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
MICHAEL GENE WORDEN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
QUINN NELSON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A04-1203-CR-145
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Mark D. Stoner, Judge
Cause No. 49G06-1104-FA-22989
December 7, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
RILEY, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant-Defendant, Quinn Nelson (Nelson), appeals his conviction for
attempted murder, a Class A felony, Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1(a); and his
adjudication as an habitual offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Nelson raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as the following: Whether the
State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Nelson’s
conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Nelson and Rebecca Mumaw (Mumaw) lived together at Mumaw’s home on the
near northeast side of Indianapolis. By April 2011, they had been in a relationship for six
months, but Mumaw wanted to end it. She had previously told Nelson of her intention.
On April 1, 2011, Nelson arrived at the home around 5:00 p.m. and began drinking
whiskey with Mumaw. The evening started well, but then both became intoxicated. The
couple began to push and argue with each other, which was not unusual in their
relationship. After midnight, Nelson left the home and Mumaw went to bed. Early the
following morning, around 5 a.m., Mumaw woke up and went to her kitchen.
Nelson had returned and the two began arguing. He told Mumaw that, “I’ll make
sure you’re never with anyone else.” (Transcript p. 36). At the time, Mumaw was
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wearing a red top and jeans. Nelson stood in front of Mumaw and poured fluid on her
and set her on fire. Mumaw did not see the fluid but felt her upper chest get wet and
smelled a “real sour smell.” (Tr. p. 35). As Mumaw’s skin and face were burning,
Nelson tried to pat the fire out, telling her, “Baby, I’m sorry.” (Tr. p. 17). Nelson left the
home thereafter. Around 6 a.m., Nelson called 911 from one of his cell phones to report
that Mumaw was badly burned and gave the operator directions to Mumaw’s home.
Police, firemen, and the paramedics arrived at Mumaw’s home. Mumaw was
found standing on a sidewalk outside her home and wearing a one-piece dress. She
shouted, “[i]t burns, it burns.” (Tr. p. 45). Recognizing that she suffered serious burns
from the waist up, paramedics grabbed Mumaw and wrapped her in sterile linen sheets
and transported her to a hospital. Paramedics noted that Mumaw was extremely anxious
and asked her how this had happened to her. Although not responding at first, Mumaw
explained that “my boyfriend doused me with lighter fluid and set me on fire.” (Tr. p.
55). Mumaw later identified her boyfriend as Nelson. At the hospital, Mumaw was
placed in an induced coma. She remained hospitalized for approximately eight weeks,
during which time one of her breasts was removed and she underwent debridement and
skin grafting as part of her treatment. Burns covered approximately forty-two percent of
her body.
After Mumaw was taken to the hospital, two homicide detectives from the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived at her home. A search warrant for
the home was later obtained. An arson detective and Lieutenant Ron Marks (Lieutenant
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Marks), a fire marshal from the Indianapolis Fire Department, arrived to conduct an
investigation on the cause and origin of the fire. They examined the exterior of the house
to look for possible causes of the fire, but found nothing. Going inside the home, the
team conducted a brief examination to find obvious indications of an accidental cause of
the fire. Finding none, the team set out to painstakingly photograph the house and collect
evidence. A partially full bottle of charcoal lighter fluid was found in the living room
and a rolled up piece of carpet had a linoleum tile from the kitchen affixed to it. The
rolled up carpet contained a pair of jeans. A struck match was found in the dining room.
In the bathroom, burnt material resembling singed human hair was found floating in the
tub, as well as in and around the sink. In the bedroom, officers found a partially burnt red
shirt along with a cigarette lighter on the nightstand. The blanket on the bed had burnt
material on it. The charcoal lighter fluid, jeans, and other material were taken as
evidence.
Returning to his office, Lieutenant Marks completed his origin and cause report,
concluding that the fire was an incendiary fire with no accidental cause. Thereafter,
Lieutenant Marks went back to Mumaw’s neighborhood. After learning that Nelson’s
sister lived close by, Lieutenant Marks found Nelson at her home and brought him to the
station for an interview. Nelson was first searched and a metal can of Zippo cigarette
lighter fluid along with three cigarette lighters were found. Nelson denied all knowledge
of the incident, explaining that he was at his sister’s house at the relevant time. However,
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Nelson’s sister was also interviewed and denied that Nelson had been at her house at the
time. In a subsequent interview, Nelson denied making the 911 call.
On April 7, 2011, the State filed an Information charging Nelson with attempted
murder, a Class A felony, I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1(a). On June 7, 2011, the State
charged Nelson with being an habitual offender, I.C. § 35-50-2-8. In the interim,
homicide detectives received two unsigned letters from Mumaw’s mother-in-law, which
had been sent to Mumaw from Nelson. Nelson had addressed the envelopes using the
name of a fictitious inmate at the Department of Correction. Both letters requested
Mumaw not to testify regarding the incident. On January 30, 2012, a bifurcated bench
trial was held. At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Nelson guilty of
attempted murder and subsequently of being an habitual offender.
On March 2, 2012, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Nelson
to forty years on the attempted murder conviction, enhanced by thirty years for his
adjudication as an habitual offender, for an aggregate sentence of seventy years.
Nelson now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Nelson argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt for attempted murder. When reviewing sufficiency of the
evidence claims, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the
witnesses. See Sargent v. State, 875 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Only that
evidence which is most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences
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that can be drawn therefrom will be considered. Id. If a reasonable trier of fact could
have found the defendant guilty based on the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, then a conviction will be affirmed. Id. A judgment may be
sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone if that circumstantial evidence supports
a reasonable inference of guilt. Hayworth v. State, 798 N.E.2d 503, 507 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003).
Here, Nelson was convicted of attempted murder. To prove that a person has
committed an attempt crime under I.C. § 35-41-5-1, the State must show that the
defendant engaged in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of
the crime attempted, while acting with the same culpability of that crime. Fry v. State,
885 N.E.2d 742, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. However, our supreme court
has emphasized the importance of requiring specific intent to kill before a defendant can
be convicted of attempted murder, despite that the culpability requirement for murder
includes the lesser standard of knowingly. Id. Thus, the State must prove that Nelson
acted with the specific intent to kill Mumaw, and while doing so, engaged in a substantial
step toward killing her. See id.On appeal, Nelson contests the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that he intended to kill Mumaw in two respects. First, he argues that
the evidence was insufficient because the State’s evidence that he poured lighter fluid on
Mumaw and set her on fire was largely circumstantial. Second, Nelson asserts that even
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if the State proved that he committed the act, it did not prove that he specifically intended
to kill Mumaw.
In addressing Nelson’s first contention, we find that direct evidence establishes
that Nelson committed the crime. Mumaw testified that Nelson poured lighter fluid on
her and lit her on fire. She also told a paramedic that Nelson committed this act. Further,
Mumaw described how the incident occurred. She testified that before being lit on fire,
Nelson was standing in front of her and she noticed that her upper chest became wet and
she smelled a sour odor. She then felt her skin and face burning. The uncorroborated
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction on appeal. Gregory v.
State, 885 N.E.2d 697, 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. As a result, we conclude
that Mumaw’s testimony establishes that Nelson committed the act resulting in her
injuries.
Turning to Nelson’s argument regarding his specific intent to kill Mumaw, we
note that intent must be determined from a consideration of the conduct and the natural
consequences of the conduct. See Mason v. State, 944 N.E.2d 68, 73 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011), trans. denied. Accordingly, intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Id.The defendant’s use of a deadly weapon in a manner to cause death or serious bodily
injury is sufficient to imply intent to kill. Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334-339 (Ind. 1992).
The Indiana Code defines a “deadly weapon” to include a “chemical substance, or other
material” that in the manner it is, could ordinarily be, or is intended to be used, “is readily
capable of causing serious bodily injury.” See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-86(2). Here, Nelson used
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lighter or other ignitable fluid coupled with fire as a deadly weapon to inflict serious
bodily injury upon Mumaw. Further, Nelson made a number of statements during the
incident that point to his guilt. Words may be indicative of intent. See Tancil v. State,
956 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Mumaw testified that Nelson
said that he would never let her be with anyone else. In sum, the trial court could have
therefore reasonably concluded that Nelson intended to kill Mumaw.
Finally, Nelson argues that his efforts after lighting Mumaw on fire “are
inconsistent with an intent to kill” her. (Appellant’s Br. p. 12). Specifically, Nelson
contends that given his efforts to put out the fire and his 911 call, it is unreasonable to
infer that he intended to kill. Essentially, Nelson argues that even if he initially acted
with specific intent to kill Mumaw, his later efforts to put the fire out and render
assistance to Mumaw negated his criminal intent. We disagree. Nelson’s acts refer to
conduct after the crime was committed. As discussed above, the State presented
sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that he set Mumaw on fire and did
so with the intent to kill her. We therefore affirm Nelson’s conviction for attempted
murder.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Nelson’s conviction.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J. and CRONE, J. concur
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