John F. Minter-Bey III v. State of Indiana ( 2013 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 14 2013, 8:17 am
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN FRANK MINTER-BEY III GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
JUSTIN F. ROEBEL
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JOHN F. MINTER-BEY III, )
)
Appellant-Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1205-PC-269
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Respondent. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Steven R. Eichholtz, Judge
Cause No. 49G20-0706-PC-102193
March 14, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAKER, Judge
In this case, the appellant-petitioner John F. Minter-Bey, is appealing the denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief. Although Minter-Bey initially raised the issues of
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims in his request for relief, he
argued only jurisdictional issues at the evidentiary hearing. Minter-Bey claims that he
was not an American citizen and, therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to bring
criminal charges against him. However, Minter-Bey failed to present evidence and/or
make a cogent argument in support of his contention. Thus, he has waived the issue.
Moreover, Minter-Bey’s jurisdictional claims fail on the merits. As a result, we conclude
that the post-conviction court properly denied Minter-Bey’s petition for post-conviction
relief.
FACTS
Minter-Bey was convicted of dealing in cocaine, a class A felony, possession of
cocaine and a firearm as a class C felony, and possession of a firearm by a serious violent
felon, a class B felony, in September 2009. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Minter-
Bey to concurrent terms of forty years for dealing in cocaine, ten years for possession of
cocaine and a firearm, and four years for possession of a firearm by a serious violent
felon. We subsequently affirmed Minter-Bey’s conviction on direct appeal in an
unpublished memorandum decision. Minter-Bey v. State, No. 49G20-0706-FA-102193
(Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2010).
On July 18, 2011, Minter-Bey filed his petition for post-conviction relief claiming,
among other things, that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. Minter-Bey
2
also challenged the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction based
on his status as a “Moorish American National.” Tr. p. 9, 12-13. Following an
evidentiary hearing on March 16, 2012, the post-conviction court denied Minter-Bey’s
request for relief. The post-conviction court determined, among other things, that
Minter-Bey’s freestanding jurisdiction claim “covering all bases with scattered references
to jurisdiction over subject matter, the case and his person” was waived, but Minter-Bey
was entitled to raise jurisdiction as part of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Appellant’s App. p. 250. The post-conviction court observed that Minter-Bey failed to
offer any supporting evidence in support of his claims and thus “failed to show that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction.” Appellant’s App. p. 250. Minter-Bey now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
In a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must establish the grounds for relief
by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5); Wesley v. State,
788 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Ind. 2003). When challenging the denial of post-conviction
relief, the petitioner appeals a negative judgment, and in doing so faces a rigorous
standard of review. Id. To prevail, the petitioner must convince this court that the
evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the
post-conviction court. Id. We will disturb the post-conviction court’s decision only
where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion and the post-
conviction court reached the opposite conclusion. Id.3
Here, the post-conviction court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in
accordance with Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Although we do not defer to the post-
conviction court’s legal conclusions, a post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will
be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 151
(Ind. 2007).
II. Minter-Bey’s Claims—Jurisdictional Issues
Minter-Bey asserts that his petition for post-conviction relief should have been
granted because he demonstrated that our courts were without subject matter and personal
jurisdiction and had no authority to hear this case. More particularly, Minter-Bey asserts
that the trial court had no authority to bring any charges against him and enter a judgment
because he was “a non-corporate natural being.” Appellant’s Br. p. 5.
In resolving this issue, we initially observe that “subject matter jurisdiction is the
power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which any particular proceeding
belongs.” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ind. 2006). In accordance with Indiana
Code section 33-29-1-1.5, our Superior Courts have “original and concurrent jurisdiction
in all civil cases and in all criminal cases.” Thus, contrary to Minter-Bey’s contention,
the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal charges that the State
brought against him.
With regard to personal jurisdiction, we note that such claims are waived if they
are not asserted in a timely manner. Truax v. State, 856 N.E.2d 116, 121-22 (Ind. Ct.
4
App. 2006). Here, Minter-Bey did not raise the issue of personal jurisdiction prior to
collateral review. Thus, his personal jurisdiction challenge is waived. See Marshall v.
Erie Ins. Exch., 923 N.E.2d 18, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (observing that when a party
appeared and participated in the proceedings, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over
that party).
Waiver notwithstanding, we note that Minter-Bey relies on the case of Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403-04 (1856), for the proposition that the trial court lacked
personal jurisdiction over him because, “as a person of African lineage, he is not a citizen
of the United States.” Appellant’s Br. p. 5-6. However, the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides that “all persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.” Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment overturned the Dred
Scott decision and made “all persons born within the United States and subject to its
jurisdiction citizens of the United States.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1873).
In short, Minter-Bey has failed to show that he is not a citizen of the United States, and
we reject his claim that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
Finally, we reject Minter-Bey’s contention that his status as a “Moorish American
National” removes him from the trial court’s jurisdiction because he is a “non-corporate
being.” Appellant’s Br. p. 8. Minter-Bey fails to support his argument with citation to
any relevant case law. Thus, he has waived the issue. See Bonner v. State, 776 N.E.2d
1244, 1247 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (observing that a party waives an issue on appeal
5
where a cogent argument is not developed, citation to authority is not provided, and there
is not adequate citation to the relevant portions of the record); Ind. Appellate Rule
46(A)(8).
Even if Minter-Bey had not waived the issue, the State retains sovereign powers in
accordance with the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides
that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people.” Minter-Bey’s
argument is wholly inconsistent with this provision. In short, Minter-Bey’s jurisdictional
challenges fail, and we conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied his
request for relief.
The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.
RILEY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
6