Jeffrey S. Heironimus v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata, Nov 01 2012, 9:15 am
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JEFF SHOULDERS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Law Offices of Steven K. Deig, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Evansville, Indiana
ERIC P. BABBS
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JEFFREY S. HEIRONIMUS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 82A01-1204-CR-152
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Carl A. Heldt, Judge
Cause No. 82C01-1105-FB-654
November 1, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge
Case Summary
Jeffrey S. Heironimus appeals the trial court’s admission of evidence of witness
identifications made of him after police officers’ warrantless entry into an accomplice’s
residence. He contends that the entry was an unconstitutional search and seizure, and any
subsequent identifications made as a result of it should be excluded from evidence. We
find that it was not an abuse of discretion to admit this evidence because Heironimus
does not have standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation. He had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the house, as it was not his, nor was he an overnight guest. We
therefore affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On May 26, 2011, Heironimus robbed the First Federal Savings Bank in
Evansville wearing a dark-colored hooded sweatshirt and carrying a backpack.
Heironimus insinuated that he had a gun by placing his hand in his backpack and took
over $3900 in cash, which included $200 in recorded bait money. The bank’s alarm
service immediately notified police. Witnesses Bradford Talley and James Hendrix saw
a man with a dark hooded sweatshirt and a backpack leave the bank, walk quickly to an
alley behind the bank, and get into a red pickup truck that had quickly pulled into the
alley. The truck was described as a red Ford F-250 extended cab truck with damage on
both sides. Tr. p. 56.
Fourteen minutes after receiving the alert from the bank, Evansville Police
Department Sergeant Brian Hildebrandt saw a truck matching the given description
parked across the street from 1000 North Third Avenue, which was one mile from the
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bank. The truck’s headlights were on, the keys were in the ignition, and the exhaust pipe
was still warm. Sergeant Hildebrandt called for a canine unit, and a police dog arrived
that was certified and trained to detect ground disturbances and human odor. The dog
sniffed the outside of the truck and followed the scent to the back door of 1000 North
Third Avenue. Despite the officer’s attempt to get the dog to move on, the dog returned
to the back door of the house and would not leave. The officer and the dog stayed at the
back door to ensure that no one could leave that way.
More officers arrived at the scene, and based on their belief that the robbery
suspects were in the house and might be armed, they decided to secure and clear the
house. Officers knocked on the front door and were let inside by a resident of the home,
Billy Hack. The officers cleared the house, bringing the approximately seven occupants
outside, but did not otherwise search the house. Heironimus and Vincent Driskell, the
man who drove the truck away from the robbery, were two of the occupants brought
outside. They were handcuffed and detained for show-up identifications.
Sergeant Hildebrandt brought Talley and Hendrix to the scene, and Talley
identified Heironimus as the passenger of the red truck. Both Talley and Hendrix
identified Driskell as the driver. The bank teller was also brought to the scene and saw
that Heironimus matched the physical description of the robber; she later saw
Heironimus’s photograph on television and definitively recognized him as the robber.
Officers later obtained a search warrant for the house and found $1500 in cash in a
room upstairs. The bait money was also surrendered to the police by Driskell’s wife,
Melissa Hall, the day after the robbery. Additionally, police searched the red truck,
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finding the registration indicating it belonged to Driskell. An officer with previous
knowledge of the truck also confirmed that the truck was Driskell’s.
The State charged Heironimus with Class C felony robbery with a habitual-
offender enhancement. Heironimus filed a motion to suppress the identification
evidence, arguing that the identifications were the fruits of an illegal entry by police into
the home. The trial court conducted a hearing, and the State argued that the house was
not Heironimus’s residence. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. A jury trial
was held, and Heironimus was found guilty. Heironimus was sentenced to eight years at
the Department of Correction, with an additional ten years for the habitual-offender
enhancement, for a total executed sentence of eighteen years.
Heironimus now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Heironimus contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the
witness identifications at trial. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the
admission or exclusion of evidence. Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009). The trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will be disturbed on
review only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic, facts, and circumstances
presented. Id. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. Ind. Evidence Rule 103.
Heironimus contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
identification evidence because it was the product of an unconstitutional search, in
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violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.1 The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or things to be seized.”
The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the States via the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). Evidence
obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights may not be introduced
against him at trial. Id. at 648-60.
In order to assert that a police entry into a home is unlawful and therefore a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the defendant must have standing, which requires a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises. Arcuri v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1095, 1100
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. One way to have that legitimate expectation of
privacy is for the defendant to have control over or ownership of the premises searched.
Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind. 1996). An overnight guest can also have a
“legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s home and may claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the owner of the
premises may not.” Matson v. State, 844 N.E.2d 566, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990); Hanna v. State, 726 N.E.2d 384, 390 n.4
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000)), trans. denied.
1
Heironimus makes no claim under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and has
therefore waived review under that provision.
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In this case, the evidence shows that Heironimus did not live at 1000 North Third
Avenue, nor was he an overnight guest at the time of the bank robbery. Rather,
Heironimus was merely present at the premises with the consent of the owner, so he does
not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the warrantless entry. Heironimus
did give 1000 North Third Avenue as his address in his unsworn claim when he was
booked into jail, Defense’s Ex. A, but the State disputed that fact at the suppression
hearing. Supp. Hr’g Tr. p. 67 (“I don’t think that’s accurate . . . . I don’t think he lived
there.”).
Further, all of the other evidence adduced at trial supports the fact that he did not
live at that address. Heironimus’s driver history information lists his previous and
current residences and mailing addresses, and none includes 1000 North Third Avenue.
Defense’s Ex. A. His handwriting exemplar listed his address as 3500 Harlan, and when
Heironimus sent a letter encouraging Talley not to testify against him at trial, he listed his
return address as 712 Hess Avenue. Finally, at trial, Dylan Hall, a resident of 1000 North
Third Avenue, testified that Heironimus “stayed there a few times,” but that the attic
bedroom wasn’t his. Tr. p. 162-63. Looking at this evidence together, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the identification evidence against Heironimus. He
does not have standing to raise a constitutional challenge against the warrantless entry by
police into the home because he was merely a visitor and therefore had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the premises. The identification evidence is therefore not the
product of an unconstitutional search.
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Affirmed.
MATHIAS, J., and BARNES, J., concur.
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