Nathan W. Golden v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
Sep 28 2012, 9:27 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case. CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CHRIS M. TEAGLE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
NATHAN W. GOLDEN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 05A02-1204-CR-345
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE BLACKFORD SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable J. Nicholas Barry, Judge
Cause No. 05D01-1110-FD-428
September 28, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Nathan Golden appeals the sentence imposed following his conviction for Class D
felony theft. We affirm.
Issue
The sole issue before us is whether Golden’s three-year sentence, with two years
suspended, is inappropriate.
Facts
On October 28, 2011, Golden went to a gas station in Hartford City and shoplifted
a candy bar. Golden claims that at the time of the offense he was under the influence of
propofol, an anesthetic that he received for a back injury he sustained several years
earlier.
On October 31, 2011, the State charged Golden with one count of Class D felony
theft. On January 12, 2012, Golden agreed to plead guilty to the charge, with the State
agreeing to a cap of one year for any executed part of the sentence. On March 21, 2012,
the trial court sentenced Golden to a term of three years, with one year executed and two
years suspended to probation. Golden now appeals.
Analysis
Golden argues solely that his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B) in light of his character and the nature of the offense. See Anglemyer v. State,
868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007). Although Rule 7(B) does not require us to be
“extremely” deferential to a trial court’s sentencing decision, we still must give due
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consideration to that decision. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007). We also understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its
sentencing decisions. Id. “Additionally, a defendant bears the burden of persuading the
appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate.” Id.The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers,
and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement
of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.”
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “should focus on the forest—
the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of
counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. Whether a sentence is
inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the
crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
case. Id. at 1224. When reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence under Rule 7(B),
we may consider all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court in
sentencing the defendant, including whether a portion of the sentence was suspended.
Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).
We concede that the nature of the offense here is about as insignificant as it could
possibly be for a count of Class D felony theft. Golden shoplifted one candy bar from a
gas station. Golden also asserts that he was under the lingering influence of the
anesthetic propofol at the time of the crime, which he took under medical guidance for a
back injury.
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Regarding Golden’s character, however, he has several prior convictions,
including three for Class D felony receiving stolen property, one for Class D felony theft,
one for Class C felony possession of a handgun with altered identification marks, one for
Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license, and one for Class A
misdemeanor criminal recklessness with a vehicle. He also had probation revoked on one
prior occasion and was on probation for the criminal recklessness conviction when he
committed the present offense. Although Golden argues that most of his criminal history
was not recent—except for criminal recklessness, all of his convictions occurred before
2003—the sheer number of convictions, together with the similarity of many of the
convictions to the present offense, is egregious.
Golden did plead guilty. We acknowledge that courts should “carefully assess the
potential mitigating weight of any guilty plea.” Marlett v. State, 878 N.E.2d 860, 866
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Golden received a benefit from the plea agreement in
that the executed portion of his sentenced was capped at one year. A guilty plea is less
mitigating when the defendant receives a substantial benefit from it. Lindsey v. State,
877 N.E.2d 190, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
Moreover, as instructed by Davidson, it is relevant that two years of Golden’s
three-year sentence were suspended and only one year is executed. In other words, even
though Golden technically received a maximum sentence for this crime, the punitive
effect of that sentence is less than if he had been required to serve all three years of his
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sentence in prison. We conclude that despite the minor nature of the offense here,
Golden’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of his character.
Conclusion
Golden’s sentence is not inappropriate. We affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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