J.G. v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before Sep 11 2012, 10:37 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata, CLERK
of the supreme court,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
VICTORIA L. BAILEY GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
KATHERINE MODESITT COOPER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
J.G., )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1201-JV-17
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION
The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, Judge
The Honorable Scott Stowers, Magistrate
Cause No. 49D09-1105-JD-1361
September 11, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
J.G. appeals the finding that he committed what would be Class D felony receiving
stolen property if committed by an adult.1 As there was sufficient evidence to support his
adjudication, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 19, 2011, A.B. was in the boy’s locker room at Southport Middle School
preparing for baseball practice. A.B. owned a cell phone and placed it in his backpack inside
his locker and went to practice. J.G. entered the locker room and stole the phone. A.B. and
his father tracked the cell phone’s usage and determined someone was using the cell phone to
make calls and search the Internet. J.G. took the cell phone to J.W.’s house and he left it
with J.W., who took it to school the next morning and hid it in the bathroom.
On May 26, 2011, the State alleged J.G. was a delinquent child for committing theft2
and for receiving stolen property, each of which is an act that would be a Class D felony if
committed by an adult. The juvenile court entered a true finding as to receiving stolen
property, but not theft, and adjudicated J.G. a delinquent. The court ordered J.G. to serve six
months probation and to complete forty hours of community service.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
J.G. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his adjudication. When the
State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent for committing an act that would be a
crime if committed by an adult, the State must prove every element of that crime beyond a
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(b).
2
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a).
2
reasonable doubt. A.E.B v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a juvenile adjudication, we neither
reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. We consider only “the
evidence of probative value and the reasonable inferences that support the determination.”
Id.The State had to prove J.G knowingly or intentionally received, retained or disposed
of the property of another person, which property had been the subject of theft. Ind. Code §
35-43-4-2(b). In addition to proving the elements of the crime, the State must also prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knew the property was stolen. Fortson v. State
919 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2010). “Knowledge that the property is stolen may be inferred
from the circumstances surrounding the possession.” Id.The State provided sufficient evidence J.G. knew the phone was stolen.3 Possession
of recently stolen property when joined with evasive or false statements or an unusual
manner of acquisition may be sufficient evidence of knowledge that the property was stolen.
Purifoy v. State, 821 N.E.2d 409, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. J.G. admitted he
was in the locker room where A.B. stored his cell phone. When questioned by school
administrators, J.G. said he found the cell phone in the locker room. He did not turn the cell
phone over to any of the coaches present, and he used the cell phone later in the day before
3
J.G., relying on Kribs v. State, 917 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), argues the facts summarized by
the court when entering its adjudication demonstrate the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication.
We disagree. In Kribs, the trial court explicitly stated it did not believe Kribs had the requisite knowledge to
commit the offense. Id. In contrast, herein, the juvenile court made no statement that directly contradicted an
element of the offense for which J.G. was found delinquent.
3
leaving it at J.W.’s house. Based on the evidence, the trial court could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that J.G. knowingly received, retained or disposed of stolen property.
Therefore, we affirm his adjudication.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
4