Dwayne Rhoiney v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of
    FILED
    Sep 07 2012, 8:54 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the                            CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    case.                                                           court of appeals and
    tax court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    VICTORIA L. BAILEY                              GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Marion County Public Defender Agency            Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    ELLEN H. MEILAENDER
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    DWAYNE RHOINEY,                                 )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                     )
    )
    vs.                               )       No. 49A02-1107-CR-650
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                               )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                      )
    APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Charles A. Wiles, Senior Judge
    Cause No. 49G03-0410-PC-182728
    September 7, 2012
    OPINION ON REHEARING - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BARTEAU, Senior Judge
    We issued an opinion in Rhoiney v. State, No. 49A02-1107-CR-650 (Ind. Ct. App.
    May 22, 2012), affirming the sentence the trial court imposed upon Dwayne Rhoiney
    after remand from a previous appeal. Rhoiney has filed a petition for rehearing, asking
    that we reconsider our decision with regard to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
    factors. We grant rehearing for the purpose of clarifying this issue but affirm our original
    opinion in all other respects.
    Rhoiney argued in this appeal that the trial court, in resentencing him, failed to
    weigh the aggravating factor of multiple victims against the mitigating factors. In our
    opinion, we stated that the trial court did not need to weigh aggravating versus mitigating
    factors, citing Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
     (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
     (2007). Rhoiney, slip op. at 7.
    Rhoiney notes that he committed his crimes prior to the issuance of Anglemyer. In
    general, “the law [that is] in effect at the time that the crime was committed is
    controlling.” Collins v. State, 
    911 N.E.2d 700
    , 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
    Rhoiney committed his crimes in 2004. Consequently, it is necessary to apply a pre-
    Anglemeyer standard of sentencing review.        Prior to the issuance of Anglemyer, a
    sentencing court’s statement was required to identify all significant aggravating and
    mitigating factors, state why each is considered to be aggravating or mitigating, and
    weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors. Montgomery v. State, 
    694 N.E.2d 1137
    , 1141 (Ind. 1998).
    2
    In this case, Judge Charles A. Wiles presided over both the original sentencing
    hearing and the resentencing hearing.1 At the original sentencing hearing, Rhoiney raised
    as mitigating factors his age (twenty-one at the time of sentencing), difficult childhood,
    drug addiction, remorse, and relatively minor criminal history. The trial court was “not
    sure” that Rhoiney’s age was a mitigating factor, Original Sentencing Tr. p. 30, but
    determined that his remorse was a mitigating factor and that his criminal record was not
    “bad,” id. at 31.
    Upon both parties’ request, the resentencing court incorporated the evidence from
    the first sentencing hearing into the resentencing hearing. The resentencing court then
    stated:
    [T]he Court is not going to reiterate the aggravators, the mitigators.
    Those were all specifically stated. The impact on the family, criminal
    history or lack of criminal history or whatever, that’s all in the record and
    there’s no sense or no useful purpose for the Court to go through those
    again. The only factor here we seem to be dealing with, as counsel points
    out, is the facts that there were multiple victims involved here and the Court
    didn’t specifically define that as an aggravator and that perhaps is the
    reason the Court of Appeals sent this back.
    So considering different victims, and I would point out here
    assuming there were multiple murder victims here certainly the Court could
    consider multiple murder victims an enhanced or run the two and sentences
    [sic] consecutively which would have amounted to hundreds of years,
    perhaps.
    So on the resentencing, the Court today on the finding of guilty of
    murder is going to impose the sentence the Court did back several years
    ago of 55 years, which is the advisory sentence. On the criminal
    confinement charge as a Class B felony, the Court is going to sentence Mr.
    Rhoiney to the minimum sentence of six years and run that consecutive.
    1
    Judge Wiles assumed senior judge status between the original sentencing hearing and the resentencing
    hearing.
    3
    And on the carrying a handgun without charge, the one year sentence is
    going to be run concurrent.
    Resentencing Tr. pp. 21-22.
    The only aggravating factor cited by Judge Wiles on resentencing was the
    presence of multiple victims. As the original sentencing court, Judge Wiles had the
    benefit of previously reviewing Rhoiney’s mitigating circumstances. The resentencing
    court did not explicitly state that the aggravating factor of multiple victims outweighed
    the mitigating circumstances. Nevertheless, upon review of the transcripts it appears that
    the trial court balanced the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See White v. State,
    
    846 N.E.2d 1026
    , 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming where the record demonstrates
    that a balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors occurred even though the trial court
    did not explicitly state that it had weighed those factors), trans. denied.
    Thus, under the pre-Anglemyer sentencing scheme, the trial court did not err in
    considering aggravating and mitigating factors. Subject to this clarification, our earlier
    opinion is affirmed in all respects.
    FRIEDLANDER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A02-1107-CR-650

Filed Date: 9/7/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021