N.B. v. State of Indiana , 2012 Ind. App. LEXIS 366 ( 2012 )

FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
GLEN E. KOCH II GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Boren, Oliver & Coffey, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Martinsville, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
ELLEN H. MEILAENDER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
Aug 02 2012, 8:32 am
IN THE
CLERK
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
N.B., )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 55A01-1111-JV-574
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MORGAN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Christopher L. Burnham, Judge
Cause No. 55D02-1107-JD-280
August 2, 2012
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
Appellant-Defendant N.B. appeals following the juvenile court’s determination that he
committed the delinquent act of Reckless Homicide, a Class C felony if committed by an
adult. Specifically, N.B. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting
his statement to the investigating officer at the evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Eleven-year-old N.B. and six-year-old A.F. were brothers who lived together with
Mother, Step-Father,1 a nine-year-old sister, and a three-year-old brother in Morgan County.
N.B. and his siblings were often left home alone with N.B. in charge. On a couple of
occasions, N.B. had pointed a firearm belonging to Mother and Step-Father at his siblings to
scare them into complying with his requests.
N.B.’s previous step-father had begun teaching N.B. about firearms and firearm safety
when N.B. was nine years old. N.B. was taught never to touch a firearm without an adult
present, always to assume that a firearm is loaded, always to check to make sure that the
firearm is empty, and always to ensure that the safety mechanism is on. While hunting with
his previous step-father, N.B. had witnessed animals being shot and killed by a firearm.
On June 30, 2011, N.B. and A.F. were left home alone. Mother told the boys that they
would be able to get pizza for dinner if they cleaned the bedroom they shared while the rest
of the family was gone. N.B. became upset when A.F. refused to clean their room. N.B.
retrieved Mother and Step-Father’s .22 caliber rifle from the master bedroom and again
1
It is unclear from the record whether Mother and Step-Father were married or merely living together.
It is clear from the record, however, that N.B. viewed Step-Father as a father-figure and referred to him as
“Dad.” Therefore, for the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to him as Step-Father.
2
instructed A.F. to clean their bedroom. When A.F. again refused, N.B. pulled the trigger,
shooting A.F. between the eyes.
After shooting A.F., N.B. returned the rifle to the master bedroom and called 911.
N.B. told the 911 dispatcher that his brother had shot himself in the head. A.F. later died as a
result of the gunshot wound to the head.
Morgan County Sheriff’s Detective Dan Downing spoke with N.B. briefly after
arriving at N.B.’s home. During this conversation, N.B. again indicated that A.F. had shot
himself. In light of N.B.’s emotional state, N.B. was taken to Susie’s Place, an independent,
child-friendly advocacy center in Hendricks County, to be more fully interviewed in a less
traumatic location. During this interview, N.B. again stated that A.F. had shot himself.
During their investigation, police officers recovered a .22 caliber rifle from inside the
master bedroom. The rifle was in good working order, the safety was off, and there was a
casing inside the gun. The officers also found two boxes of .22 caliber cartridges lying on a
dresser in the master bedroom and a spent .22 caliber casing on the floor. The casing was
fired from the rifle. The officers also discovered a latent print of N.B.’s left ring finger on
the magazine, as well as prints of N.B.’s right thumb and right middle finger on the box of
cartridges.
An autopsy was conducted on A.F. the following morning, after which it was
determined that it would have been physically impossible for the fatal gunshot wound to have
been self-inflicted with the rifle in question. After reviewing the autopsy results, Detective
Downing contacted Mother, told her that there were discrepancies in N.B.’s statement that
3
needed to be cleared up, and requested permission to re-interview N.B. Mother took
Detective Downing’s request to mean that he did not believe that N.B. had been truthful in
his earlier statement. Mother agreed to allow N.B. to talk to Detective Downing. Later that
afternoon, N.B. arrived at the sheriff’s department with his maternal grandmother
(“Grandmother”) and was met by Mother and Step-Father. Mother, Step-Father,
Grandmother, and, at the family’s request, a chaplain were present during Detective
Downing’s interview with N.B.
After N.B. and his family arrived at the sheriff’s department, Detective Downing
again indicated that he wished to discuss certain discrepancies in N.B.’s prior statement and
the autopsy results with N.B. Detective Downing gave Mother and N.B. papers setting forth
N.B.’s rights. After ascertaining that N.B. could read, Detective Downing instructed Mother
and N.B. to read the papers and inquired as to whether each understood N.B.’s constitutional
rights. Both responded in the affirmative and signed the acknowledgment and waiver forms.
Detective Downing then informed the family that he was going to leave the room and
turn off all recording devices to provide the family with an opportunity to discuss amongst
themselves whether they believed that N.B. should answer his questions. Fifteen to twenty
minutes later, Detective Downing returned to the room and asked N.B., “Okay. Well, do you
want to tell me what happened?” State’s Ex. 69A, p. 2. N.B. responded by telling Detective
Downing that he had shot A.F. N.B.’s family demonstrated love and concern for N.B. At no
time did Mother, or any other family member, indicate that they did not want N.B. to speak to
Detective Downing.
4
On July 1, 2011, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that N.B. had engaged
in conduct that would constitute murder and Class C felony reckless homicide if committed
by an adult. On August 10, 2011, N.B. filed a “motion to quash” his July 1, 2011 statement
to Detective Downing. The juvenile court conducted a suppression hearing on N.B.’s motion
on August 23, 2011. The juvenile court denied N.B.’s motion on August 24, 2011.
The juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on September 6-7, 2011. On
September 9, 2011, the juvenile court issued an order adjudicating N.B. delinquent for
committing what would be Class C reckless homicide if committed by an adult. The juvenile
court determined that the State had failed to prove that N.B. committed what would be
murder if committed by an adult. At the dispositional hearing, which was conducted on
November 14, 2011, the juvenile court ordered that N.B. be placed in the Children’s Bureau
Program. This appeal follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
N.B. contends that the juvenile court erred in admitting his statement to Detective
Downing because the procedural safeguards for the waiver of a juvenile’s constitutional
rights, as required by Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1 (2010) (the “juvenile waiver statute”),
were not followed. Specifically, N.B. claims that Mother was not an appropriate custodian to
join in the waiver of his rights because she had an adverse interest to N.B. and that his waiver
was not knowing or voluntary because he executed the written waiver before being afforded
an opportunity for meaningful consultation with Mother. For its part, the State argues that
the juvenile court properly admitted N.B.’s statement because N.B. was not in custody at the
5
time he spoke to Detective Downing, and, alternatively, because the procedural safeguards
set forth by the juvenile waiver statute were met.
I. Whether N.B. was Subjected to a Custodial Interrogation
As a general rule, when a juvenile who is not in custody gives a statement to police,
neither the safeguards of a Miranda2 warning nor the juvenile waiver statute is implicated.
A.A. v. State, 706 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, the threshold issue is whether
N.B. was subject to a custodial interrogation when he gave his statement. Id. “For an
interrogation to be custodial in nature, one does not necessarily have to be under arrest.” Id.“To be custodial in the non-arrest context, the interrogation must commence after the
person’s freedom of action has been deprived in any significant way.” Id. This is determined
by examining whether a reasonable person in similar circumstances would believe he is not
free to leave. S.D. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
The parties do not discuss whether N.B. was interrogated. “The term ‘interrogation’
has been defined as a process of questioning by law enforcement officials which lends itself
to obtaining incriminating statements.” A.A., 706 N.E.2d at 261 (citing Jenkins v. State, 627
N.E.2d 789, 796 (Ind. 1993)). The record shows that Detective Downing requested
permission for N.B. to appear at the sheriff’s department to clarify certain discrepancies in
his prior statement which came to light following the autopsy of A.F. The line of questioning
posed by Detective Downing elicited an incriminating response from N.B., i.e., that N.B. had
shot A.F. Thus, we conclude that N.B. was interrogated by Detective Downing.
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6
Here, the trial court found that N.B. was in custody at the time he was interviewed by
Detective Downing. The parties dispute this finding with N.B. arguing that the trial court
properly found that N.B. was in custody and the State arguing that N.B. was not in custody
when he was interviewed by Detective Downing. However, we need not determine whether
N.B. was in custody because, as will be discussed below, we conclude that the procedural
safeguards set forth in the juvenile waiver statute were met.
II. Whether the Procedural Safeguards
Set Forth in the Juvenile Waiver Statute Were Followed
We next consider whether the procedural safeguards for the waiver of a juvenile’s
constitutional rights, as required by the juvenile waiver statute, were followed. Indiana Code
section 31-32-5-1 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the United States,
the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only:
****
(2) by the child’s custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem if:
(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right;
(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;
(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child;
and
(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver[.]
Thus, in Indiana, there are four requirements that must be satisfied before a juvenile’s
statements made during a custodial interrogation can be used in the State’s case-in-chief.
D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327, 333-34 (Ind. 2011).
First, both the juvenile and his or her parent must be adequately advised of the
juvenile’s rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 467-74, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602;
[Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 439, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1972)]. Second, the
juvenile must be given an opportunity for meaningful consultation with his or
her parent. I.C. § 31–32–5–1(2); Lewis, 259 Ind. at 439, 288 N.E.2d at 142.
7
Third, both the juvenile and his or her parent must knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waive the juvenile’s rights. I.C. § 31–32–5–1(2); Miranda,
384 U.S. at 475-76, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Finally, the juvenile’s statements must be
voluntary and not the result of coercive police activity. Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986).
Id. at 334.
Here, N.B. challenges the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to suppress on two
fronts. First, he contends that Mother was not an appropriate custodian to join in the waiver
of his rights because she had an interest adverse to N.B.’s. Second, he contends that his
waiver was not knowing or voluntary because he executed the written waiver before being
afforded an opportunity for meaningful consultation with Mother.
The State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
juvenile received all of the protections of Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1,
Brown v. State, 751 N.E.2d 664, 670 (Ind. 2001), and that both the juvenile
and his or her parent knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the
juvenile’s rights, Stewart v. State, 754 N.E.2d 492, 494-95 (Ind. 2001). Cf.
Douglas v. State, 481 N.E.2d 107, 111-12 (Ind. 1985) (procedural safeguards
judged by same standard as voluntariness). In reviewing a court’s denial of a
motion to suppress a confession, we do not reweigh the evidence but instead
examine the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence of
probative value to support that decision. Willsey v. State, 698 N.E.2d 784, 789
(Ind. 1998). We consider any conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to
the juvenile court’s decision, Brown, 751 N.E.2d at 670, along with any
substantial uncontested evidence, Douglas, 481 N.E.2d at 111-12. And we
will uphold the decision if it is supported by “a reasonable view of the
evidence.” Willsey, 698 N.E.2d at 789.
Id. at 334-35.
A. Adverse Interests
N.B. claims that Mother was not an appropriate custodian to join in the waiver of his
constitutional rights because she had an interest adverse to N.B.’s. Specifically, N.B. argues
8
that Mother had an adverse interest because, at the time N.B. spoke to Detective Downing,
Mother potentially faced criminal charges for neglect of a dependent resulting in death.
However, the mere fact that Mother faced potential criminal liability relating to A.F.’s death
does not create an interest adverse to N.B.’s. Here, Mother faced potential criminal liability
regardless of how A.F. was shot, whether at N.B.’s hands or by his own.
Indiana Code section 35-46-1-4 (2010) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person
having the care of a dependent … who knowingly or intentionally … places the dependent in
a situation that endangers the dependent’s life or health … commits a Class A felony if it is
committed … by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age and results in the death of a
dependent who is less than fourteen (14) years of age.” In the instant matter, the record
demonstrates that Mother, who had responsibility for the care and control of N.B. and A.F.,
left an eleven-year-old and a six-year-old at home alone, unsupervised, with ready access to
an unsecured and loaded firearm, and the six-year-old ended up fatally shot in the head by
that firearm. Mother’s potential liability under Indiana Code section 35-46-1-4 would not be
dependent upon which of the children actually fired the fatal shot but rather upon whether
she knowingly or intentionally left N.B. and A.F. alone in a home with access to an
unsecured and loaded firearm, placing the children in a situation that resulted in the death of
a child under the age of fourteen. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4. N.B. fails to show how
Mother’s potential criminal liability for any neglect of N.B. and A.F., which again was not
dependent upon whether N.B. or A.F. actually fired the fatal shot, affected her ability to act
in accordance with N.B.’s interests.
9
Furthermore, to the extent that N.B. relies upon this court’s conclusion in Borum v.
State, 434 N.E.2d 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), to support his claim that Mother had an interest
adverse to N.B.’s, we conclude that Borum is readily distinguishable from the instant matter.
In Borum, the juvenile’s legal guardian, a caseworker for the Department of Public Welfare,
initiated the proceedings against the juvenile by filing a charging petition. 434 N.E.2d at
583. In concluding that the caseworker could not appropriately waive the juvenile’s rights,
the court determined that the juvenile’s caseworker “had not only filed the petition initiating
the proceedings, but was also an employee of the state agency which had effectively assumed
the role of an adverse party.” Id. at 584. As such, the caseworker’s interests were adverse to
those of the juvenile. Id.No such conflict exists here. When Mother encouraged N.B. to waive his rights and
tell the truth, she was neither acting as an agent for the police or prosecutor nor acting as a
key witness against N.B. in any of the potential charges he might face. To the contrary,
Mother, in addition to the other family members present, expressed her love and concern for
N.B. during the interview with Detective Downing. This court’s holding in Borum in
inapplicable to the instant matter.
Further still, to the extent that N.B. claims that Mother was not an appropriate
custodian to join in the waiver of his constitutional rights because she is the parent of both
N.B. and the victim, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that the parent of an alleged
juvenile delinquent does not have a conflict of interest by virtue of being a parent of both the
juvenile and the victim. See K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ind. 2006) (providing that
10
the alleged juvenile delinquent’s mother did not have an adverse interest to the juvenile
merely because she was also the victim’s mother); Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363, 1369-
70 (Ind. 1988) (providing that a grandfather who, acting as his grandson’s custodian, advised
his grandson to waive his right to remain silent did not have interests adverse to grandson
who murdered his mother and father–the grandfather’s daughter and son-in-law). As such,
Mother was not an inappropriate custodian merely because she was both N.B. and A.F.’s
mother.
B. Knowing and Voluntary Waiver and the Reasonable Opportunity for
Meaningful Consultation
N.B. also claims that his waiver was neither knowing nor voluntary. Specifically,
N.B. argues that his written waiver was defective because it occurred before he had an
opportunity for a meaningful consultation and that the record does not support the finding
that he impliedly waived his rights. The State, for its part, argues that the record
demonstrates that N.B. impliedly waived his rights after receiving the opportunity to engage
in meaningful consultation with Mother, Step-Father, and Grandmother.
Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1 requires that, before a juvenile’s rights are waived, he
or she must be afforded an opportunity for meaningful consultation with a parent. D.M., 949
N.E.2d at 335.
The mere presence of a parent, standing alone, does not satisfy the statute.
Hall v. State, 264 Ind. 448, 451, 346 N.E.2d 584, 587 (1976). Rather, the
consultation requirement is satisfied “when the State demonstrates ‘actual
consultation of a meaningful nature or ... the express opportunity for such
consultation, which is then forsaken in the presence of the proper authority by
the juvenile, so long as the juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waives his [or
her] constitutional rights.’” Brown, 751 N.E.2d at 670 (ellipsis in original)
11
(quoting Williams v. State, 433 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Ind. 1982)). Additionally,
the opportunity for the juvenile and the parent to counsel with each other must
occur before the juvenile’s rights are waived because the purpose of
consultation is to allow the juvenile to make a decision on whether to waive
his or her rights in a comparatively relaxed and stable atmosphere. Patton v.
State, 588 N.E.2d 494, 496 (Ind. 1992); cf. Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. at 439-40,
288 N.E.2d at 142.
To prove that “actual consultation of a meaningful nature” occurred, the
State needs only to prove that the police provided a relatively private
atmosphere that was free from police pressure in which the juvenile and the
parent could have had a meaningful discussion about the “allegations, the
circumstances of the case, and the ramifications of their responses to police
questioning and confessions.” Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 148 (Ind.
1999); see also Hall, 264 Ind. at 452, 346 N.E.2d at 587 (providing that
“meaningful consultation can only occur in the absence of the neutralizing
pressures which result from police presence”). The interrogating officer
cannot dictate or even recommend how they should use this time. Trowbridge,
717 N.E.2d at 148; Patton, 588 N.E.2d at 495 n.3; [Whipple, 523 N.E.2d at
1371]; Buchanan v. State, 268 Ind. 503, 506-07, 376 N.E.2d 1131, 1134
(1978). “What is important is that the child and adult be aware of and
understand the child’s rights in order to discuss them intelligently.” Patton,
588 N.E.2d at 496. Once such an opportunity is provided, it is up to the
juvenile and the parent to use this opportunity to their advantage. Id. at 495
n.3; Whipple, 523 N.E.2d at 1371. The State need not show that the
consultation was beneficial in helping the juvenile and his or her parent decide
whether to waive or stand on the juvenile’s rights. Fortson v. State, 270 Ind.
289, 298-99, 385 N.E.2d 429, 436 (1979); cf. Trowbridge, 717 N.E.2d at 148;
Fowler v. State, 483 N.E.2d 739, 743 (Ind. 1985); Buchanan, 268 Ind. at 506-
07, 376 N.E.2d at 1134. Rather, the extent to which the conversation aids in
the waiver decision “is a circumstance among many others which the trial
court may consider in arriving at its decision as to whether the waiver is
voluntary and knowing.” Fortson, 270 Ind. at 299, 385 N.E.2d at 436.
Id. at 335-36 (bracketed material supplied).
It is uncontested that N.B. signed the waiver form acknowledging and waiving his
rights before he was afforded approximately fifteen to twenty minutes of meaningful
consultation with Mother, Step-Father, and Grandmother. As such, the written waiver form
alone is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1. However,
12
the requirements of Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1 may still be met and N.B.’s waiver found
knowing and voluntary if the record demonstrates that N.B. impliedly waived his rights after
being afforded the opportunity to engage in meaningful consultation with Mother.
The Indiana Supreme Court has held that while a written waiver is certainly strong
proof that a valid waiver occurred, “an express oral or written statement is not required to
establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights–valid waivers may be implied.” Id. at
339. “Generally, a valid implied waiver occurs where a suspect who has been advised of his
or her Miranda rights and has acknowledged an understanding of those rights makes an
uncoerced statement without taking advantage of them.” Id.
In determining the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, we examine the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the
suspect’s choice “was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception” and whether the waiver was “made with a
full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon [them].” [Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135 (1986)]; see also [Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223,
1230 (Ind. 2000)] (reviewing totality of the circumstances to ensure that
waiver was “not induced by violence, threats, or other improper influences that
overcame the defendant's free will”); cf. [Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,
725, 99 S.Ct. 2560 (1979)] (holding that the totality-of-the-circumstances test
applies to juvenile waivers). Relevant considerations include the juvenile’s
physical, mental, and emotional maturity; whether the juvenile or his or her
parent understood the consequences of the juvenile’s statements; whether the
juvenile and his or her parent were informed of the delinquent act for which
the juvenile was suspected; the length of time the juvenile was held in custody
before consulting with his or her parent; whether there was any force,
coercion, or inducement; and whether the juvenile and his or her parent had
been advised of the juvenile’s Miranda rights. I.C. § 31-32-5-4; see also
Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725-27, 99 S.Ct. 2560.
D.M., 949 N.E.2d at 339-40 (first two sets of bracketed material in the original, all other
bracketed material supplied).
13
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of N.B. supports the
juvenile court’s conclusion that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights.
Shortly after the conclusion of A.F.’s autopsy, Detective Downing contacted Mother and
requested permission to re-interview N.B. regarding certain discrepancies between his prior
statement and the autopsy results. Mother agreed. Grandmother transported N.B. to the
sheriff’s department where she and N.B. were met by Mother and Step-Father. After N.B.
and his family arrived at the sheriff’s department, Detective Downing again indicated that he
wished to discuss certain discrepancies between N.B.’s prior statement and the autopsy
results. Detective Downing gave Mother and N.B. papers setting forth and explaining N.B.’s
rights, including his rights to remain silent and to an attorney. After ascertaining that N.B.
could read, Detective Downing instructed Mother and N.B. to read the papers and inquired as
to whether each understood N.B.’s constitutional rights. Both responded in the affirmative
and signed the acknowledgment and waiver forms.
Detective Downing then informed the family that he was going to leave the room and
turn off all recording devices to provide the family with an opportunity to discuss amongst
themselves whether they believed that N.B. should answer his questions. Fifteen to twenty
minutes later, Detective Downing returned to the room and asked N.B. “Okay. Well, do you
want to tell me what happened?” State’s Ex. 69A, p. 2. N.B.’s actions immediately
thereafter indicated that he wished to waive his rights as he then told Detective Downing
what happened the day before, including the fact that he had shot A.F. At no time did
Mother, or any other family member, indicate that they did not want N.B. to continue, and
14
Mother, as well as Step-Father and Grandmother, encouraged N.B. to tell the truth. Further,
N.B. did not indicate at any point that he did not wish to talk to Detective Downing and
nothing in the record indicates that Detective Downing coerced N.B. to talk.
N.B. was not held in police custody prior to being brought to the sheriff’s department
for the purpose of giving the statement, and the record does not demonstrate that he was
coerced to talk in any way. He was surrounded at all times by family members who
demonstrated love and concern for him and encouraged him to tell the truth.3 Based on the
totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial court’s determination that while “the
signing of the waiver form should, under best practices, occur after the parent and child have
had an opportunity for meaningful consultation,” Appellant’s App. p. 81 (emphasis omitted),
under the facts of this case, N.B. impliedly waived his rights after engaging in meaningful
consultation with Mother, and that both N.B.’s and Mother’s waiver was knowing and
voluntary.
The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
3
We do not believe that the fact that a reasonable person might not believe that he was free to go
without permission from Detective Downing or his adult chaperones would impact N.B.’s ability to knowingly
or voluntarily waive his rights to an attorney or to remain silent after being encouraged to tell the truth by these
same adult chaperones.
15