David West v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

FILED
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before May 24 2012, 8:33 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
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case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
RONALD K. SMITH GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
AARON J. SPOLARICH
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DAVID WEST, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 18A02-1111-CR-1013
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE DELAWARE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Marianne L. Vorhees, Judge
Cause No. 18C01-0801-FB-7
May 24, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
David West appeals his sentence following the revocation of his probation. West
raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering him to serve the entirety of his previously-suspended sentence.1
We affirm.
The relevant facts follow. In January 2008, West was charged with three counts of
criminal confinement as class B felonies. West was found guilty on one of the three
counts, and on July 3, 2008, he was sentenced to eight years with three years executed
and the balance suspended, and he was ordered to serve five years on supervised
probation. On October 6, 2010, West’s probation officer filed a petition for hearing on
revocation of supervised probation alleging, among other things, that West committed
crimes including two counts of child exploitation as class C felonies, four counts of
possession of child pornography, and three counts of performance before a minor that is
harmful to minors.
On October 26, 2011, the court held a revocation hearing at which evidence was
presented that in August, 2011, West had been found guilty of a crime in Delaware
County of two counts of child exploitation as class C felonies and two counts of
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West also challenges the appropriateness of the sentence imposed for his probation violation
under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). This rule provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute
if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184,
187-188 (Ind. 2007). However, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) is not
the correct standard to apply when reviewing a sentence imposed for a probation violation and that our
review is confined to the abuse of discretion standard which is also raised by West. See id. at 188; see
also Jones v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (Ind. 2008) (noting that a remedy under Ind. Appellate Rule
7(B) is not available on appeals from a probation revocation hearing); Milliner v. State, 890 N.E.2d 789,
793 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that we do not review probation revocations under Ind. Appellate Rule
7(B) and that the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation), trans. denied.
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possession of child pornography as class D felonies. The State asked the court to revoke
the entirety of West’s previously-suspended sentence. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court stated:
At this time then, as to Count 3, Attempted Criminal Confinement, a Class
B felony, I really think with the time that’s going to have to be served in
Circuit Court No. 3 that my only option is to go ahead and execute the five
(5) year suspended sentence to the Department of Corrections. So I will
find that due to the nature and circumstances of the violations, which
involved two (2) Class C felony convictions and two (2) Class D felony
convictions, that it would be appropriate to execute that suspended sentence
to the Department of Correction.
Transcript at 11. The court ordered that West serve his previously-suspended sentence of
five years in the Department of Correction, and it granted West 418 days of credit for
time served in the Delaware County Jail.
The issue is whether the court abused its discretion in ordering West to serve the
entirety of his previously-suspended sentence in the Department of Correction. West
argues that the court’s statement that “I really think with the time that’s going to have to
be served in Circuit Court No. 3 that my only option is to go ahead and execute the five
(5) year suspended sentence to the Department of Corrections” was “an improper
statement of the law” because Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3) provides that the court “may
order execution of the sentence that was suspended at the time of the initial hearing.”
Appellant’s Brief at 6. West argues that the court was “under the mistaken impression
that it was mandatory on her part to order execution of the balance of the sentence” when
“[i]n fact, execution of the sentence is not mandatory, but permissive, and is only one of
several options that are available to the trial court.” Id. The State argues that West
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“adopts an unreasonably literal reading of the trial court’s statement that does not
consider the context in which the trial court imposed [West’s] sanction.” Appellee’s
Brief at 5.
Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g) sets forth a trial court’s sentencing options if the trial
court finds a probation violation and provides:
If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before
termination of the period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the
following sanctions:
(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without
modifying or enlarging the conditions.
(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more
than one (1) year beyond the original probationary
period.
(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was
suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g) permits judges to sentence offenders
using any one of or any combination of the enumerated options. Prewitt v. State, 878
N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ind. 2007).
The Indiana Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s sentencing decisions for
probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 188.
The Court explained that “[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering
probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in
deciding how to proceed” and that “[i]f this discretion were not afforded to trial courts
and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined
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to order probation to future defendants.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. (citation
omitted). As long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a probation
revocation hearing, “the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a
finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Goonen v. State, 705 N.E.2d
209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Here, the court heard evidence that West had recently been found guilty of four
felonies including two counts of child exploitation as class C felonies and two counts of
possession of child pornography as class D felonies. In ordering West to serve the
previously-suspended portion of his sentence in the Department of Correction, the court
noted that it expected West to receive a significant sentence on the new crimes, that it
therefore believed its “only option” was to order that he serve his remaining sentence,
and that this reasoning was “due to the nature and circumstances of the violations, which
involved two (2) Class C felony convictions and two (2) Class D felony convictions . . .
.” Transcript at 11. The court’s statements at sentencing merely reflected its view of the
severity of the violations involved and the practical implication of West’s situation. If
the court had continued West on probation the probation would not be served until the
completion of the potentially lengthy executed sentence in the Delaware County case.
Further, West’s convictions for child exploitation and child pornography while on
probation demonstrate that probation is not deterring his criminal activity. The court
accordingly concluded that West serving the previously-suspended portion of his
sentence was warranted.
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Given the circumstances, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in
ordering West to serve his entire previously-suspended sentence. See Wilkerson v. State,
918 N.E.2d 458, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering probationer to serve the balance of his previously-suspended
sentence in the Department of Correction); Milliner v. State, 890 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reinstating the
probationer’s entire previously-suspended sentence), trans. denied.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order that West serve his
entire previously-suspended sentence in the Department of Correction.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.
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