City of Gary and Gary Sanitation District v. Indiana Department of Environmental Management and City of Hobart ( 2012 )


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  •                                                  FILED
    FOR PUBLICATION                               May 17 2012, 9:41 am
    CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    tax court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE INDIANA
    DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
    E. SEAN GRIGGS                      MANAGEMENT:
    FREDRIC P. ANDES
    DAVID T. BALLARD                    GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Barnes & Thornburg, LLP             Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    FRANCES BARROW
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE CITY OF
    HOBART:
    JOSEPH P. ALLEGRETTI
    Dyer, Indiana
    ADAM J. SEDIA
    Rubino, Ruman, Crosmer, Smith, Sersic &
    Polen
    Dyer, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    CITY OF GARY AND GARY SANITATION,   )
    DISTRICT,                           )
    Appellants,                   )
    )
    vs.                       )      No. 49A02-1106-MI-553
    )
    INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF               )
    ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT and        )
    CITY OF HOBART                      )
    Appellees.                               )
    APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable David J. Certo, Judge
    Cause No. 49F12-1002-MI-007318
    May 17, 2012
    OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
    MATHIAS, Judge
    The City of Gary and the Gary Sanitation District (collectively “Gary”) appeal the
    Marion Superior Court’s order affirming the order of the Office of Environmental
    Adjudication, which upheld the Indiana Department of Environmental Management’s
    (“IDEM”) decision to issue a permit to the City of Hobart to operate a new wastewater
    treatment plant. Gary appeals and raises several issues, which we consolidate into the
    following two:
    I. Whether IDEM’s interpretation of 327 Indiana Administrative Code section 5-2-
    11.7 is reasonable; and,
    II. Whether IDEM’s decision to issue the permit was arbitrary, capricious, and
    otherwise not in accordance with the law or is unsupported by substantial evidence.
    We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    The City of Hobart’s wastewater is currently treated both at Gary’s wastewater
    treatment facility and at its own, aging Nob Hill wastewater treatment facility. Hobart
    pays Gary for its use of Gary’s facility. Hobart’s Nob Hill facility discharges into a
    2
    tributary of the Deep River and consistently struggles to stay within its permit limits.
    Deep River is an impaired water source for mercury.
    Gary utilizes a collection system of stormwater and sanitary sewers that are
    combined in part. The system is designed with a number of combined sewer overflows
    which routinely discharge untreated wastewater into the Grand Calumet and Little
    Calumet rivers during wet weather. Both rivers are tributaries to Lake Michigan, as is the
    Deep River.
    On some date prior to April 1, 2004, Hobart requested a permit to construct a new
    4.8 million gallon per day wastewater treatment plant. The proposed plant would allow it
    to shut down the Nob Hill facility and disconnect from the Gary facility. On April 1,
    2004, IDEM issued the requested National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
    Permit (“the Hobart permit”)1 granting Hobart permission to operate a new wastewater
    treatment plant to be constructed along the Deep River.
    The permitted mercury limits for the proposed Hobart facility are a daily
    maximum limit of 3.2 parts per trillion (“ppt”) and a monthly average of 1.3 ppt per day.
    These limits are substantially less than the limits currently permitted at the Gary facility.
    Because the new Hobart facility will not utilize combined sewer overflows, it would
    completely avoid the discharge of untreated sewage.
    1
    “The Federal Clean Water Act (“CWA”) prohibits ‘the discharge of any pollutant’ into ‘waters of the
    United States’ without a permit. Similarly, Indiana state environmental law generally requires a permit to
    discharge pollutants into ‘waters of the state.’” Ind. Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Twin Eagle, LLC, 
    798 N.E.2d 839
     (Ind. 2003) (citing 
    327 Ind. Admin. Code 5
    –2–2 (2001) (“Any discharge of pollutants into
    waters of the state as a point source discharge, . . . is prohibited unless in conformity with a valid NPDES
    permit obtained prior to the discharge.”).
    3
    Shortly after IDEM issued a permit for the construction of the Hobart facility,
    Gary filed a petition for administrative review of the Hobart permit with the Indiana
    Office of Environmental Adjudication. On January 19, 2010, the environmental law
    judge issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final order in favor of IDEM and
    Hobart. The environmental law judge concluded that the mercury discharge limits in the
    Hobart permit would result in an overall improvement in water quality, and IDEM’s
    decision to issue the permit complied with applicable law.
    Gary then filed a verified petition for judicial review in Marion Superior Court.
    After briefing and oral argument, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions
    of law on March 26, 2011. As is noted in the trial court’s findings and conclusions, the
    paramount issue in this case is the parties’ interpretation of IDEM’s antidegradation
    requirement for outstanding state resource waters (“OSRWs”)2 found in 327 Indiana
    Administrative Code 5-2-11.7(a)(2):
    (2) For a new or increased discharge of a pollutant or pollutant parameter
    from a new or existing Great Lakes discharger into a tributary of an OSRW
    for which a new or increased permit limit would be required:
    (A) section 11.3(a) and 11.3(b) of this rule (327 IAC 5-2-11.3) apply
    to the new or increased discharge of a pollutant or pollutant
    parameter into the tributary; and
    (B) the discharge shall not cause a significant lowering of water
    quality in the OSRW.
    (C) The requirements of this subdivision will be considered to have
    been met when:
    (i) one (1) or more of the items listed in section 11.3(b)(1)(C)(i),
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(ii), 11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(BB), 11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(FF), or
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(II) of this rule (327 IAC 5-2-11.3) apply; or
    (ii) all three (3) of the following are met:
    2
    Lake Michigan is classified as an OSRW.
    4
    (AA) one (1) or more of the subitems in section
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(AA),
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(CC),11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(EE),11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii
    )(GG), 11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(HH), or 11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(LL) of
    this rule (327 IAC 5-2-11.3) apply;
    (BB) the applicant demonstrates that the increase is
    necessary; and
    (CC) the public notice requirements in subsection (c)(6) are
    met; or
    (iii) all four (4) of the following are met:
    (AA) one (1) or more of the subitems in section
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(DD),11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(JJ),              or
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(KK) of this rule (327 IAC 5-2-11.3) apply;
    (BB) the applicant demonstrates that the increase is
    necessary;
    (CC) the applicant demonstrates that it will result in a net
    environmental improvement; and
    (DD) the public notice requirements in subsection (c)(6) are
    met.
    (D) As used in this subdivision, “tributary of an OSRW” includes
    the upstream segments of a receiving waterbody when some or all of
    the downstream segments of the receiving waterbody are designated
    as an OSRW.
    Throughout these proceedings, Gary has argued that subsections 11.7(a)(2)(A), (B), and
    (C) must be read in the conjunctive, but IDEM and Hobart have argued that clause 2(C)
    should be read independently of 2(A) and (B).
    The trial court affirmed the environmental law judge’s final order, and in doing so,
    issued its own conclusions of law concerning the parties’ interpretations of the regulation.
    Specifically, the court concluded:
    12. 327 IAC 5-2-11.7(a)(2) is written to ensure that the water quality of an
    OSRW is maintained and protected by applying certain requirements on
    new or increased discharges into the tributary of the OSRW. It states that
    for such discharges for which a new or increased permit limit would be
    required, clauses (A) and (B) will apply.
    13. The “and” between (A) and (B) clearly reflects that for such discharges
    for which a new permit limit would be required both (A) and (B) will apply.
    5
    There is no “and” connecting clauses (C) and (D) to clauses (A) and (B).
    Therefore, clauses (C) and (D) must be read independently of (A) and (B).
    14. 327 IAC 5-2-11.7(a)(2)(C) simply states that the requirements of
    subdivision (2) will be considered met by the items listed in clause (C).
    The items in clause (C) are not the exclusive means for meeting the
    requirements of subdivision (2). Clause (C) refers to subdivision (2), not to
    clause (B).
    15. IDEM and the [Environmental Law Judge] interpreted subdivision (2)
    to mean that a new discharge into a tributary of an OSRW for which a new
    permit limit would be required will have to satisfy clauses (A) and (B), or it
    can satisfy this rule by meeting the requirements listed in clause (C). The
    rule does not preclude IDEM from granting a new permit limit if clauses
    (A) and (B) are met independent of the items listed in clause (C).
    16. The [Environmental Law Judge] reasonably concluded that the express
    language of 327 IAC 5-2-11.7(a)(2)(C) supports IDEM’s interpretation.
    Clause (C) is stated in clear and unambiguous terms. Those terms do not
    state that clause (C) is the exclusive means by which to determine that 327
    IAC 5-2-11.7(a)(2) is met but that satisfying clause (C) is one way to meet
    the rule requirements.
    17. The [Environmental Law Judge] reasonably concluded that Gary’s
    “interpretation of 327 IAC 5-2-11.7(a)(2) would require stricter
    requirements for discharge into an OSRW tributary than for discharge
    directly into an OSRW, contrary to the express, clear terms of the
    applicable regulations . . . .“
    Appellant’s App. pp. 13-14.
    The trial court also concluded that the Environmental Law Judge reasonably found
    that the new wastewater treatment plant authorized in the Hobart Permit would comply
    with more stringent standards than those limits established in the permit governing the
    operation of the Gary facility as it processes its own wastewater and that of Hobart. And
    the new Hobart wastewater treatment plant will divert Hobart’s raw sewage away from
    Gary’s combined system, thereby preventing the release of Hobart’s raw sewage in the
    effluent that Gary currently discharges during wet weather. Both the Environmental Law
    Judge and the trial court ultimately concluded that Hobart’s construction of a new
    6
    wastewater treatment plant will result in significant overall environmental benefit to Lake
    Michigan.     Therefore, the trial court affirmed the Final Order of the Office of
    Environmental Adjudication, and Gary now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as
    necessary.
    Standard of Review
    Gary argues that the trial court erroneously affirmed IDEM’s decision to issue the
    Hobart Permit. The Administrative Orders and Procedures Act governs judicial review
    of an administrative action and is the exclusive means for judicial review of an agency
    action. 
    Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5
    -1. A trial court may provide relief from an administrative
    decision only if the agency action is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
    otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, power,
    privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
    short of statutory right; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; or (5)
    unsupported by substantial evidence. I.C. § 4-21.5-5-14. Importantly, our court grants
    “‘deference to the administrative agency’s findings of fact, [but] no such deference is
    accorded to the agency’s conclusions of law.’” Soames v. Ind. Dep’t of Natural Res., 
    934 N.E.2d 1154
    , 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied (quoting LTV Steel Co. v. Griffin,
    
    730 N.E.2d 1251
    , 1257 (Ind. 2000)).
    I. Interpreting 327 Indiana Administrative Code section 5-2-11.7(a)(2)
    When we interpret administrative regulations, our court applies the same rules of
    construction that apply to statutes. Dev. Servs. Alts., Inc. v. Ind. Family & Social Servs.
    Admin., 
    915 N.E.2d 169
    , 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
    7
    An interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the
    duty of enforcing the statute is entitled to great weight, unless this
    interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself . . . . Deference
    to an agency’s interpretation of a statute becomes a consideration when a
    statute is ambiguous and susceptible of more than one reasonable
    interpretation. When a court is faced with two reasonable interpretations
    of a statute, one of which is supplied by an administrative agency charged
    with enforcing the statute, the court should defer to the agency. If a court
    determines that an agency’s interpretation is reasonable, it should
    terminate its analysis and not address the reasonableness of the other
    party’s proposed interpretation. Terminating the analysis recognizes
    the general policies of acknowledging the expertise of agencies
    empowered to interpret and enforce statutes and increasing public reliance
    on agency interpretations. However, an agency’s incorrect interpretation of
    a statute is entitled to no weight. If an agency misconstrues a statute, there
    is no reasonable basis for the agency’s ultimate action and the trial court is
    required to reverse the agency’s action as being arbitrary and capricious.
    
    Id.
     (quoting Pierce v. Ind. Dep’t of Correction, 
    885 N.E.2d 77
    , 89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008))
    (citations and quotation marks omitted and emphasis added).
    The threshold issue in this case is whether IDEM reasonably interpreted the
    antidegradation requirement for OSRWs found in 327 Indiana Administrative Code 5-2-
    11.7(a)(2):
    (2) For a new or increased discharge of a pollutant or pollutant parameter
    from a new or existing Great Lakes discharger into a tributary of an OSRW
    for which a new or increased permit limit would be required:
    (A) section 11.3(a) and 11.3(b) of this rule (327 IAC 5-2-11.3) apply
    to the new or increased discharge of a pollutant or pollutant
    parameter into the tributary; and
    (B) the discharge shall not cause a significant lowering of water
    quality in the OSRW.
    (C) The requirements of this subdivision will be considered to have
    been met when:
    (i) one (1) or more of the items listed in section
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(i), 11.3(b)(1)(C)(ii), 11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(BB),
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(FF), or 11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(II) of this rule
    (327 IAC 5-2-11.3) apply; or
    (ii) all three (3) of the following are met:
    8
    (AA) one (1) or more of the subitems in section
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(AA),
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(CC),11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(EE),11.3(b)(1
    )(C)(iii)(GG),            11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(HH),     or
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(LL) of this rule (327 IAC 5-2-11.3)
    apply;
    (BB) the applicant demonstrates that the increase is
    necessary; and
    (CC) the public notice requirements in subsection
    (c)(6) are met; or
    (iii) all four (4) of the following are met:
    (AA) one (1) or more of the subitems in section
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(DD),11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(JJ),        or
    11.3(b)(1)(C)(iii)(KK) of this rule (327 IAC 5-2-11.3)
    apply;
    (BB) the applicant demonstrates that the increase is
    necessary;
    (CC) the applicant demonstrates that it will result in a
    net environmental improvement; and
    (DD) the public notice requirements in subsection
    (c)(6) are met.
    (D) As used in this subdivision, “tributary of an OSRW” includes
    the upstream segments of a receiving waterbody when some or all of
    the downstream segments of the receiving waterbody are designated
    as an OSRW.
    When IDEM issued the Hobart Permit, it applied only subsections 11.7(a)(2)(A)
    and (B) and determined that the Hobart Permit met those requirements. IDEM declined
    to apply subsection 11.7(a)(2)(C) and argues that clause (C) should be read independently
    of clauses 2(A) and (B). Under IDEM’s interpretation of the regulation, satisfying clause
    (C) is simply one of two ways to meet the regulation’s requirements.
    IDEM’s interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the regulation.
    Clauses (A) and (B) are connected by an “and.”           Therefore, a “new or increased
    discharge of a pollutant” for which a new or increased permit limit would be required
    must comply with both clauses (A) and (B) of the regulation if applied. There is no
    9
    conjunctive language connecting clauses (A) and (B) to clause (C). And clause (C)’s
    opening phrase, i.e. “[t]he requirements of this subdivision will be considered to have
    been met when,” implies that the requirements of the subdivision may be satisfied by
    other means particularly in the absence of any language stating that clause (C) is the
    exclusive means to determine whether the requirements of subdivision 11.7(a)(2) are met.
    In addition, in this particular case, the antidegradation factors cited in clause (C)
    do not apply to the Hobart Permit’s mercury discharges.             Clause (C) cites to
    antidegradation factors listed in 327 Indiana Administrative Code 5-2-11.3(b).         But
    section 11.3(b) applies only to “high quality waters that are not designated as an” OSRW.
    Because the Deep River is not a “high quality water” to begin with, due to existing levels
    of mercury pollution, section 11.3(b) is inapplicable to the Hobart Permit. Because the
    requirements of subdivision 11.7(a)(2)(C) can only be satisfied by applying the
    specifically cited antidegradation factors enumerated in section 11.3(b), it would be
    impossible to apply clause (C) to the Hobart Permit. Therefore, it was reasonable for
    IDEM to conclude that it could satisfy subdivision 11.7(a)(2) by meeting the
    requirements of clauses (A) and (B) in its consideration of whether to award the Hobart
    Permit.
    Ultimately, IDEM concluded that it must, at a minimum, satisfy subdivision
    11.7(a)(2) by meeting the requirements of clauses (A) and (B) or by meeting the
    requirements in clause (C). Because we conclude that IDEM’s interpretation of 327
    Indiana Administrative Code 5-2-11.7(a)(2) is reasonable, we conclude our analysis and
    10
    need not address the reasonableness of Gary’s proposed interpretation. See Dev. Servs.
    Alts., Inc., 
    915 N.E.2d at 181
    .
    II. The Hobart Permit
    Gary also argues that even if IDEM’s interpretation of 327 Indiana Administrative
    Code subdivision 5-2-11.7(a)(2) is reasonable, its decision to issue the Hobart Permit
    “violated antidegradation regulations” and “will cause a significant lowering of water
    quality” in violation of 327 Indiana Administrative Code sections 5-2-11.3(a) and 5-2-
    11.7(a)(2). Appellant’s Br. at 30, 35. Specifically, Gary argues that its own permitted
    mercury discharges into an OSRW remain unchanged, and therefore, once Hobart begins
    discharging mercury from its new wastewater treatment plant “there will be a significant
    increase of permitted mercury discharges into Lake Michigan[.]” Id. at 30.
    Before we specifically consider Gary’s argument, we observe that, within the
    language at issue, “degradation” means:
    (1) With respect to an outstanding national resource water, any new or
    increased discharge of a pollutant or a pollutant parameter, except for a
    short term, temporary increase.
    (2) With respect to an outstanding state resource water, any new or
    increased discharge of a pollutant or pollutant parameter that results in a
    significant lowering of water quality for that pollutant or pollutant
    parameter, unless:
    (A) the activity causing the increased discharge:
    (i) results in an overall improvement in water quality in the
    outstanding state resource water; and
    (ii) meets the applicable requirements of 327 IAC 2-1-2(1)
    and (2) and 327 IAC 2-1.5-4(a) and (b)[.]
    11
    
    Ind. Code § 13-11-2-50
    .5 (2009). Moreover, the Water Pollution Control Board3 is
    required to promulgate rule procedures that will “prevent degradation” and
    allow for increases and additions in pollutant loadings from an existing or
    new discharge if:
    (A) there will be an overall improvement in water quality for the
    outstanding state resource water as described in this section; and
    (B) the applicable requirements of 327 IAC 2-1-2(1) and 327 IAC 2-
    1-2(2) and 327 IAC 2-1.5-4(a) and 327 IAC 2-1.5-4(b) are met.
    I.C. § 13-18-3-2(k) (2009).
    A. 327 Indiana Administrative Code section 5-2-11.3(a)
    Consistent with these statutory mandates, in its issuance of the Hobart Permit,
    IDEM was required to comply with the regulations set forth in 327 Indiana
    Administrative Code section 5-2-11.3(a) and (b) and establish that the new discharge
    would “not cause a significant lowering of water quality in the OSRW.” See 327 I.A.C. §
    5-2-11.7. As we noted above, section 5-2-11.3(b) applies only to “high quality waters
    that are not designated as an outstanding state resource water.” Due to existing levels of
    mercury pollution, the Deep River, which empties into an OSRW, is not considered a
    high quality water. Therefore, only subsection 11.3(a) applies to our consideration of the
    Hobart Permit.
    327 Indiana Administrative Code section 5-2-11.3(a) applies to all waters in the
    Great Lakes system4 and provides in pertinent part:
    3
    The Water Pollution Control Board operates under IDEM’s umbrella but “with separate and distinct
    statutory authority. The [Board] in particular is assigned the duties of adopting rules ‘for the control and
    prevention of pollution’ in Indiana’s waters.” Twin Eagle, 798 N.E.2d at 845 (citing I.C. § 13-18-3-1).
    4
    Indiana’s antidegradation policy, which is partially implemented by 327 Indiana Administrative Code
    section 5-2-11.3, provides:
    12
    the commissioner shall ensure that the level of water quality necessary to
    protect existing uses is maintained. In order to achieve this requirement,
    and consistent with 40 CFR 131.10, water quality standards use
    designations must include all existing uses. Controls shall be established as
    necessary on point and nonpoint sources of pollutants to ensure that the
    criteria applicable to the designated use are achieved in the water and that
    any designated use of a downstream water is protected. Where water
    quality does not support the designated uses of a waterbody or ambient
    pollutant concentrations are greater than water quality criteria applicable to
    that waterbody, the commissioner shall not allow a lowering of water
    quality for the pollutant or pollutants that prevents the attainment of such
    uses or the water quality criterion.
    The environmental law judge specifically found that IDEM’s determination that
    the Hobart Permit met regulations enumerated in 327 Indiana Administrative Code
    section 5-2-11.3(a) was supported by the guidance provided by the Environmental
    Protection Agency (“EPA”) for new discharges into an impaired water in that agency’s
    Supplementary Information Document.
    IDEM interpreted 327 IAC 5-2-11.3(a)’s “lowering of water quality” in
    conformation with [the] EPA’s view that a wasteload allocation set equal to
    the most stringent criterion applied “end-of-pipe” is permissible. “End-of-
    pipe” criteria provide no mixing zone for dilution, will contain a lower
    concentration of the pollutant than the receiving water, and will thus not
    increase a waterway’s pollutant concentration, if not cause the
    concentration to decrease.
    Appellant’s App. p. 289.
    For all surface waters of the state within the Great Lakes system, existing instream water
    uses and the level of water quality necessary to protect existing uses shall be maintained
    and protected. Where designated uses of the waterbody are impaired, there shall be no
    lowering of the water quality with respect to the pollutant or pollutants that are causing
    the impairment.
    327 I.A.C. § 2-1.5-4(a).
    13
    The environmental law judge’s finding is consistent with the EPA’s Water Quality
    Guidance for the Great Lakes System: Supplementary Information Document (hereinafter
    “the SID”). Specifically, the SID provides in pertinent part:
    . . . [The] EPA believes that limiting discharges from point sources to
    criteria end-of-pipe is nonetheless appropriate in these circumstances, as
    discussed below.
    Numeric criteria are concentration-based standards designed to
    protect the aquatic ecosystem and humans from the adverse affects of
    pollutant discharges that would occur at levels above the criteria. Where
    the background level of the pollutant in the receiving water is greater than
    the criteria, the stream is in non-attainment and the aquatic environment or
    human health is adversely impacted. A point source discharging at criteria
    end-of-pipe in such situations, however, will contain a lower concentration
    of the pollutant than the receiving water, and therefore will not increase the
    pollutant concentration in the waterway. Such a discharge may, in fact,
    cause the ultimate pollutant concentration in the receiving water to decrease.
    Where the environmental effects of a pollutant on the aquatic ecosystem or
    on human health are associated with the concentration of the pollutant in
    the waterway, limiting discharges from point sources to criteria end-of-pipe
    in these circumstances should therefore result in no further degradation of
    the waterbody, and may in fact improve the water quality of the
    waterbody. . . . The Agency therefore believes that establishing limits on
    point sources under these circumstances at criteria end-of-pipe is consistent
    with the underlying environmental objectives of the [Clean Water Act].
    Id. at 107.
    Although the SID also states that “special environmental considerations are
    present with regard to bioaccumulative [persistent] compounds,” which would include
    mercury discharges, the EPA has authorized the permitting authority to “require more
    stringent limitations than criteria end-of-pipe in order to provide a requisite level of
    protection” Id.   Gary argues therefore that “IDEM should have considered additional
    means to limit new mass discharges of BCCs into an impaired waterbody such as Deep
    River, but failed to do so in this case.” Appellant’s Br. at 39. But there is no evidence in
    14
    the record establishing whether there were “additional means” available to IDEM to limit
    new mass discharges of mercury into the Deep River. And in the SID, the EPA does not
    require the permitting authority to apply further limitations to address mass loading, but
    leaves that decision to the permitting authority’s discretion. Appellant’s App. p. 107.
    Therefore, although IDEM could have imposed an end-of-pipe limit more stringent than
    the 1.3 ppt wildlife criterion to specifically address mercury as a bioaccumulative
    chemical of concern, it was not explicitly required to do so.
    IDEM’s decision to issue the Hobart Permit with an end-of-pipe limit of 1.3 ppt
    wildlife criterion is consistent with the guidance provided by the EPA in the SID because
    applying the stringent end-of-pipe criteria for measuring mercury concentrations will
    result in the addition of mercury to the Deep River at a concentration lower than that of
    the receiving water.5 For all of these reasons we conclude that the limits established in
    the Hobart Permit will not lower the water quality in the Deep River, and therefore does
    not run afoul of section 5-1-11.3(a).
    B. 327 Indiana Administrative Code section 5-2-11.7(a)(2)(B)
    Gary also argues that “the new mercury discharge allowed under the Hobart
    Permit will cause a significant lowering of water quality in violation of” the anti-
    5
    Gary argues that the section of the SID discussed above does not support IDEM’s arguments “because
    that section does not relate to antidegradation.” Appellant’s Br. at 37. Contrary to Gary’s assertion,
    application of that section of the SID is relevant to determining whether the new discharge of mercury
    into the Deep River will result in a significant lowering of water quality. Because the environmental law
    judge correctly determined that issuance of the Hobart Permit will not result in a lowering of water
    quality, but will result in a significant overall environmental benefit, an antidegradation analysis is not
    required. Only section 5-2-11.3(b) requires an anti-degradation analysis before an action causing a
    “significant lowering of water quality occurs.” But as we have previously held, section 11.3(b) does not
    apply in the case before us.
    15
    degradation rule enumerated in 327 Indiana Administrative Code section 5-2-
    11.7(a)(2)(B). See Appellant’s Br. at 32.
    (2) For a new or increased discharge of a pollutant or pollutant parameter
    from a new or existing Great Lakes discharger into a tributary of an OSRW
    for which a new or increased permit limit would be required: . . . (B) the
    discharge shall not cause a significant lowering of water quality in the
    OSRW.
    To determine whether issuance of the Hobart Permit violates section 11.7(a)(2)(B),
    IDEM applied its 1998 Nonrule Policy Document,6 which provides guidance as to what
    constitutes a “significant lowering of water quality.” The document states in pertinent
    part:
    A new or increased discharge into a tributary of Lake Michigan will not
    cause a significant lowering of water quality in Lake Michigan if any of the
    following are met: . . . The new or increased discharge into a tributary of
    Lake Michigan is the result of an activity that will result in a significant
    overall environmental benefit to Lake Michigan.
    Appellant’s App. p. 305.
    With this standard in mind, IDEM presented evidence that the new discharge of
    mercury was the result of an activity that would result in a significant overall
    environmental benefit to Lake Michigan. First, we observe that the Hobart Permit’s
    effluent limits for mercury are lower than the existing or ambient levels of mercury in the
    waterbody. Further, IDEM and the City of Hobart established that the new wastewater
    treatment plant will treat mercury discharge significantly more effectively than it is
    6
    We reject Gary’s argument that the Nonrule Policy document was no longer valid after 327 Indiana
    Administrative Code 5-2-11.7(a) was amended to add clause 5-2-11.7(a)(2)(C). IDEM’s use of the
    document was proper as its contents were superseded only to the extent that it conflicts with 11.7(a)(2)(C),
    which IDEM appropriately did not apply in its decision to issue the Hobart Permit.
    16
    currently treated at Hobart’s aging Nob Hill plant or at the Gary wastewater treatment
    plant.
    We may reasonably assume, absent contrary evidence in the record, that Gary’s
    mercury discharges will decrease when Hobart’s sewage is no longer treated at Gary’s
    wastewater facility. But Gary suggests that it might add new sources of wastewater after
    it ceases treating Hobart’s wastewater. Gary correctly observes that if Gary continues to
    discharge mercury at its current permit limits, i.e. a monthly average of 30 ppt, the
    additional mercury discharge allowed from the Hobart wastewater treatment plant will
    increase the amount of mercury discharged into the OSRW, i.e. Lake Michigan. This
    would result in a lowering a water quality, but only as it pertains to the amount of
    mercury discharged into the OSRW and its tributaries.
    Even though Gary may continue to discharge mercury at its current permit limits,
    the environmental law judge concluded that the Hobart Permit will result in significant
    overall environmental benefit to the OSRW, and the evidence supports that conclusion.
    In addition to treating mercury discharge more effectively, construction of Hobart’s new
    wastewater treatment facility will allow the city to close the Nob Hill wastewater
    treatment plant, a facility that has consistently not met its permit obligations.7 And
    7
    Gary argues that IDEM’s argument concerning the closure of the Nob Hill facility was a post hoc
    agency rationalization because IDEM “did not raise this reasoning in support of the Hobart Permit at the
    time of its issuance.” Appellant’s Br. at 33. We disagree. Closure of the Nob Hill facility was referenced
    in the Hobart Permit. Appellant’s App. p. 155. Further, IDEM necessarily discussed the benefits of
    closing the Nob Hill facility before the Environmental Law Judge because her findings of facts and
    conclusions of law specifically discuss the Nob Hill facility, and its closure and accompanying beneficial
    environmental impact are cited as reasons for sustaining IDEM’s decision to issue the permit. For these
    reasons, we conclude that citing the closure of the Nob Hill facility to support IDEM’s decision to issue
    the permit was not a post hoc agency rationalization. See Dev. Servs. Alts., Inc., 
    915 N.E.2d at
    184
    17
    Hobart’s raw sewage will no longer utilize Gary’s combined sewer overflows, which will
    avoid the discharge of untreated sewage during wet weather. The discharge of untreated
    sewage releases pollutants such as mercury, E. Coli, copper, and ammonia-nitrogen into
    the waterways. The issued permit will require the new Hobart wastewater treatment plant
    to apply more stringent standards when treating sewage than the standards in effect at
    Gary’s facility.
    Conclusion
    We conclude that IDEM’s decision to issue the Hobart Permit was neither
    arbitrary nor capricious, and that the decision was in accordance with the law and
    supported by substantial evidence.               First, IDEM’s interpretation of 327 Indiana
    Administrative Code section 5-2-11.7(a)(2) was reasonable in that it only required Hobart
    to comply with subdivision 11.7(a)(2)(A) and (B), but not 11.7(a)(2)(C), in its decision to
    issue the Hobart Permit. And, although the Hobart Permit allows a new source for
    discharge of mercury, because Hobart will be able to close its non-compliant Nob Hill
    Plant and treat its wastewater more effectively than it is currently treated by Gary’s
    facility, the Hobart Permit will result in an overall environmental benefit to and will not
    cause a significant lowering of water quality in Lake Michigan and its tributary, the Deep
    River. Therefore, IDEM’s decision to issue the Hobart Permit does not violate the
    regulations set forth in 327 Indiana Administrative Code sections 5-2-11.3(a) and
    11.7(a)(2)(A) and (B).
    (stating “that it is the reviewing court, and not the administrative agency, that is barred from considering
    post hoc rationalizations”).
    18
    Affirmed.
    FRIEDLANDER, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
    19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A02-1106-MI-553

Filed Date: 5/17/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014