Lathisha Lawson v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

FILED
May 10 2012, 9:15 am
FOR PUBLICATION
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
JOHN C. BOHDAN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
GEORGE P. SHERMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
LATISHA A. LAWSON, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A03-1107-CR-350
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Frances C. Gull, Judge
Cause No. 02D05-1012-FA-64
May 10, 2012
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary1
Latisha Lawson appeals her convictions for murder, Class C felony neglect of a
dependent, Class D felony neglect of a dependent, and Class D felony battery. We
affirm.
Issue
The sole issue before us is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s rejection of Lawson’s insanity defense.
Facts
Lawson was the mother of two children: K.K., born in 2000, and J.K., born in
2007. Lawson lived with the father of the children, Lawrence King, until October 2009,
when the two split up. King had known Lawson for fifteen years and had never noticed
any signs that she had a “profound mental illness.” Tr. p. 622. Additionally, Lawson had
never previously received any mental health treatment.
After splitting up with King, Lawson and her children moved in with Natasha
Hawkins and her three children. Lawson, who had always been steadily employed, quit
her job after moving in with Hawkins. She also began homeschooling K.K. Lawson
later explained that she believed God or “the Lord” had told her to quit her job and move
in with Hawkins. Id. at 743. While she was living with Hawkins, other persons who
came into contact with Lawson did not notice any signs of mental illness or unusual
1
We held oral argument in this case on April 2, 2012, at the University of Notre Dame Law School. We
thank the Law School for its hospitality, and counsel for both parties for their able presentations and
participation in this “traveling” oral argument.
2
behavior. One person trusted Lawson enough to allow her to babysit her own children at
times.
Behind closed doors, however, Lawson was frequently battering K.K. with a belt
and extension cords, sometimes with enough force to leave permanent scars. Lawson
began telling K.K. that J.K. was possessed by a demon, whom Lawson believed was
named Marzon. Lawson believed that J.K.’s physical appearance and bone structure was
changing as a result of his possession; Lawson also managed to convince K.K. that these
changes were occurring. At some point, Lawson claims that God revealed a plan to
exorcise the demon from J.K. The plan required forcing J.K., along with K.K. and
Hawkins’s children,2 to ingest a combination of “blessed” oil (i.e., olive oil over which
Lawson prayed) and vinegar. Id. at 754. Hawkins agreed to this plan, and Lawson
asserts that God told her the specific day on which to carry it out.
On that day, which appears to have been in November 2009, all of the children
were given the oil and vinegar mixture, which caused them to vomit. J.K. fought against
drinking the mixture, shaking his head no, crying, and attempting to spit it out. Hawkins
helped hold J.K. down while he was given the mixture. Lawson and Hawkins, who
apparently showed no signs of anger during the process, prayed out loud over J.K. The
other children could not understand what the adults were saying for the most part, and
Lawson claimed that she was speaking in tongues at that time. In order to force J.K. to
ingest the oil and vinegar mixture, Lawson held her hand over his mouth for as long as
2
Apparently, Lawson believed that the other four children were possessed by demons as well, though not
to the same extent as J.K.
3
five to ten minutes. Eventually, Lawson noticed that J.K. stopped breathing, and she told
K.K. to say “bye” to him. Id. at 318. J.K. died at that time from suffocation.3 Lawson
later claimed to have been shocked that J.K. had died and that she expected him to come
back to life at some point.
After J.K. died, his body was placed on Hawkins’s bed, where it remained for
approximately one month while Lawson and Hawkins continued sleeping in the bed next
to it. Lawson told one of Hawkins’s children that she was “doing things for God” that
would lead to J.K. coming back to life, which the child considered “crazy.” Id. at 543.
Lawson also purchased some clothes for J.K. after he died. Later, J.K.’s body was
moved into a closet, and K.K. noticed a bad smell coming from the closet. Lawson and
Hawkins eventually stuffed J.K.’s body into a plastic bin. Lawson forbade K.K. from
discussing J.K.’s death, saying that she (Lawson) would go to jail if anyone found out
about it. Lawson also sometimes forced the children in the house either to look at or
touch J.K.’s body as a form of punishment.
Lawson essentially broke off all contact with her mother after moving in with
Hawkins, even though she previously had had frequent contact with her. Lawson’s
mother eventually contacted the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and the Ft.
3
There was evidence that J.K. had a broken bone in his neck, and a pathologist believed that the break
must have occurred during his life, indicating that pressure had been applied to his neck and he had been
strangled to death. Lawson denies that any strangulation of the neck occurred and the bone break must
have occurred after death, but she does admit to having suffocated J.K. by placing her hand over his
mouth for at least five to ten minutes. None of the other testifying eyewitnesses to J.K.’s death—K.K.
and Hawkins’s three children—described Lawson as putting her hand around his neck, as opposed to over
his mouth. In any event, Lawson makes no argument, aside from her insanity claim, that there is
insufficient evidence of knowingly or intentionally killing J.K.
4
Wayne Police Department with her concerns over Lawson and the children’s situation.
In September 2010, a Ft. Wayne police officer went to Lawson and Hawkins’s apartment
to perform a welfare check. The officer spoke to Lawson and did not notice any signs
that she was suffering from a mental health issue. Lawson also told the officer that J.K.
was staying with an aunt at the time. After walking through the apartment and finding
nothing unusual, the officer left and filed a report with DCS, which evidently did not
follow up on the report. Lawson also told other persons, after J.K.’s death, that he was
staying with other family members.
Lawson moved out of Hawkins’s apartment at the end of November 2010. She
brought the plastic bin containing J.K.’s body with her when she moved into the home of
an acquaintance, Yvonne Hill. Lawson told Hill first that J.K. was “somewhere safe,”
and later said that he had been adopted. Id. at 266. Hill described her conversations with
Lawson as “normal.” Id. at 268. After a short time living with Hill, Lawson moved into
a home provided by a local pastor. Again, she brought the plastic bin with her, keeping it
by her bedside.
On December 20, 2010, Ft. Wayne police officers performed a welfare check on
Hawkins and her children at her apartment. Hawkins revealed to the officers that a baby
had been killed in her apartment approximately one year before and placed into a bin.
Police then were able to locate Lawson. At first, Lawson told police that her son had
been adopted, but she declined to say by whom. Eventually, Lawson gave police a
statement describing her belief that J.K. had been possessed, the exorcism attempt, and
5
his death. Lawson consented to a search of the residence where she had been staying,
and police found the plastic tub with J.K.’s partially mummified body inside.
On December 28, 2010, the State charged Lawson with Class A felony battery,
Class A felony neglect of a dependent, Class C felony neglect of a dependent, Class D
felony neglect of a dependent, and Class D felony battery. The first two charges were
with respect to J.K.’s death, and the last three charges were with respect to Lawson’s
treatment of K.K., including physically and mentally abusing her and forcing her to drink
the oil and vinegar. On January 28, 2011, the State added a charge of murder for J.K.’s
death.
Lawson filed notice that she intended to rely upon a defense of insanity. She
accordingly was examined by two court-appointed experts: Dr. Kevin Wieland, a clinical
psychologist, and Dr. Herbert Trier, a psychiatrist. Dr. Wieland’s examination consisted
of interviews and tests totaling seven to eight hours, while Dr. Trier’s examination
consisted of a forty-five minute interview and review of the background investigation of
the case. At Lawson’s jury trial held on May 24-27, 2011, Dr. Wieland was asked
whether he had an opinion on whether Lawson was “sane or insane at the time of the
offense,” and he responded, “My opinion [sic] that Ms. Lawson was able to determine
right from wrong regardless of a delusional process she may have.” Id. at 443-44. Dr.
Wieland further explained that his opinion was “to a medical degree of certainty” for the
following reasons:
6
Based on all of the psychological measures and the clinical
interview my opinion comes from a belief that she did [sic] in
order to help her child. And that was her main goal of even
doing the behavior at all. And so because of that her belief at
that particular time was that her actions would help her child
not harm. So she has a belief that helping is better than
harming. She also has a deep belief in God and spirituality
and cited on numerous occasions throughout the interview
that God tries to influence for good rather than evil. And she
talked a lot about good verses [sic] evil in the interview. And
from that we can take that she has a strong belief between
right, wrong, good, evil and that’s where that opinion comes
from.
Id. at 446-47.
Dr. Wieland also testified that based upon Lawson’s description of events to him,
“she definitely demonstrated the ability to make choices and to make choices in a right or
wrong manner at that time.” Id. at 451. He also believed there was “no evidence that she
was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct at the time of the offense.” Id.
at 473. After questioning by the court and the parties, the jury submitted a question
asking Dr. Wieland whether “an insane person [can] in any way tell the difference
between right and wrong.” Id. at 478. Dr. Wieland responded, “Yes. Just because
somebody is considered insane doesn’t mean that they lose the ability [sic] ascertain right
and wrong although many times they do.” Id.
Dr. Trier testified that he “felt that she was not sane at the time of the offense.” Id.
at 483. He also stated that a person with a delusional mental illness “might know right
from wrong in a number of circumstances but not in the area where the delusions
concerned.” Id. at 488-89. He also noted that “a person can be acting normal and have a
7
delusional disorder . . . that happens all the time.” Id. at 491-92. Dr. Trier believed that
Lawson may have had either psychotic depression with delusions or schizophrenic
disorder with delusions. Neither Dr. Wieland nor Dr. Trier gave any indication that they
suspected Lawson of malingering.4
The jury was instructed that it had the option of finding Lawson not guilty, not
responsible by reason of insanity, guilty, or guilty but mentally ill. It returned a verdict
of guilty for all six counts. The trial court entered judgments of conviction on four of the
six counts: murder, Class C felony neglect of a dependent, Class D felony neglect of a
dependent, and Class D felony battery. After being sentenced to an aggregate term of
sixty-one years, Lawson now appeals.
Analysis
Lawson’s sole argument on appeal is that the jury erred in rejecting her insanity
defense.5 Even when the State proves every element of a charged offense beyond a
reasonable doubt, a defendant can avoid criminal responsibility for that offense by raising
and proving an insanity defense. Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 708 (Ind. 2010).
Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-6 states:
(a) A person is not responsible for having engaged in
prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect,
he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct
at the time of the offense.
4
Any written reports prepared by Dr. Wieland or Dr. Trier based on their examinations of Lawson were
not introduced into evidence.
5
Lawson’s argument on this point focuses primarily upon J.K.’s death.
8
(b) As used in this section, “mental disease or defect”
means a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and
demonstrably impairs a person’s perception, but the term does
not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated
unlawful or antisocial conduct.
The defendant must prove an insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.
Code § 35-41-4-1(b).
Because Lawson bore the burden of establishing her insanity defense, she is now
appealing from a negative judgment. See Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709. When reviewing
a negative judgment, this court will not reweigh evidence, reassess witness credibility, or
disturb reasonable inferences made by the trier of fact, even if more reasonable inferences
arguably could have been made. Id. A defendant appealing a rejection of his or her
insanity defense must establish to this court that the evidence is without conflict and leads
only to the conclusion that he or she was insane when the crime was committed. Id.
“Although this standard of review is deferential, it is not impossible . . . . An impossible
standard of review under which appellate courts merely ‘rubber stamp’ the fact finder’s
determinations, no matter how unreasonable, would raise serious constitutional concerns
because it would make the right to an appeal illusory.” Id.
When mental health experts who have examined a defendant offer conflicting
opinions on whether a defendant was insane at the time of the offense, i.e. where one or
more experts testify that the defendant was insane while others testify that he or she was
sane, such conflicting testimony generally “is sufficiently probative of sanity.” Id. at
710. Even when the experts unanimously agree that a defendant was insane when a
9
crime was committed, a jury may still reject an insanity defense if there is “other
evidence of probative value from which a conflicting inference of sanity can be drawn.”
Id. at 712. Such evidence may include “lay opinion testimony that conflicts with the
experts or demeanor evidence that, when considered in light of the other evidence,
permits a reasonable inference of sanity to be drawn.” Id. An expert witness who
testifies that he or she has no opinion as to a defendant’s sanity does not provide
probative evidence on that question. Id. at 711. “[A]s a matter of law, a person is either
sane or insane at the time of the crime; there is no intermediate ground.” Id. Where one
or more experts offer an opinion that a defendant was insane when a crime was
committed, while another expert fails to offer any opinion, this is treated as if there is
unconflicting expert testimony that the defendant was insane for purposes of appellate
review. See id. at 711-12.
Lawson first argues that Dr. Wieland did not provide probative evidence on the
question of Lawson’s sanity, thus leaving only Dr. Trier’s opinion of insanity. Although
Dr. Wieland offered a blanket statement that Lawson was sane at the time of J.K.’s death,
Lawson claims that his explanations for that finding and subsequent testimony render that
opinion lacking in probative value, as if he had failed to offer any opinion on her sanity.
We disagree with Lawson’s assertion on this point.
As a court’s witness, the trial court asked Dr. Wieland whether he had an opinion
on whether Lawson was “sane or insane at the time of the offense,” and he responded,
“My opinion [sic] that Ms. Lawson was able to determine right from wrong regardless of
10
a delusional process she may have.” Tr. pp. 443-44.6 Dr. Wieland also testified that he
believed there was “no evidence that she was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of
her conduct at the time of the offense.” Id. at 473.
Despite this testimony, Lawson essentially argues that we should disregard it. She
draws a comparison to Galloway, where an expert who originally testified that he
believed the defendant was sane later opined after extensive cross-examination that he
was unable to offer a definite opinion on sanity, and a majority of our supreme court
concluded that such testimony equated to the expert’s failure to offer an opinion on the
defendant’s sanity. See Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 711.7 Dr. Wieland did testify, in
explaining his finding of sanity, that Lawson had a “belief at that particular time . . . that
her actions would help her child not harm. So she has a belief that helping is better than
harming.” Tr. pp. 446-47. Arguably, this explanation of his findings is inconsistent with
his testimony that Lawson was sane, which necessarily implies that she knew that what
she was doing was wrong when she killed J.K. Likewise, the jury submitted a question to
Dr. Wieland asking whether “an insane person [can] in any way tell the difference
6
As indicated by Dr. Wieland’s reference to “a delusional process she may have,” he did not give a
definitive opinion on whether Lawson was in fact suffering from a mental illness and delusions, nor was
he directly asked that question. On the other hand, Dr. Wieland did not give any testimony that Lawson
was malingering or faking her claims of delusions, which were corroborated by the testimony of K.K. and
Hawkins’s children regarding her belief that J.K. was possessed by a demon. As noted, the jury found
Lawson guilty of these offenses, not guilty but mentally ill, meaning it concluded Lawson suffered from
no mental illness at all when she committed them.
7
Justices Shepard and Dickson strongly disagreed with the majority’s assessment of the expert’s
testimony, believing it was within the province of the jury to believe the expert’s written report and direct
testimony finding the defendant to be sane and to find his answers on cross-examination to be “less
compelling.” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 718 (Shepard, C.J., dissenting).
11
between right and wrong.” Id. at 478. Dr. Wieland responded, “Yes. Just because
somebody is considered insane doesn’t mean that they lose the ability [sic] ascertain right
and wrong although many times they do.” Id. Lawson contends it is incompatible with
the legal definition of insanity to state that an insane person can tell right from wrong. 8
Regardless of any perceived weaknesses in Dr. Wieland’s testimony, we conclude
it was within the province of the jury to assess the weight to be given to that testimony.
We observe that the majority in Galloway did not reweigh the testimony of the expert or
reassess his credibility. Rather, it relied upon the expert’s ultimate conclusion, after
being presented on cross-examination with facts of which he had previously been
unaware, that he could not offer an opinion on the defendant’s sanity. Galloway, 938
N.E.2d at 711. Here, by contrast, Dr. Wieland never wavered from his original opinion
that Lawson was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct and, therefore, was
legally sane at the time of these crimes. We decline to expand Galloway to cover the
present situation.
Rather, we believe this case is covered by the well-established rule that an
appellate court will not reassess the credibility of a witness unless such testimony was
“incredibly dubious.” “[A] court will impinge upon the jury’s responsibility to judge the
credibility of witnesses only when confronted with inherently improbable testimony or
8
The State notes that Dr. Wieland was not specifically asked in this jury question about the legal
definition of insanity, as opposed to insanity in a colloquial sense. In that regard, Dr. Wieland’s comment
about an “insane” person being able to tell right from wrong might only have meant that a person with
even a severe mental illness may still possess the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her
conduct, which is insufficient to meet the legal definition of insanity. See Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 708.
12
coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.” Murray v.
State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Ind. 2002) (emphasis added). Lawson does not make an
“incredible dubiosity” argument. Moreover, as a general rule any discrepancies in expert
witness testimony, or lack of facts and reasoning to support expert opinion, go to the
weight to be given that testimony and not to its admissibility. See Krumm v. State, 793
N.E.2d 1170, 1180-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Hoglund v.
State, 962 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. 2012). That being the case, any inconsistencies or lack of
clarity in Dr. Wieland’s testimony was for the jury to consider in weighing his testimony.
We decline to second-guess its apparent assessment of that testimony.
We conclude that Dr. Wieland’s testimony is probative evidence that Lawson was
sane when she committed these crimes, and that alone “is sufficiently probative of
sanity,” despite its conflict with Dr. Trier’s testimony that Lawson was insane. See
Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 710. The jury certainly was free to credit Dr. Wieland’s opinion
over Dr. Trier’s, especially given the much longer time Dr. Wieland spent examining and
testing Lawson as opposed to Dr. Trier. See Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1086
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that jury was entitled “to give little or no weight” to insanity
opinions of expert witnesses, based on their descriptions of how thoroughly they had
examined the defendant), trans. denied.
Additionally, there was independent lay witness testimony tending to corroborate
Dr. Wieland’s opinion that Lawson was sane. First, Lawson told K.K. after J.K.’s death
not to tell anyone about it because she could go to jail if anyone found out, which is
13
evidence of awareness of the wrongfulness of her conduct. Second, Lawson told persons
who came investigating J.K.’s whereabouts either that he had been adopted or was
visiting other family members, which is consistent with an attempt to “cover up” her
wrongdoing. Third, several persons who interacted with Lawson while she was living
with Hawkins noticed nothing unusual about her behavior; one of these persons went so
far as to permit Lawson to babysit her children.
The Galloway majority carefully scrutinized the so-called “demeanor” lay
evidence of the defendant’s sanity in that case, finding there to be limits to the probative
value of such evidence. Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 713. It held such evidence to be “of
more limited value when the defendant has a long history of mental illness with
psychosis.” Id. The Galloway majority quoted extensively from this court:
The proposition that a jury may infer that a person’s actions
before and after a crime are “indicative of his actual mental
health at the time of the” crime is logical when dealing with a
defendant who is not prone to delusional or hallucinogenic
episodes. However, when a defendant has a serious and well-
documented mental disorder, such as schizophrenia, one that
causes him to see, hear, and believe realities that do not exist,
such logic collapses . . . .
Moler v. State, 782 N.E.2d 454, 458–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. The
Galloway majority also noted that “insanity is not limited to the stereotypical view of a
‘raging lunatic’—a person experiencing a psychotic delusion may appear normal to
passersby.” Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 713-14.
14
The Galloway majority observed that the concept of using lay witness demeanor
evidence had more probative value to negate an insanity defense when it was based on
whether the defendant had the capacity to conform his or her conduct to the law’s
requirements, but that basis for an insanity defense was removed from the statute in 1984.
Id. at 714. Finally, the Galloway majority noted that “demeanor evidence before and
after a crime is of more limited value than the defendant’s demeanor during the crime.”
Id. Indiana recognizes claims of “temporary insanity,” and so there is the possibility that
a defendant may be legally insane when a crime is committed but apparently sane
immediately before and after the crime. Id. In sum, “demeanor evidence must be
considered as a whole, in relation to all the other evidence.” Id.
We believe the observations of the Galloway majority have limited application in
this case, where there is in fact expert testimony that Lawson was sane at the time of
these crimes. That is, the “demeanor” evidence in this case is not being used as the sole
basis for a finding of sanity, but merely as corroboration of Dr. Wieland’s testimony.
Moreover, unlike the defendant in Galloway, Lawson does not have a long-standing,
well-documented history of severe mental illness. In fact, Dr. Trier’s diagnosis is the
only one on record suggesting she has a mental illness at all, and she has never received
treatment for any such illness. We acknowledge that a mental illness must begin
sometime, and the lack of a long-standing history of mental illness should not
automatically preclude a finding of insanity. Still, the lack of such history is a
circumstance that a fact-finder may consider in evaluating an insanity defense. Here,
15
considered in relation to all of the evidence in the case, including Dr. Wieland’s
testimony, the “demeanor” evidence in this case had probative value tending to support
the jury’s rejection of Lawson’s insanity defense.
Lawson’s behavior in this case admittedly was highly bizarre; her actions
concerning the “exorcism” and retention of J.K.’s body thereafter were confirmed by
three independent eyewitnesses. Still, as we recently noted, our supreme court has
affirmed the rejection of an insanity defense even “where the crimes appear to have been
completely irrational.” Fernbach, 954 N.E.2d at 1087. One such case was Gambill v.
State, 675 N.E.2d 668, 672-73 (Ind. 1996), where a defendant had drowned her five-year-
old son for the stated purpose of preventing friends whom she believed were “devils”
from sacrificing him and four expert witnesses testified that the defendant was insane at
the time of the crime, but there was lay testimony opining that the defendant in fact knew
the wrongfulness of her actions. Another case was Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60 (Ind.
1995), where a defendant bit off his girlfriend’s finger, shot her eight times, then hit her
in the head and chest with a splitting maul, saying that “all women [were] evil” and that
the finger had contained an “evil worm.” Although three expert witnesses testified that
the defendant was insane at the time of the crime, our supreme court affirmed the
rejection of the insanity defense based on the defendant complaining to a police officer
about the victim’s “nagging,” a friend’s opinion that the defendant had seemed “O.K.,”
and the defendant having told his sister that he believed the victim was phoning the
16
police when he shot her.9 Barany, 658 N.E.2d at 64. In a third case cited to us by the
State, whose facts are quite similar to those here, our supreme court affirmed rejection of
an insanity defense where a woman killed a child after giving him an overdose of salt, but
claimed to have done so because she was Jesus and she had given the child salt in order
to “cleanse” his body and four expert witnesses unanimously testified that the defendant
was legally insane at the time of the crime. Mayes v. State, 440 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind.
1982). Compared to these cases, we cannot say Lawson’s behavior was so much more
bizarre that reversal of her convictions is warranted on the basis that the jury improperly
rejected her insanity defense.
Conclusion
It may be, as suggested by defense counsel at oral argument, that Galloway
requires closer appellate scrutiny of insanity defense claims than had been the case
before. Still, even after applying such scrutiny in this case, we hold there is sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s rejection of Lawson’s insanity defense. We affirm.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
9
In Moler, this court criticized Barany as making it “very difficult even for defendants with well-
documented mental illnesses to successfully raise the insanity defense” and stated, “In the interests of
justice, we hope that our supreme court will revisit this rule.” Moler, 782 N.E.2d at 458–59. Although
the Galloway majority quoted at length from Moler, it stopped short of expressly criticizing or
disapproving of Barany, and it also did not disapprove of Gambill.
17