Carolyn Boss v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

FOR PUBLICATION
FILED
Mar 30 2012, 9:37 am
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
SUZY ST. JOHN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
KARL M. SCHARNBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
CAROLYN BOSS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1106-CR-320
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Linda E. Brown, Judge
Cause No. 49F10-0812-CM-276473
March 30, 2012
OPINION – FOR PUBLICATION
DARDEN, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Carolyn Boss appeals her convictions and sentence following a bench trial for six
counts of class A misdemeanor failure to restrain a dog1 and six counts of class B
misdemeanor harboring a non-immunized dog.2
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
ISSUES
1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Boss‟s
convictions.
2. Whether Boss‟s convictions constitute double jeopardy.
3. Whether Boss‟s sentence is inappropriate pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B).
4. Whether Boss‟s one-year consecutive sentences are unconstitutional.
FACTS
On November 3, 2008, three dogs surrounded Carole Bales as she walked in an
alley near her home. Bales recognized the dogs as those kept by Boss, who lived across
the street from Bales.
One of the dogs clamped down on Bales‟s arm and began shaking her by the arm
before pulling her down to the ground. Another dog bit Bales‟s leg and “started shaking”
1
Ind. Code § 15-20-1-4.
2
I.C. § 35-46-3-1.
2
it while the third dog “started nipping [her] up and down [her] body.” (Tr. 12). The dogs
then “started dragging [Bales] down the alley.” (Tr. 12).
Thomas Wimberly responded to Bales‟s cries for help. When he got to the alley,
he saw the dogs “gnawing on” Bales. (Tr. 28). As Wimberly attempted to get the dogs
away from Bales, two of the dogs bit his arms and knocked him to the ground. A passer-
by alerted Boss to the attack. Boss called the dogs off of Bales and Wimberly and took
them back to her yard.
Deborah Dobbins, an animal control officer with Indianapolis Animal Control &
Care, responded to the scene. She observed two of the dogs in a fenced area at the side of
Boss‟s house. A forty-two-inch-high chain-link fence surrounded the area. Dobbins,
however, observed that the fence was “dilapidated,” with gaps at the bottom of the fence
under which a dog could crawl. (Tr. 58). The third dog was loosely secured by its collar
to a tree in the unfenced backyard. Dobbins observed that the collar was “way too loose
for that dog” because it “slipped right off the dog‟s head . . . .” (Tr. 59). Dobbins
observed blood on all three dogs.
Boss informed Dobbins that the dogs belonged to her son and that she was caring
for them because he was incarcerated. Dobbins did not find any rabies tags on the dogs,
and Boss could not provide any vaccination records. Boss signed a Surrender of Owner‟s
Animal, whereby she certified that she was the owner of the dogs and voluntarily
surrendering the dogs to Animal Control & Care.
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The dog bites caused extensive injuries to Bales, including permanent damage to
the nerves in her arm. Bales‟s injuries required a two-week stay in the hospital followed
by extensive physical therapy. Bales also suffered several bite wounds to her legs as well
as scratches to her torso. Wimberly‟s injuries to his arm required a hospital stay of six
weeks, followed by several weeks of physical therapy. Wimberly also suffered
permanent damage to his arm. In addition, Wimberly suffered several less severe bites to
his arms.
On December 8, 2008, the State charged Boss with six counts of class A
misdemeanor failure to restrain a dog and six counts of class B misdemeanor harboring a
non-immunized dog. The trial court held a bench trial on June 22, 2011, after which it
found Boss guilty as charged.
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on June 24, 2011. The trial court found
Boss‟s lack of criminal history and that she voluntarily surrendered the dogs to be
mitigating circumstances. The trial court found the nature and circumstances of the crime
to be an aggravating circumstance. Finding that the aggravator outweighed the
mitigators, the trial court sentenced Boss to concurrent sentences of one year on Counts
1, 2, 3, 5, and 6. The trial court further sentenced Boss to one year on Count 4, to be
served consecutive to the sentence on Count 1, to be served in county jail. The trial court
then sentenced Boss to concurrent sentences of 180 days on the remaining counts, with
168 days on each count suspended to probation. Thus, Boss received an aggregate
sentence of two years, followed by 168 days of probation.
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DECISION
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Boss asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions for failing
to restrain her dogs and harboring non-immunized dogs.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder‟s role, not that of
appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to
determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this
structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court‟s ruling. Appellate
courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not
necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be
drawn from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted).
a. Failure to restrain
Boss argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that she failed to take
reasonable steps to restrain her dogs. Indiana Code section 15-20-1-4 provides that the
owner of a dog commits a class C misdemeanor if:
(1) the owner recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally fails to take
reasonable steps to restrain the dog;
(2) the dog enters property other than the property of the dog‟s
owner; and
(3) as the result of the owner‟s failure to restrain the dog, the dog
bites or attacks another person without provocation, resulting in
bodily injury to the other person.
5
The offense is a class A misdemeanor if it results in serious bodily injury to a person.
“In interpreting statutes, we do not interpret a statute that is facially
clear and unambiguous. Rather, we give the statute its plain and clear
meaning.” “[I]f a statute is ambiguous, we seek to ascertain and give effect
to the legislature‟s intent.” “The best evidence of legislative intent is the
language of the statute itself, and all words must be given their plain and
ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated by statute.” “[P]enal statutes
must be strictly construed against the State, but a statute should not be
overly narrowed so as to exclude cases fairly covered by it and should be
interpreted so as to give efficient operation to the expressed intent of the
legislature.” “Also, we assume that the language in a statute was used
intentionally and that every word should be given effect and meaning.”
“We seek to give a statute practical application by construing it in a way
favoring public convenience and avoiding absurdity, hardship, and
injustice.”
Buchanan v. State, 956 N.E.2d 124, 128-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (internal citations
omitted).
“Reasonable” is defined as “not extreme or excessive[.]” See
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reasonable (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). In
Plesha v. Edmonds ex rel. Edmonds, 717 N.E.2d 981, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans.
denied, this court construed the meaning of “restraint,” as used in a city ordinance
requiring owners to keep their dogs restrained. Looking at the plain and ordinary
meaning, the court determined the terms “restraint” and “restrained” import active control
and prevention of conduct rather than mere containment. See id. (citing BLACK‟S LAW
DICTIONARY at 1214 (6th ed. 1991) (confinement or holding back from action);
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY at 1438 (3d ed. 1992) (to hold back or keep in check;
control)). We find the use of the term “restrain” in Indiana Code section 15-20-1-4 to be
6
analogous to that addressed in Plesha. Accordingly, we interpret Indiana Code section
15-20-1-4 as requiring an owner of a dog to take practical and sensible steps to control
his or her dog to prevent the dog from going onto the property of another.
Here, the evidence shows that Boss kept two of the dogs in a fenced area.
Dobbins, however, testified that the fence had obvious gaps through which the dogs
could escape. The evidence further shows that Boss kept the third dog in her unfenced
backyard, with only a loose collar through which his head easily slipped. Given the
evidence, the trial court could reasonably infer that Boss failed to take reasonable steps to
restrain the dogs.
b. Harboring a non-immunized dog
Boss further asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that she
harbored a non-immunized dog. Boss maintains that it was the State‟s burden to prove
that the dogs were not immunized. She also maintains that the State failed to present
evidence that she knew the dogs were not immunized.
Indiana Code section 35-46-3-1 provides that a “person who knowingly or
intentionally harbors a dog that is over the age of six (6) months and not immunized
against rabies commits harboring a non-immunized dog.” The offense is a class B
misdemeanor “if the dog causes bodily injury by biting a person.” I.C. § 35-46-3-1.
Indiana Administrative Code section 1-5-2 requires owners to vaccinate their dogs
against rabies. Pursuant to Indiana Administrative Code section 1-5-1, upon
administering a rabies vaccination, the veterinarian must provide the owner with a
7
completed rabies vaccination certificate and a rabies vaccination identification tag, both
of which the owner is required to keep.
In this case, the State presented evidence that Boss could provide neither tags nor
certificates of rabies vaccination for the dogs. Thus, the trier-of-fact could reasonably
infer that the dogs had not been immunized.
In the alternative, Boss argues that the State failed to prove that she knew the dogs
had not been immunized. “A person engages in conduct „knowingly‟ if, when he engages
in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2.
“„Because such a finding requires one to resort to inferential reasoning to ascertain the
defendant‟s mental state, the appellate courts must look to all the surrounding
circumstances of a case to determine if a guilty verdict is proper.‟” Scruggs v. State, 883
N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting McMichael v. State, 471 N.E.2d 726, 731
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984), trans. denied), trans. denied.
Here, the State presented evidence that Boss cared for the dogs3 and that she did
not have proof that they had been vaccinated. Accordingly, the trial court could infer that
Boss was aware of a high probability that the dogs had not been immunized.
We find that the State presented sufficient evidence from which the trial court
could infer that Boss harbored non-immunized dogs. Boss is asking this Court to
reweigh the evidence, which we will not do.
3
Boss admittedly “assumed the role of owner to [the] three dogs . . . .” Boss‟s Br. at 5.
8
2. Double Jeopardy
Boss next asserts that her convictions violate Indiana‟s prohibition against double
jeopardy. Specifically, she contends that she was subjected to double jeopardy “when her
convictions for harboring a non-immunized dog were elevated to a [c]lass B
misdemeanor on the same type of bodily injury elevating her convictions for failure to
restrain a dog to a [c]lass A misdemeanor.” Boss‟s Br. at 21.
Pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, “[n]o person shall be
put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.”
[T]wo offenses are the “same offense” in violation of the Indiana Double
Jeopardy Clause if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the
challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential
elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of
another challenged offense.
Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d
32, 49 (Ind. 1999)). “In addition, categories of double jeopardy based on rules of
statutory construction and common law prohibit multiple convictions or punishments for
the same crime.” Porter v. State, 935 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). These
categories bar “„[c]onviction and punishment for an enhancement of a crime where the
enhancement is imposed for the very same behavior or harm as another crime for which
the defendant has been convicted and punished.‟” Id. (quoting Guyton v. State, 771
N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. 2002)). We consider the evidence, charging information, final
jury instructions and arguments of counsel in determining what facts the trier-of-fact used
9
to establish each element of an offense. Ramon v. State, 888 N.E.2d 244, 253 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008).
Failure to restrain a dog is a class A misdemeanor when it results in serious bodily
injury. “Serious bodily injury” means a bodily injury that, inter alia, causes serious
permanent disfigurement, extreme pain or “permanent or protracted loss or impairment of
the function of a bodily member or organ[.]” I.C. § 35-41-1-25. Knowingly or
intentionally harboring a non-immunized dog is a class C infraction. The offense,
however, is elevated to a class B misdemeanor if “the dog causes bodily injury by biting
a person. I.C. § 35-46-3-1. “„Bodily injury‟ means any impairment of physical
condition, including physical pain.” I.C. § 35-41-1-4.
In Counts 1 through 6, the State alleged that Boss committed failure to restrain a
dog as a class A misdemeanor based upon “bite wound(s) and[/]or laceration(s) resulting
in extreme pain and/or serious permanent disfigurement and/or permanent or protracted
loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ” to Wimberly and Bales.
(App. 36-41) (emphasis omitted). In Counts 7 through 12, the State alleged that Boss
committed harboring a non-immunized dog as a class B misdemeanor based upon “bite
wound(s) and/or lacerations” to Wimberly and Bales. (App. 42-44(B)).
The evidence introduced at trial indicates that both Wimberly and Bales suffered
permanent injuries to their arms, including nerve damage and loss of function, due to the
dog bites. The evidence introduced at trial also indicates that Wimberly and Bales each
suffered numerous other bites.
10
Although the State presented evidence of multiple wounds to Wimberly and Bales,
it presented no actual evidence to prove bodily injury from Boss‟s separate conduct of
harboring a non-immunized dog. From the evidence presented, we find that Boss has
demonstrated a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the trier-of-fact to
elevate her convictions for harboring non-immunized dogs also were used to enhance her
convictions for failure to restrain a dog. See Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 54 (Ind.
1999). Therefore, the enhancements for both offenses cannot stand. Accordingly, we
remand with directions to vacate Boss‟s convictions and sentences for harboring a non-
immunized dog as class B misdemeanors and enter a determination that Boss committed
harboring a non-immunized dog as class C infractions.
3. Inappropriate Sentence
Boss asserts that her sentence is inappropriate. She argues that “it should be
revised to a term served on home detention in accord with the prosecutor‟s original
recommendation.” Boss‟s Br. at 8.
We may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). It is the defendant‟s burden
to “„persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness
standard of review.‟” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on
reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080
(Ind. 2006)).
11
In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence “is the
starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime
committed.” Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Indiana Code section 35-50-3-2 provides
that “[a] person who commits a Class A misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed
term of not more than one (1) year[.]”4
The location where a sentence is to be served is an appropriate focus
for application of our review and revise authority. . . . Nonetheless, we
note that it will be quite difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim that
the placement of his sentence is inappropriate. This is because the question
under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more
appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is
inappropriate. A defendant challenging the placement of a sentence must
convince us that the given placement is itself inappropriate. As a practical
matter, trial courts know the feasibility of alternative placements in
particular counties or communities. For example, a court is aware of the
availability, costs, and entrance requirements of community corrections
placements in a specific locale.
King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
As to Boss‟s character, it appears that her criminal history consists only of a
conviction for driving with a suspended license.5 She also expressed remorse during the
sentencing hearing. Moreover, the victims stated that they did not want anything bad to
happen to Boss, and the State recommended home detention. While we acknowledge the
victims‟ statements as well as the State‟s recommendation, and Boss‟s character
4
We do not address the concurrent sentences imposed on Counts 7 through 12 as we hereby vacate those
sentences.
5
The record does not include a pre-sentence investigation report.
12
notwithstanding, it is the nature of the offenses that is critical to our review of her
sentence.
As to Boss‟s offense, her failure to adequately restrain three dogs resulted in
catastrophic injuries to two people. Furthermore, the testimony presented indicates that
this was not the first occasion Boss‟s dogs ran loose. In light of these factors, we find
that Boss‟s sentence of one year in jail for each count of failure to restrain a dog is
appropriate.
4. Consecutive Sentences
Boss further asserts that her two one-year consecutive sentences violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 23 of the
Indiana Constitution because “she is not eligible to benefit from the consecutive
sentencing limitations of Indiana Code [section] 35-50-1-2.” Boss‟s Br. at 29. She
maintains that her total sentence for the six class A misdemeanor convictions should not
have exceeded one and one-half years, the advisory sentence for a class D felony. See
I.C. § 35-50-2-7.
Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(c) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of
imprisonment . . . to which the defendant is sentenced for felony
convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed
the advisory sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher
than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been
convicted.
(Emphasis added).
13
In Dunn v. State, 900 N.E.2d 1291, 1292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), this court held that
“[t]he clear and unambiguous language of Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(c) requires the
defendant to be sentenced for felony convictions in order to fall within its purview[.]”
Finding that Dunn had only misdemeanor convictions and failed to cite “other statutory,
constitutional, or common law restrictions on consecutive sentences for misdemeanor
offenses,” this court affirmed Dunn‟s sentence.
Again, Boss asserts a constitutional basis for reversing her sentence. We note,
however, that this court is not permitted to address a constitutional issue when we can
base our decision on any other statutory or common-law basis. Wright v. State, 668
N.E.2d 224, 226 n.4 (citing Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind.1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992)).
We recognize that Boss‟s convictions arose out of a single criminal episode.
Nonetheless, Boss‟s failure to restrain her dogs resulted in serious injuries to two separate
victims. Given that a single act resulted in separate harms to separate people, we cannot
say that Boss is entitled to a limit on her sentence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-
50-1-2. See, e.g., Vance v. State, 860 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding no
error in the imposition of consecutive sentences on the defendant‟s misdemeanor
convictions where a single act resulted in separate harms).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
BAKER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
14