Earl Arnold, Sr. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. ( 2012 )

FOR PUBLICATION FILED
Mar 27 2012, 9:16 am
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
RANDAL M. KLEZMER PAUL L. FIELDS
Klezmer Maudlin, P.C. The Law Offices of The Liberty
Indianapolis, Indiana Mutual Group
Carmel, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
EARL ARNOLD, SR., )
)
Appellant, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1109-EX-874
)
ROSE ACRE FARMS, INC., )
)
Appellee. )
APPEAL FROM THE INDIANA WORKER‟S COMPENSATION BOARD
The Honorable Linda P. Hamilton, Chairperson
Application No. C-192913
March 27, 2012
OPINION – FOR PUBLICATION
DARDEN, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Earl Arnold, Sr. (“Arnold”) appeals from the denial by the Worker‟s
Compensation Board of Indiana (“the Board”) of his claim under the Worker‟s
Compensation Act (“the Act”) alleging injuries arising out of and in the course of his
employment with Rose Acre Farms, Inc. (“Rose Acre”).
We affirm.
ISSUE
Whether the Board erred in concluding that Arnold did not sustain an injury
arising out of and in the course of his employment with Rose Acre.
FACTS
On June 25, 2006, Arnold was employed as a night security guard at Rose Acre‟s
Cortland facility. Arnold drove his automobile from his home to Rose Acre‟s location on
County Road 800 North (“the public road”). Arnold drove westbound on the public road
to a point in front of the gravel road that serves as the only entrance into Rose Acre‟s
Cortland facility.
As Arnold crossed the center line of the public road and entered the eastbound
lane in making his left-hand turn into the Rose Acre facility, his automobile was struck
by a pick-up truck. Although the collision occurred on the public road, the vehicles came
to rest partially in the public road and partially in Rose Acre‟s driveway. The collision
resulted in multiple injuries to Arnold, including broken bones and cognitive impairment.
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Arnold filed a claim with the Board alleging that the collision was an accident that
arose out of and in the course of his employment. After a hearing, a Single Hearing
Member made the following findings:
3. In general, for an accident to have occurred within the course of the
employment, an injury must occur during work and on the
employer‟s premises, and therefore, most injuries sustained in route
to or from the workplace are not covered under workers‟
compensation law.
4. Parking lots and employer owned driveways which provide ingress
and egress are considered an extension of the employer‟s premises
wherein an accident occurring in these locations is typically
considered in the course of employment.
5. An accident occurring on a public thoroughfare, where the general
public is exposed to the same risks as the employee, is not
considered in the course of the employment. When the accident is
not on the employer‟s premises, the Act only applies when there is
an increased risk or the employee is engaged in activities incidental
to the employment.
6. [Arnold‟s] accident did not occur on the employer‟s premises.
Additionally, [Arnold] did not meet his burden of showing that the
circumstances at the time of the accident created an increased risk
causally related to the employment.
7. [Arnold] argued that [his] view could have been obstructed by a
truck pulling out from the driveway of the employer causing an
increased risk. However, Arnold was unable to testify as to this fact
himself; the truck driver testified that he did not believe that
[Arnold‟s] view would have been obstructed, and the police report
which notes an obstructed view is hearsay evidence that cannot by
itself support a finding on this matter.
8. In conclusion, because [Arnold] was subject to the risks of the
general public and has been unable to show an increased risk, he was
not in the course of his employment at the time of his accident and
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therefore is not entitled to benefits or compensation under the
Indiana Worker‟s Compensation Act.
(App. 7-9) (citations omitted). The Full Board adopted the Single Hearing Member‟s
findings and conclusions as its own.
DECISION
When reviewing a decision made by the Worker‟s Compensation Board, we
neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. Obetkovski v.
Inland Steel Industries, 911 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. We
are bound by the factual determinations of the Board and may only consider errors in the
Board‟s conclusions. Id. While we are not bound by the Board‟s legal conclusions, we
will disturb the conclusions only if the Board incorrectly interpreted the Act. Id. In other
words, it is within our province to draw our own legal conclusions. Ag One Co-Op v.
Scott, 914 N.E.2d 860, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
The Act provides compensation for employees who suffer injuries that occur “by
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment . . . .” Ind. Code § 22-3-2-
2(a). “Arising out of” and “in the course of” are two separate and distinct elements: the
“arising out of” element refers to the causal connection between the accident and the
employment, while the “in the course of” element refers to the time, place, and
circumstances of the accident. Smith v. Bob Evans Farms, Inc., 754 N.E.2d 18, 24-25
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Both elements must be met before compensation is
awarded, and the person seeking compensation bears the burden of proving the elements.
Mueller v. Daimler Chrysler Motors Corp., 842 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
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In Global Construction, Inc. v. March, 813 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Ind. 2004), our
supreme court stated that “in general, to arise „in the course‟ of employment, an injury
must occur during work and on the employer‟s premises.” The court went on to express
the general rule that “most injuries sustained on route to or from the workplace are not
covered.” Id. (citing Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation
Law, § 13.01, at 13-3 (2004)). The rule “is grounded in recognition that injuries suffered
while going to or coming from work are essentially similar to other injuries suffered off
duty away from the employer‟s premises and, like those other injuries, are usually not
work related.” 82 Am. Jur. 2d Worker’s Compensation § 271 (2011) (citing Bruck v.
Glen Johnson, Inc., 418 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). Thus, “the hazards
encountered by an employee while going to or coming from the regular place of
employment are not ordinarily incidental to the employment since the employee is
exposed to dangers and risks to which all traveling persons are exposed.” 1 Modern
Workers Compensation § 111.1 (1993).
In Global, our supreme court cited Donahue v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 474
N.E.2d 1013, 1014 (Ind. 1985) as an example of the general rule. In Donahue, the Court
affirmed the denial by the Board of benefits for an injury an employee sustained on the
way home from work. The Court reasoned that the claimant had completed her duties
and clocked out and was crossing a public street when she was injured. The Court
explained that because the claimant was on a public street open to and used by members
of the general public, she was exposed to the same dangers as any member of the public
and her injury therefore fell outside of the employment relationship. Id. at 1016.
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The Global court also recognized that Indiana courts have developed exceptions to
the general rule. The court cited Reed v. Brown, 129 Ind. App. 75, 152 N.E.2d 257(1958), the primary case relied upon by Arnold, as an example of an exception to the
rule. The Court noted that in Reed, this court
early explained [that] “employment is not limited to the exact moment
when the workman reached the place where he is to begin his work, or to
the moment when he ceases that work. It necessarily includes a reasonable
amount of time and space before and after ceasing actual employment,
having in mind all the circumstances connected with the accident.”
Id. at 1167 (quoting Reed, 152 N.E.2d at 259) (citation omitted). The Court concluded
that under the reasoning in Reed “employer-controlled parking lots and private drives
used by employees have been held to be extensions of the employer‟s operating premises
for purposes of coverage under the Act.” Id. In Reed, we held that worker‟s
compensation coverage applied after the claimant entered the employer‟s premises and
was injured on a railroad easement that bisected the private drive on the employer‟s
property.
Arnold recognizes that the accident in the instant case did not occur in Rose
Acre‟s employer-controlled parking lot or private drive or on an easement bisecting Rose
Acre‟s property; however, he argues that the public road was an extension of Rose Acre‟s
operating premises. Specifically, he points to the stipulated evidence that Rose Acre‟s
property line “goes to approximately the center of the roadway and that the right of way
of the [public road] extends fifteen feet on each side of the center.” (Tr. 20). He also
points out that anyone going to Rose Acre‟s Cortland facility had to use the public road to
access Rose Acre‟s driveway. Arnold argues that because the gravel drive serving as
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Rose Acre‟s sole driveway ended at the public road, the road “was the sole ingress/egress
point for Rose Acre‟s employees to report to work, [and] both the eastbound and
westbound lanes in front of this entry point are premises used by Rose Acre‟s
employees.” Arnold‟s Br. at 10-11.
We cannot say that the Board erred in concluding that the public road was not part
of Rose Acre‟s premises for purposes of the Act. Although Rose Acre technically owned
the soil beneath the public road, it had no control over the use of the road as a public
thoroughfare. As the Donahue court held in denying worker‟s compensation coverage,
“[The claimant was injured while on a public road, and the hazards and dangers of his
accident were common to all persons using the public road since [the employer] had no
control over the use of the public right-of-way by either [the claimant] or the public at
large.” 474 N.E.2d at 1016. All persons using a public road experience the hazard
occasioned by a left hand turn against traffic. We reject Arnold‟s argument that the left-
hand turn into Rose Acre distinguished his use of the public road from the use made by
the public at large.
Arnold also argues that he is entitled to compensation under the reasoning of
Clemans v. Wishard Mem’l Hosp., 727 N.E.2d 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.
In Clemans, the employer owned the property on both sides of a public street and the
claimant, after completing her duties as an employee, was injured while crossing the
public street to get to the employer-owned parking garage. We held that Clemans was
entitled to worker‟s compensation because the injury did not occur while Clemans was a
member of the general public but as she crossed from her primary place of employment
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to the employer-provided parking garage. The holding in Clemans is consistent with a
second general rule that a claimant is eligible for worker‟s compensation benefits where
“the employee travels along or across a public road between two portions of the
employer‟s premises, whether going or coming, or pursuing other duties.” Larson, §
13.01(4) at 13-24. In short, Clemans is consistent with the rule that an employee is in
the course of employment when he is traveling from one part of the employer‟s premises
to another. It does not stand for the proposition that an employee may be eligible for
benefits from injuries occurring when traveling a public road from his home to his
employer‟s sole piece of property. Thus, Clemans does not support Arnold‟s position
that he was injured “in the course of” employment as he traveled to work on a public
road.
CONCLUSION
Arnold has failed to show that the Board erred in determining that he was not
injured in the course of his employment with Rose Acres.1
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
1
We make no determination as to whether Arnold‟s injuries “arose out of” his employment with Rose
Acres.
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