Matthew Weitzel v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
STEVEN KNECHT GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
ERIC P. BABBS
Deputy Attorney General
FILED
Indianapolis, Indiana
Feb 20 2012, 9:08 am
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
MATTHEW WEITZEL, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 08A05-1107-CR-336
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE CARROLL SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Kurtis G. Fouts, Judge
Cause No. 08D01-1004-FD-50
February 20, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge
Case Summary
Matthew Weitzel appeals his conviction for Class D felony possession of
methamphetamine. Weitzel contends there is insufficient evidence to support his
conviction because the State failed to prove that he had either actual or constructive
possession of the methamphetamine. The State sufficiently proved the elements of
possession of methamphetamine, including actual possession. We therefore affirm
Weitzel’s conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts most favorable to the verdict are that on April 21, 2010, a naked man
presumed to be Weitzel ran from the home of his father, Rick Weitzel (“Rick”), to the
neighboring property of Sharon Stevenson. Stevenson’s property had a detached garage
and a separate shed. Stevenson saw Weitzel run across her property and go behind the
shed. Charles Beck’s property was on the other side of Stevenson’s property, and he saw
Weitzel beside Stevenson’s garage. Next to the garage was a pile of clothing including a
pair of khaki shorts with a wallet containing Weitzel’s driver’s license and a prescription
bottle with Weitzel’s name on it. Beck saw Weitzel rummaging through the pile of
clothing and “pull[] something out of the clothes.” Tr. p. 17. Weitzel then ran to the
shed behind the garage and went inside the shed.
Stevenson called Rick and told him that someone from his house was naked and
running around her property. Rick came over and escorted his son, Weitzel, back to his
house. Beck called the Carroll County Sheriff’s Department to report the incident.
2
When the police arrived, an investigation revealed that there was a red metal
canister in a burrow underneath but still visible from outside the shed. The canister
contained a baggie with a whitish powdery substance that appeared to be
methamphetamine and later field-tested positive for methamphetamine.
Carroll County Sheriff’s Department Deputies Spencer Kingery and Tony Liggett
went to Rick’s house and spoke with Weitzel. Weitzel’s demeanor was described as
jittery and he had red, watery eyes and a blank stare. Id. at 23. Deputy Liggett asked
Weitzel when he had last used methamphetamine and Weitzel said it had been “at least
four or five hours ago.” Id. at 38.
The State charged Weitzel with Count I: Class D felony possession of
methamphetamine, Count II: Class C misdemeanor public nudity, and Count III: habitual
substance offender status. Count II was dismissed, and Count I was tried before a jury on
May 24, 2011. At the conclusion of the State’s case, Weitzel moved for a directed
verdict, that is, a judgment on the evidence, which was denied. Appellant’s App. p. 26.
The jury found Weitzel guilty of possession of methamphetamine.
A bench trial was held on Count III, and Weitzel moved for a “directed verdict,”
which the trial court granted.1 A sentencing hearing was held on June 22, 2011, and the
trial court sentenced Weitzel to three years in the Department of Correction. Id. at 42-43.
Weitzel now appeals.
1
We note that a motion for judgment on the evidence under Trial Rule 50 is improper at a bench
trial. Plesha v. Edmonds, 717 N.E.2d 981, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Because the habitual offender count
was tried before the court without a jury, Weitzel’s motion was a motion for involuntary dismissal under
Trial Rule 41. See id.3
Discussion and Decision
Our standard of review with regard to sufficiency claims is well settled. In
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this Court does not reweigh the evidence
or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bond v. State, 925 N.E.2d 773, 781 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We consider only the evidence most favorable
to the verdict and the reasonable inferences draw therefrom and affirm if the evidence
and those inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the
verdict. Id. Reversal is appropriate only when a reasonable trier of fact would not be
able to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.Class D felony possession of methamphetamine occurs when the defendant
“without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of the
practitioner’s professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses
methamphetamine (pure or adulterated) . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a). A conviction
for possession of contraband may rest upon proof of either actual or constructive
possession. Washington v. State, 902 N.E.2d 280, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.
denied. Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over the
substance, Walker v. State, 631 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), and that actual
possession does not need to exist at the exact time as the law enforcement’s discovery of
the contraband. Wilburn v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1098, 1101 (Ind. 1982). Constructive
possession, on the other hand, occurs when the defendant has both (1) the intent and (2)
the capability to maintain dominion and control over the subject contraband. Atwood v.
State, 905 N.E.2d 479, 484 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
4
Weitzel contends that the State failed to show that he had either actual or
constructive possession of the methamphetamine. Finding that the State provided
sufficient evidence of Weitzel’s actual possession of methamphetamine, we disagree.
The evidence at trial indicated that Weitzel had used and therefore possessed
methamphetamine earlier in the day, Tr. p. 38, and that when he was questioned by
police, his demeanor was “jittery,” he had red, watery eyes, and he had a blank stare. Id.
at 23. Additionally, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it was
also reasonable that the jury could infer that Weitzel was the naked man and that he did
have actual possession of the methamphetamine found beneath Stevenson’s shed.
Stevenson saw Weitzel go behind her shed where the methamphetamine was found, Beck
specifically saw Weitzel remove an object from the clothing beside the garage and run to
the shed, and the methamphetamine was found in a burrow beneath the shed. Id. at 17-
18, 60-61. Further, the pile of clothing found by the shed contained a prescription bottle
with Weitzel’s name on it, along with a wallet containing Weitzel’s driver’s license.
Taking all of this evidence together, the jury could reasonably infer that the
methamphetamine found was Weitzel’s and that he moved the methamphetamine from
his clothing to the shed.
This evidence is sufficient to support Weitzel’s conviction for possession of
methamphetamine. We therefore affirm the trial court.
Affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.
5